Aim of the session: To critically examine the literature on electoral systems (both as dependent and independent variables), to explore the factors affecting the emergence and transformation of electoral systems and to analyze the outcomes predicted by theories of electoral systems..
Discussion topics:
(a) What are the most important factors affecting the emergence and/or transformation of electoral systems? Which of the different theoretical approaches to this question do you find most convincing? Why?
(b) What are the most important consequences of electoral systems? Which of the different theoretical approaches to this question do you find most convincing? Why?
Readings:
(a) Electoral systems as dependent variables
· Boix, Carles (1999), ‘Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies’ APSR 93 (3): 609-624.
· Colomer Josep Maria (2005), ‘It’s Parties that Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger’s Law’s Upside Down)’. Political Studies 53:1–21.
· Cox, Gary (1997), Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems.
· Cusack, Thomas R., Iversen, Torben and Soskice, David (2007), ‘Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems’. American Political Science Review 101: 373-391.
· Rogowski, Ronald (1987), ‘Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions’. International
Organization 41: 203–24.
· Rokkan, Stein (1970), Citizens, Elections, Parties.
· Benoit, Kenneth (2007), ‘Electoral Laws as Political Consequences: Explaining the Origins and Change of Electoral Institutions’ Annual Review of Political Science 10: 363-90.
· Przeworkski, Adam, Susan Carol Stokes and Bernard Manin (1999), Democracy, Accountability
and Representation
(b) Electoral systems as independent variables
· Bawn, Kathleen, and Frances Rosenbluth (2006), ‘Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral
Accountability and the Size of the Government Sector’. American Journal of Political Science 50:
251–65.
· Cox, Gary. Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems. American Journal of Political Science, 1990, 34: 903-35.
· Duverger, Maurice (1963), Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State.
· Iversen, Torben, and Soskice, David (2006), ‘Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others’. American Political Science Review 100 (2): 165-191.
· Lijphart, Arend (1990), ‘The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws’ APSR 84 (2) pp 481-496.
· Powell, G Bingham (2000), Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Vision.
· Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (2004), The Economic Effects of Constitutions.
· Rogowski, Ronald, and Kayser, Mark Andreas (2002), ‘Majoritarian Electoral Systems and
Consumer Power’. American Journal of Political Science 46: 526-539.
· Rae, Douglas (1971), The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws.
· Taagepeera, Rein and Matthew Shugart (1989) Seats and Votes
· Sartori, Giovanni (2001), ‘The Party-Effects of Electoral Systems’, in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds), Political Parties and Democracy.
(more)
Thursday 5 November 2009
Milward (1992) The European Rescue of the Nation State
*Milward, Alan (1992), The European Rescue of the Nation-State
Available New College - P 1.5 MIL.
Notes. (more)
Available New College - P 1.5 MIL.
Notes. (more)
Nordlinger (1981) On the autonomy of the democratic state
Nordlinger, Eric (1981), On the Autonomy of the Democratic State
Available SSL - JC423.NOR .
And here is the rest of it. (more)
Available SSL - JC423.NOR .
And here is the rest of it. (more)
Evans et al (1985) Bringing the State Back In
Evans, Peter B et al eds (1985) Bringing the State Back In, esp Intro, Chs 2 & 4
Available New College - P 6.2 EVA
Chapter 2 - The State and Economic Transformation - Towards and Analysis of the conditions underlying effective intervention. (P. 44)
The classic interpretations of Polanyi and Gershenkron have brought the state to the fore of capitalist economic development.
Myth of the industrial revolution of a purely private process.
States affect the form and rate of cpaital accumulation and affect whether negative distributional effects will be mitigated or exacerbated.
Even narrowest neoclassic model has room for the state. Market requires a strong set of normative underpinnings to function at all (Durkheim). Need for effective institutionalised guarantees of these - otherwise transactions costs will be exhorbitant.
(Ostrom, protecting the commons?)
