Baohui Zhang, ‘Corporatism, Totalitarianism and the Transition to Democracy’, Comparative Political Studies, vol 27, 1, 1994
Available - PDF Link
Notes.
(more)
Wednesday 11 November 2009
Pye (1990) Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism
Lucian Pye, 'Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism', American Political Science Review, 84, 1990
Available - PDF Link
Notes (more)
Available - PDF Link
Notes (more)
Huntingdon (1991) How Countries Democratise
Samuel Huntington, 'How Countries Democratise', Political Science Quarterly, 106:4, 1991-92
Available - PDF Link
Notes. (more)
Available - PDF Link
Notes. (more)
Higley (1989) The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns
John Higley, ‘The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns’, American Sociological Review, vol. 54, pp 17-32
Available - PDF Link
Notes. (more)
Available - PDF Link
Notes. (more)
Dogan and Higley (1998) Elites Crises and the Origins of Regimes
Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds), Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).
Available: SSL - JC330.ELI
Chapter 1 available PDF
Chapter 2 - Historical and theoretical conditions (Alan Knight).
(30)
What exactly is a "crisis"? Difficult to identify empirically and is vulnerable to ex post facto rationalisations. We see crises when and where we want to. Even though Dogan and Higley do formulate a narrow political conception involving an event or series of events that over a short time period (days or weaks) that destroy or drastically weaken a regime's equilibrium and effectiveness.
Chapter 3 - Political crises and elite settlements (Burton and Higley)
(64)
There is a disagreement here with Knight who argues that it is at times of crisis when elites are weakest. Knight has identified some situations where elite control was limited or absent. They regard this as supporting their theory; elites lost control because they were disunited. In none of these cases was there an elite settlement.
Knight is not the first scholar to speculate that elite settlements are largely epiphenemonal outcomes of structural class struggles or cultural evolutions. Marxists see the 1689 elite settlement in Britain as solidifying the landed class's hold on power.
(65)
The thesis that because of a unique political crisis English elites alone reached a settlement during the early modern period is more parsimonious, less disembodied, and accords better with the conclusions of historians who have studied the period closely. There was a similar class system in other European countries but no specific settlements reached so the marxist explanation is less compelling.
A general shortcoming of class centred structural frameworks is that classes and other large collectivities are never actors; nor are states.
(more)
Available: SSL - JC330.ELI
Chapter 1 available PDF
Chapter 2 - Historical and theoretical conditions (Alan Knight).
(30)
What exactly is a "crisis"? Difficult to identify empirically and is vulnerable to ex post facto rationalisations. We see crises when and where we want to. Even though Dogan and Higley do formulate a narrow political conception involving an event or series of events that over a short time period (days or weaks) that destroy or drastically weaken a regime's equilibrium and effectiveness.
Chapter 3 - Political crises and elite settlements (Burton and Higley)
(64)
There is a disagreement here with Knight who argues that it is at times of crisis when elites are weakest. Knight has identified some situations where elite control was limited or absent. They regard this as supporting their theory; elites lost control because they were disunited. In none of these cases was there an elite settlement.
Knight is not the first scholar to speculate that elite settlements are largely epiphenemonal outcomes of structural class struggles or cultural evolutions. Marxists see the 1689 elite settlement in Britain as solidifying the landed class's hold on power.
(65)
The thesis that because of a unique political crisis English elites alone reached a settlement during the early modern period is more parsimonious, less disembodied, and accords better with the conclusions of historians who have studied the period closely. There was a similar class system in other European countries but no specific settlements reached so the marxist explanation is less compelling.
A general shortcoming of class centred structural frameworks is that classes and other large collectivities are never actors; nor are states.
(more)
Higley and Gunther (1991) Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America
John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1991) ch. 1.
Available SSL - HN110.5.Z9.ELI or New College P 2.3 HIG .
Preface - they take the view that another book on democratisation is necessary because there is room for further work at the theoretical and intepretive level.
The country studies in the existing literature focus on consolidation within individual countries rather than emergence. Transitions may be triggered by a wide variety of events and the course may vary from case to case.
They aim to take a systematic view focussing on the role of elites in democratic transitions.
