ADD
American Inst
VHL OpenShelf JK 1991 .F57 2006 Available
Notes.
(more)
Thursday 25 February 2010
Brookings Institution Press - Financing the 2008 Election: Assessing Reform
Financing the 2008 Election: Assessing Reform (Paperback)
~ Anthony Corrado (Editor), David B. Magleby (Editor)
Available - Amazon Link
# Paperback: 240 pages
# Publisher: Brookings Institution Press (January 2010)
# Language: English
# ISBN-10: 0815703325
# ISBN-13: 978-0815703327
Notes. (more)
~ Anthony Corrado (Editor), David B. Magleby (Editor)
Available - Amazon Link
# Paperback: 240 pages
# Publisher: Brookings Institution Press (January 2010)
# Language: English
# ISBN-10: 0815703325
# ISBN-13: 978-0815703327
Notes. (more)
Campaign Finance - implied threats and implied bribes
Another approach to looking at the effect of money that isn't spent directly.
Implied Threat - since Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission can the threat of issue ads change actions of legislators/candidates?
Implied Bribe - what do legislators do after they leave office? Does this give them skewed incentives? (more)
Implied Threat - since Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission can the threat of issue ads change actions of legislators/candidates?
Implied Bribe - what do legislators do after they leave office? Does this give them skewed incentives? (more)
Gais (1998) Improper Influence
Improper influence : campaign finance law, political interest groups, and the problem of equality / Thomas Gais.
Publisher Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, c1998
American Inst
VHL OpenShelf KF 4920 .G35 1998 Available
Notes. (more)
Publisher Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, c1998
American Inst
VHL OpenShelf KF 4920 .G35 1998 Available
Notes. (more)
Biersack, Herrnson and Wilcox (1999) After the Revolution
After the revolution : PACs, lobbies, and the Republican Congress / Robert Biersack, Paul S. Herrnson, Clyde Wilcox, general editors.
Available - American Inst
VHL OpenShelf JK 1991 .A66 1999
Notes. (more)
Available - American Inst
VHL OpenShelf JK 1991 .A66 1999
Notes. (more)
Baron (1994) Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters
Electoral Competition with Informed and Uniformed Voters
Author(s): David P. Baron
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 33-47
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944880
Available - Google Docs
Formal analysis based on candidates designing policies to sell policies to interest groups to generate funds to appeal to uninformed voters, and choosing policies that appeal to informed voters.
Cited by: http://www.jstor.org/stable/info/2944880?seq=1&type=cite (more)
Author(s): David P. Baron
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 33-47
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944880
Available - Google Docs
Formal analysis based on candidates designing policies to sell policies to interest groups to generate funds to appeal to uninformed voters, and choosing policies that appeal to informed voters.
Cited by: http://www.jstor.org/stable/info/2944880?seq=1&type=cite (more)
Austen-Smith (1995) Campaign Contributions and Access
Campaign Contributions and Access
Author(s): David Austen-Smith
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Sep., 1995), pp. 566-581
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082974
Goes through the 3 theories of campaign contributions and access.
Predicated on the idea that congressmen genuinely do have their own preferences and so PACs merely gain a chance to state their case in front of sympathetic legislators with consistent preferences. It is about providing information rather than changing prefs.
How is this measure of preferences made?
// Read this piece - overview of theoretical literature based on formal analysis
Is access what's important? (more)
Author(s): David Austen-Smith
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Sep., 1995), pp. 566-581
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082974
Goes through the 3 theories of campaign contributions and access.
Predicated on the idea that congressmen genuinely do have their own preferences and so PACs merely gain a chance to state their case in front of sympathetic legislators with consistent preferences. It is about providing information rather than changing prefs.
How is this measure of preferences made?
// Read this piece - overview of theoretical literature based on formal analysis
Is access what's important? (more)
Coleman and Manna (2000) Campaign Spending and the Quality of Democracy
Congressional Campaign Spending and the Quality of Democracy
Author(s): John J. Coleman and Paul F. Manna
Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Aug., 2000), pp. 757-789
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science
Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647959
Their result is that more spending does have some positive outcomes, based on survey data of various types of political attitudes. Based on 1994-1996 House Elections only.
How they state their claim "Despite the concerns of reformers, we find that campaign spending produces generally beneficial effects. Campaign spending contributes importantly to key aspects of democracy and political community such as knowledge and affect, while not damaging public trust or involvement."
Did they get the direction of causation right? Need to check that higher spending not a result of higher contributions which is a result of higher levels of all these variables... (more)
Author(s): John J. Coleman and Paul F. Manna
Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Aug., 2000), pp. 757-789
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science
Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647959
Their result is that more spending does have some positive outcomes, based on survey data of various types of political attitudes. Based on 1994-1996 House Elections only.
How they state their claim "Despite the concerns of reformers, we find that campaign spending produces generally beneficial effects. Campaign spending contributes importantly to key aspects of democracy and political community such as knowledge and affect, while not damaging public trust or involvement."
Did they get the direction of causation right? Need to check that higher spending not a result of higher contributions which is a result of higher levels of all these variables... (more)
Bonneau (2007) The Effects of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections
The Effects of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections
Author(s): Chris W. Bonneau
Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 489-499
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4623847
Available - PDF
Conclusion is that spending more money helps the challenger, not the incumbent
The incumbent already has free publicity so spending more money doesn't help (as much)
Argument therefore that limiting campaign contributions (for state supreme court judges) would serve to increase incumbency advantage (more)
Author(s): Chris W. Bonneau
Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 489-499
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4623847
Available - PDF
Conclusion is that spending more money helps the challenger, not the incumbent
The incumbent already has free publicity so spending more money doesn't help (as much)
Argument therefore that limiting campaign contributions (for state supreme court judges) would serve to increase incumbency advantage (more)
Artes Vinuela (2007) Campaign spending and office seeking motivations
Campaign spending and office-seeking motivations: an
empirical analysis
Available - http://www.springerlink.com/content/k705751136445576/fulltext.pdf
Campaign spending per capita increases with stakes for winner (measured by appointment power of office).
campaign spending per capita increases with the level of self-government of the region. Our results concord with those reported for other countries with very different systems of campaign funding
// So people spend more to win more important races. Hardly surprising. Suggests actors believe in a link between campaign spending and vote share. Would go against rational choice view that policy is all that matters.
(more)
empirical analysis
Available - http://www.springerlink.com/content/k705751136445576/fulltext.pdf
Campaign spending per capita increases with stakes for winner (measured by appointment power of office).
campaign spending per capita increases with the level of self-government of the region. Our results concord with those reported for other countries with very different systems of campaign funding
// So people spend more to win more important races. Hardly surprising. Suggests actors believe in a link between campaign spending and vote share. Would go against rational choice view that policy is all that matters.
(more)
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