Class argument - dominant class that has no interest in transforming the means of production - split between this class and the state apparatus. Realist theory of IR - states need to attain economic development to defend themselves against their neighbours - state managers are incentivised to conflict with the dominant class.
(45)
In monopoly capitalist economies where industries are mainly oligopolies - theoretical justification for relying on market signals to promote capital accumulation fades.
Relax assumption of competitive market - competition is no longer possible to both stimulate and discipline entrepreneurship.
(46)
If distribution is an issue, role of an extra market actor is clear cut.
Not falling into the "functionalist trap" of assuming that because the state is "necessary" is will therefore have the inclination and capacity to fulfil its required role.
Outline of the approach (p. 47)
They use a Weberian definition of the state - set of organisations invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people in a particular territory.
Cardoso: we cannot see the state just as an expression of class interests - since it cannot be other than a social network of people, it therefore has interests of its own and exists in its own right.
Coherent state action is the concern of state elites.
State's ability to act in a coherent way is strictly circumscribed by it's simultaneously an arena of social conflict. Unless social domination is monolithic - state apparatuses will inevitably become arenas of social conflict
[these are theories of state action/basis of a theory at least]
State's claim to being the guardian of the universal interests of society can contradict its role as an autonomous corporate actor.
(48)
The efficacy of the state will always depend on the pattern in which these contradictory tendencies are combined, both in internal structure and in relation to the social structure as a whole.
(49)
The state must acquire relative autonomy from the dominant social class in order to promote economic transformation effectively. The same idea is found in Marxist, classic pluralist and state-centric approaches.
Discussion focusses on the social structural conditions likely to promote autonomy.
They argue against seeing these factors as mutually reinforcing - state's success in building its role as a corporate actor may undercut its ability to remain autonomous and effective intervention may increase the extent to which the state becomes an arena of social conflict
[draw in Nordlinger's theories of state autonomy - is the state autonomous when it can formulate its own preferences or does it have to be able to actually enact them as well. Could the state by strong but not autonomous? - criticism of the theory here).
State structure and the capacity to intervene (p. 50)
Classic answer: Weber - bureaucratic organisation is the most efficient form of organising large scale administrative activities. Weber's ideal type - corporate cohesion of the organisation, differentiation and insulation from its social environment, unambiguous location of decision making and channels of authority, internal rationality and activism.
To engage in economic transformation, workings of this machinery must link up with workings of the market. [to engage the state must have an appropriate relationship with the 5 spheres of partial democracy, otherwise it won't have legitimacy/influence in all of these spheres, it will harm its capability. Rueschemeyer and Evens are focussing on the economic arena - or market sphere as they call it).
(51) Constructing bureaucratic machinery
Effective process of institution building must reshape the goals, priorities, and commitments of core participants and inculcate shared assumptions and expectations on which a common rationality can be based.
Growth of a distinctive esprit de corps among pivotal civil servants is an essential aspect of this process. Such institutional constructions may require decades or generations to become established.
State elites may not be able to intervene in the way they wish if the bureaucratic machinery cannot be created in time. (see footnote 15 p. 73)
(52)
State formation may be as much a result of luck, external factors rather than planning. E.g. S. Korea's institutions were founded on those built by Japan when under occupation.
Organisations cannot easily switch or expand into other fields of action - inflexibility.
(52)
Classic argument for state managers having a different perspective than the dominant class is their removal from concern with short run profit considerations. Potential for a distinctive outlook remains an important aspect of state structure - crucial for its ability to realise its role as a corporate actor.
Organisational capacity and distributional policies
State structure: implications and conclusions (P. 59)
Building the non-bureaucratic foundations of bureaucratic functioning - non instrumental sources of cohesion. Cannot be laid ad hoc. Historical chapter must be taken into account in any attempt to explain its capacity or lack of capacity to intervene.
[how do we measure scope of intervention, goals?]
A large amount of political independence is required for the administrative units rather than just administrative independence. This invites attempts to capture these units by societal groups.