O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) see elite pacts as crucial to transition from authoritarian rule.
Politics as bargaining rather than politics as war (Sartori 1987)
Argue that there is widespread agreement about elite precondition for consolidated democracy.
In independent authoritarian states, elite transformation carried out by elites themselves are the main possibly only route to democratic consolidation. Elite transformations from disunity to consensual unity must occur- through elite settlement or elite convergence.
Chapter 1: Introduction - elite transformations and democratic regimes.
(1)
"ideal-type" definitions of democracy, they offer a few, they are "demanding"
We cannot be too rigid in conceiving of democracy in procedural terms
They reject the substantive conception of measuring democracy by political and social outcomes.
(3)
Consolidated regimes
definition: regime that meets all the procedural criteria of democracy and in which all politically significant groups agree/adhere to the democratic rules of the game (an ideal type)
"a process of adaption/freezing of democratic norms, that come to be accepted as legitimate by part or all of civil society" (Morlino, 1986, p. 210)
definition Analytically consolidated regimes encompass specific elite and mass features. All important elite groups and factions share a consensus about rules and codes of political conduct and the worth of political institutions. what's "important"?
and Extensive mass participation in elections with no groups systematically left out
So it doesn't have to be durable, systemic, what if one of the important elites changed their mind? maybe there should have to be some sort of equilibrium or incentive for them not to do so
Where elites are not in consensus about the democratic rules of the game but procedural democracy exists, they call it unconsolidated democracy.
Stable limited democracies have elite consensus but poor participation.
Pseudo democracies - elections but with little elite competition and/or mass intimidation
(7)
Consolidation should be operationalised in such a way that it is not tautological, i.e. not just based on the length of the regime's survival
Public statements from elites (particularly at a time a new constitution is being drafted and ratified) can give an indication of elite consensus. this seems very subjective...
Antisystem parties with consistently high levels of support demonstrate lack of consolidation. May try to subvert existing institutions or vote against a democratic constitution.
(8)
Elites, definition: persons who are able to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially. again a very subjective definition
The key decision makers in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, cultural organisations and movements.
Large countries e.g. US/Soviet Union there may be >10,000 elites. Quite small countries e.g. Portugal <1000 style="font-style: italic;">We are thinking about elites, conceptualising this variable, on the basis of individuals. Should we be thinking about groups or organisations instead? What if elite organisations are bounded by strong constitutions?
Elites relevant to democratic transitions are in opposition to authoritarian regimes. Unless (spontaneous) outbursts are directed by acknowledged leaders and are organised, popular outbursts usually dissipate or are promtly suppressed.
Important variable: protest groups require an "acknowledged and organised" set of elites, either within or without the authoritarian regime.
Unorganised forces are unlikely to establish a stable democracy even if successful in toppling a regime.
Democratic stability depends on agreements that can be struck only among elites which then need to impose these agreements on their followers and gain support for them.
(10)
Types of elites
Structural integration and value consensus are the two dimensions of elite functioning.
Disunified elite - struct integ and val consens are minimal.
Consensually unified elite - the 2 dimensions are relatively inclusive
They tend to perceive politics as positive sum or politics as bargaining (Sartori 1987)
Share an underlying consensus about rules of the game and worth of democratic institutions
Reduces the cost of political defeat (incentive structure)
Ideologically unified elite - structural integration and value consensus are monolithic (totalitarian)
Emergence of democracy takes place when elite transformations occur. Settlement and convergence.
(13)
Elite settlement
Elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganise their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements (Burton and Higley 1987)
Can create patterns of peaceful and open competition between elites (basis for a stable limited democracy)
Can facilitate emergence of a consolidated democracy (though no guarantee)
Two sets of circumstances foster elite settlements:
Prior conflict with both sides suffering heavy losses. Involves situation of uncertainty and/or situation where fighting is more costly than conceding some powers.
Major crisis that threatened the resumption of widespread violence.
Elite cooperation had to be sustained and there were usually some elites seeking to undercut any agreement. Do we know systematically why such elite pacts were signed? Must be about beliefs and incentives but it is difficult to translate this to reality.