State action and class relations (p. 60)
Conclusions (P. 68)
Some of the competing interests in economy and society, even the structurally dominant ones, will have to be sacrificed in order to achieve systematically required "collective goods" that cannot be provided by partial interests.
[can bring in the example of Japan as mentioned by Moore/Skocpol whereby the state used a situation of national emergency to overrule the dominant class interests).
Mutual reinforcement between state intervention and state autonomy/corporate cohesion occurs and often predominates.
Having more resources under state control diminishes the state's reliance on privately generated resources and thereby increases autonomy.
State's claim to being a guardian of universal interests becomes problematic when some social agents view its interventions as being wilful and particularistic. Deeper interventions can undermine one of the main bases from which state managers can claim autonomy if legitimacy is questioned.
(70)
Specific outcomes cannot be predicted by an overarching theory of capitalism nor do they follow an all embracing logic of industrial society. They must be viewed as complexly contingent explicable on by the basis of careful comparative historical research.
Chapter 4 - Weir and Skocpol - State structures and the possibilities for Keynesian responses to the great depression in Sweden, Britain and the US (p. 107)
(Introduction)
Keynesian era of the 1930s in honour of Keynes's 1936 book The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.
Sweden and the US were the sites of the boldest responses to the crisis by reformist political leaderships. Supported electorally by industrial workers and farmers, both embarked on programmes of deficit government spending to provide emergency relief, create public works projects jobs, and enhance popular social security.
(108)
Liberal platform to reduce unemployment called for a large scale programme of loan financed public works,
Conclusion (p. 148)
The Great Depression opened new possibilities for the state in capitalist liberal democracies to become the active agent of societal welfare through a synthesis of social spending and macroeconomic management.
Depended on emergence of new ideas about the management of capitalist economies, a shift in political power that strengthened organised labour, socially rooted coalitions politically willing and able to support deficit spending policies.
[draw the distinction between the government and the state]
Such factors were not sufficient to account for national policy choices. Political parties defined their goals in the 1930s in close relationship to existing policies and capacities of the states with which they were dealing.
The political coalitions of social groups willing to support deficit spending programmes gained leverage only through state structures and came together or broke apart partially in response to the sequence and effects of state policies themselves.
Several comparative observations worth turning into questions for further exploration:
Swedish economists achieved their policy impact without first forging a striking new grand theory. And without clothing their econoic presciptions in politically partisan and conflictual prescriptions.
Early and sustained access to administratively strategic centres of public policy made it possible for Swedish economists to produce effective intellectual justifications for state sponsored reforms in this relatively atheoretical and non conflictual mode.
The organisational structure of the British state in the 1920s influenced Keynes's theories which then influenced everything that followed. Random outcome...
(more)
Available New College - P 6.2 EVA
Chapter 2 - The State and Economic Transformation - Towards and Analysis of the conditions underlying effective intervention. (P. 44)
The classic interpretations of Polanyi and Gershenkron have brought the state to the fore of capitalist economic development.
Myth of the industrial revolution of a purely private process.
States affect the form and rate of cpaital accumulation and affect whether negative distributional effects will be mitigated or exacerbated.
Even narrowest neoclassic model has room for the state. Market requires a strong set of normative underpinnings to function at all (Durkheim). Need for effective institutionalised guarantees of these - otherwise transactions costs will be exhorbitant.
(Ostrom, protecting the commons?)
Class argument - dominant class that has no interest in transforming the means of production - split between this class and the state apparatus. Realist theory of IR - states need to attain economic development to defend themselves against their neighbours - state managers are incentivised to conflict with the dominant class.
(45)
In monopoly capitalist economies where industries are mainly oligopolies - theoretical justification for relying on market signals to promote capital accumulation fades.
Relax assumption of competitive market - competition is no longer possible to both stimulate and discipline entrepreneurship.
(46)
If distribution is an issue, role of an extra market actor is clear cut.
Not falling into the "functionalist trap" of assuming that because the state is "necessary" is will therefore have the inclination and capacity to fulfil its required role.
Outline of the approach (p. 47)
They use a Weberian definition of the state - set of organisations invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people in a particular territory.
Cardoso: we cannot see the state just as an expression of class interests - since it cannot be other than a social network of people, it therefore has interests of its own and exists in its own right.
Coherent state action is the concern of state elites.
State's ability to act in a coherent way is strictly circumscribed by it's simultaneously an arena of social conflict. Unless social domination is monolithic - state apparatuses will inevitably become arenas of social conflict
[these are theories of state action/basis of a theory at least]
State's claim to being the guardian of the universal interests of society can contradict its role as an autonomous corporate actor.
(48)
The efficacy of the state will always depend on the pattern in which these contradictory tendencies are combined, both in internal structure and in relation to the social structure as a whole.
(49)
The state must acquire relative autonomy from the dominant social class in order to promote economic transformation effectively. The same idea is found in Marxist, classic pluralist and state-centric approaches.
Discussion focusses on the social structural conditions likely to promote autonomy.
They argue against seeing these factors as mutually reinforcing - state's success in building its role as a corporate actor may undercut its ability to remain autonomous and effective intervention may increase the extent to which the state becomes an arena of social conflict
[draw in Nordlinger's theories of state autonomy - is the state autonomous when it can formulate its own preferences or does it have to be able to actually enact them as well. Could the state by strong but not autonomous? - criticism of the theory here).
State structure and the capacity to intervene (p. 50)
Classic answer: Weber - bureaucratic organisation is the most efficient form of organising large scale administrative activities. Weber's ideal type - corporate cohesion of the organisation, differentiation and insulation from its social environment, unambiguous location of decision making and channels of authority, internal rationality and activism.
To engage in economic transformation, workings of this machinery must link up with workings of the market. [to engage the state must have an appropriate relationship with the 5 spheres of partial democracy, otherwise it won't have legitimacy/influence in all of these spheres, it will harm its capability. Rueschemeyer and Evens are focussing on the economic arena - or market sphere as they call it).
(51) Constructing bureaucratic machinery
Effective process of institution building must reshape the goals, priorities, and commitments of core participants and inculcate shared assumptions and expectations on which a common rationality can be based.
Growth of a distinctive esprit de corps among pivotal civil servants is an essential aspect of this process. Such institutional constructions may require decades or generations to become established.
State elites may not be able to intervene in the way they wish if the bureaucratic machinery cannot be created in time. (see footnote 15 p. 73)
(52)
State formation may be as much a result of luck, external factors rather than planning. E.g. S. Korea's institutions were founded on those built by Japan when under occupation.
Organisations cannot easily switch or expand into other fields of action - inflexibility.
(52)
Classic argument for state managers having a different perspective than the dominant class is their removal from concern with short run profit considerations. Potential for a distinctive outlook remains an important aspect of state structure - crucial for its ability to realise its role as a corporate actor.
Organisational capacity and distributional policies
State structure: implications and conclusions (P. 59)
Building the non-bureaucratic foundations of bureaucratic functioning - non instrumental sources of cohesion. Cannot be laid ad hoc. Historical chapter must be taken into account in any attempt to explain its capacity or lack of capacity to intervene.
[how do we measure scope of intervention, goals?]
A large amount of political independence is required for the administrative units rather than just administrative independence. This invites attempts to capture these units by societal groups.
State action and class relations (p. 60)
Conclusions (P. 68)
Some of the competing interests in economy and society, even the structurally dominant ones, will have to be sacrificed in order to achieve systematically required "collective goods" that cannot be provided by partial interests.
[can bring in the example of Japan as mentioned by Moore/Skocpol whereby the state used a situation of national emergency to overrule the dominant class interests).
Mutual reinforcement between state intervention and state autonomy/corporate cohesion occurs and often predominates.
Having more resources under state control diminishes the state's reliance on privately generated resources and thereby increases autonomy.
State's claim to being a guardian of universal interests becomes problematic when some social agents view its interventions as being wilful and particularistic. Deeper interventions can undermine one of the main bases from which state managers can claim autonomy if legitimacy is questioned.
(70)
Specific outcomes cannot be predicted by an overarching theory of capitalism nor do they follow an all embracing logic of industrial society. They must be viewed as complexly contingent explicable on by the basis of careful comparative historical research.
Chapter 4 - Weir and Skocpol - State structures and the possibilities for Keynesian responses to the great depression in Sweden, Britain and the US (p. 107)
(Introduction)
Keynesian era of the 1930s in honour of Keynes's 1936 book The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.
Sweden and the US were the sites of the boldest responses to the crisis by reformist political leaderships. Supported electorally by industrial workers and farmers, both embarked on programmes of deficit government spending to provide emergency relief, create public works projects jobs, and enhance popular social security.
(108)
Liberal platform to reduce unemployment called for a large scale programme of loan financed public works,
Conclusion (p. 148)
The Great Depression opened new possibilities for the state in capitalist liberal democracies to become the active agent of societal welfare through a synthesis of social spending and macroeconomic management.
Depended on emergence of new ideas about the management of capitalist economies, a shift in political power that strengthened organised labour, socially rooted coalitions politically willing and able to support deficit spending policies.
[draw the distinction between the government and the state]
Such factors were not sufficient to account for national policy choices. Political parties defined their goals in the 1930s in close relationship to existing policies and capacities of the states with which they were dealing.
The political coalitions of social groups willing to support deficit spending programmes gained leverage only through state structures and came together or broke apart partially in response to the sequence and effects of state policies themselves.
Several comparative observations worth turning into questions for further exploration:
Swedish economists achieved their policy impact without first forging a striking new grand theory. And without clothing their econoic presciptions in politically partisan and conflictual prescriptions.
Early and sustained access to administratively strategic centres of public policy made it possible for Swedish economists to produce effective intellectual justifications for state sponsored reforms in this relatively atheoretical and non conflictual mode.
The organisational structure of the British state in the 1920s influenced Keynes's theories which then influenced everything that followed. Random outcome...
(more)
MT09 - Week 5 reading list - The State in Comparative Politics
Aim of the session: Despite the central role states occupy in our lives and in the political science literature, there is remarkably little agreement on how powerful the state actually is and what the state should actually do. This session aims to explore different models of state-society relations, and to understand variations in types of state across time and political systems..
Discussion topics:
(a) What is, and what is not, the state? How can we model state-society rela tions? How can we assess or measure state ‘capacity’ in comparative analysis, to trace how it is changing? Does it make sense to distinguish between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states? (or ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ states?)?
(b) Is state power increasing or declining? Is it paradoxical that some political scientists argue for
‘bringing the state back in’ just when others are suggesting that globalization means state power is declining? Is there clear evidence of a general decline in state capacity and if so for what types of state, if any, is such a decline to be regretted?
Readings:
(a) State Capacity
· Almond, Gabriel (1988), ‘Return to the State’ American Political Science Review 82: 853-74.
· Dyson, Kenneth (1980), The State Tradition in Western Europe. Contrast with Laborde, Cécile
(2000) ‘The Concept of the State in British and French Political Thought’ Political Studies 48 (3):
540-57.
· Evans, Peter B et al eds (1985) Bringing the State Back In, esp Intro, Chs 2 & 4.
· Krasner, Stephen (1984), ‘Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical
Dynamics’ Comparative Politics 16: 223-46.
· *Levi, Margaret (1988), Of Rule and Revenue (Ch 2).
· Migdal, Joel (1988), Strong Societies and Weak States, Ch 1. (See p.4 for an enumeration of state capacities).
· *Nettl, J Peter (1968), ‘The State as a Conceptual Variable’ World Politics 20 (4) 559-592.
· North, Douglass (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History: 20-32. (Also compare with his more recent Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance).
· Nordlinger, Eric (1981), On the Autonomy of the Democratic State.
· *Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirit’ of Capitalism and Other Writings. (Compare
with Karl Marx’s Das Kapital).
(b) State Power & State Failure
· Bates, Roger (2008), When Things Fall Apart.
· Berger, Suzanne (2000), ‘Globalization and Politics’ Annual Review of Politics Science 3: 43-62.
· Cerny, Philip (1997), ‘Paradoxes of the Competitive State: The Dynamics of Political
Globalization’ Government and Opposition 32 (2): 251-74.
· *Geertz, C ed (1969), Old Societies and New States.
· Held, David and Anthony McGrew eds (2000), The Global Transformations Reader, Ch 11.
(This is a good introduction to the globalization debate, especially the Intro and Chs 7 & 12).
· Herbst, Jeffrey (2000), States and Power in Africa, Intro.
· Majone, Giandomenico (1997), ‘From the Positive to the Regulatory State’ Jrnl Public Policy 17:
139-67.
· *Milward, Alan (1992), The European Rescue of the Nation-State.
· Strange, Susan (1996), The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy.
· Weiss, Linda (1998), The Myth of the Powerless State.
· Woods, Ngaire ed. (2000), The Political Economy of Globalization, Chs 1 & 5.. (more)
Discussion topics:
(a) What is, and what is not, the state? How can we model state-society rela tions? How can we assess or measure state ‘capacity’ in comparative analysis, to trace how it is changing? Does it make sense to distinguish between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states? (or ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ states?)?
(b) Is state power increasing or declining? Is it paradoxical that some political scientists argue for
‘bringing the state back in’ just when others are suggesting that globalization means state power is declining? Is there clear evidence of a general decline in state capacity and if so for what types of state, if any, is such a decline to be regretted?
Readings:
(a) State Capacity
· Almond, Gabriel (1988), ‘Return to the State’ American Political Science Review 82: 853-74.
· Dyson, Kenneth (1980), The State Tradition in Western Europe. Contrast with Laborde, Cécile
(2000) ‘The Concept of the State in British and French Political Thought’ Political Studies 48 (3):
540-57.
· Evans, Peter B et al eds (1985) Bringing the State Back In, esp Intro, Chs 2 & 4.
· Krasner, Stephen (1984), ‘Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical
Dynamics’ Comparative Politics 16: 223-46.
· *Levi, Margaret (1988), Of Rule and Revenue (Ch 2).
· Migdal, Joel (1988), Strong Societies and Weak States, Ch 1. (See p.4 for an enumeration of state capacities).
· *Nettl, J Peter (1968), ‘The State as a Conceptual Variable’ World Politics 20 (4) 559-592.
· North, Douglass (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History: 20-32. (Also compare with his more recent Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance).
· Nordlinger, Eric (1981), On the Autonomy of the Democratic State.
· *Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirit’ of Capitalism and Other Writings. (Compare
with Karl Marx’s Das Kapital).
(b) State Power & State Failure
· Bates, Roger (2008), When Things Fall Apart.
· Berger, Suzanne (2000), ‘Globalization and Politics’ Annual Review of Politics Science 3: 43-62.
· Cerny, Philip (1997), ‘Paradoxes of the Competitive State: The Dynamics of Political
Globalization’ Government and Opposition 32 (2): 251-74.
· *Geertz, C ed (1969), Old Societies and New States.
· Held, David and Anthony McGrew eds (2000), The Global Transformations Reader, Ch 11.
(This is a good introduction to the globalization debate, especially the Intro and Chs 7 & 12).
· Herbst, Jeffrey (2000), States and Power in Africa, Intro.
· Majone, Giandomenico (1997), ‘From the Positive to the Regulatory State’ Jrnl Public Policy 17:
139-67.
· *Milward, Alan (1992), The European Rescue of the Nation-State.
· Strange, Susan (1996), The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy.
· Weiss, Linda (1998), The Myth of the Powerless State.
· Woods, Ngaire ed. (2000), The Political Economy of Globalization, Chs 1 & 5.. (more)
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