(18)
Feature of elite settlements was the predominance of experienced political leaders rather than "new men". Again adds colour but is hardly a systematic approach
At the time elites reached settlements in England, Sweden, Columbia and Venezuela, their countries were at a relatively low level of socio-economic development.
England and Sweden were predominantly agrarian societies. Neither Col or Venez were highly industrialised. Suggests that the national elites enjoyed considerable autonomy from mass followings and pressures. Elites could be more dynamic in forging a consensus.
"Settlements cannot occur in a democratic or mass-media fishbowl" because elites require autonomy. Seems like dodgy reasoning/hardly backed up by much evidence or theory
Leadership positions of elites must be strong enough to negotiate away important concessions to traditional enemies without being ousted.
The situations for successful elite settlement and the formation of a consolidated democracy are very rare hence we rarely see this in reality.
(20)
Elite settlements and democratic consolidation
there can be a significant time lag while democratic participation increases to a sufficient level. There is a strong link between socioeconomic development and mass participation in democratic politics (Almond and Verba 1963; Lipset 1960).
Subsistence economies are normally associated with populations that are illiterate, geographically isolated, deferential to local elites, and uninvolved in national politics. Economic mobilisation goes hand in hand with political mobilisation.
As in England and Sweden, consensually unified elites may gradually coopt the elites that later emerge from mass parties and movements spawned by industrialisation and modernisation.
An elite settlement needs to coopt all important elites so as new elites develop as society changes, they too need to be brought in, otherwise the regime is unconsolidated.
(23)
The mass mobilisation/protest/action often necessary/influential in bringing down an authoritarian regime may make subsequent democratic consolidation difficult (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
Elites may need to demobilise their supporters once the regime falls.
Elite Convergence (occurs in unconsolidated democracies)
Elites realise that by forming a broad coalition they can mobilise a reliable majority of voters, win elections repeatedly, protect their interests by dominating government executive power.
Signalled by electoral victory of previously dissident elites.
Polarised elites must moderate their distinctive ideological and policy positions.
Is it possible to identify these situations ex ante as well as ex post?
(29)
Key facilitating circumstances (based on the French situation) are a high level of socioeconomic development and a strong leader.
(more)
Available SSL - HN110.5.Z9.ELI or New College P 2.3 HIG .
Preface - they take the view that another book on democratisation is necessary because there is room for further work at the theoretical and intepretive level.
The country studies in the existing literature focus on consolidation within individual countries rather than emergence. Transitions may be triggered by a wide variety of events and the course may vary from case to case.
They aim to take a systematic view focussing on the role of elites in democratic transitions.
O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) see elite pacts as crucial to transition from authoritarian rule.
Politics as bargaining rather than politics as war (Sartori 1987)
Argue that there is widespread agreement about elite precondition for consolidated democracy.
In independent authoritarian states, elite transformation carried out by elites themselves are the main possibly only route to democratic consolidation. Elite transformations from disunity to consensual unity must occur- through elite settlement or elite convergence.
Chapter 1: Introduction - elite transformations and democratic regimes.
(1)
"ideal-type" definitions of democracy, they offer a few, they are "demanding"
We cannot be too rigid in conceiving of democracy in procedural terms
They reject the substantive conception of measuring democracy by political and social outcomes.
(3)
Consolidated regimes
definition: regime that meets all the procedural criteria of democracy and in which all politically significant groups agree/adhere to the democratic rules of the game (an ideal type)
"a process of adaption/freezing of democratic norms, that come to be accepted as legitimate by part or all of civil society" (Morlino, 1986, p. 210)
definition Analytically consolidated regimes encompass specific elite and mass features. All important elite groups and factions share a consensus about rules and codes of political conduct and the worth of political institutions. what's "important"?
and Extensive mass participation in elections with no groups systematically left out
So it doesn't have to be durable, systemic, what if one of the important elites changed their mind? maybe there should have to be some sort of equilibrium or incentive for them not to do so
Where elites are not in consensus about the democratic rules of the game but procedural democracy exists, they call it unconsolidated democracy.
Stable limited democracies have elite consensus but poor participation.
Pseudo democracies - elections but with little elite competition and/or mass intimidation
(7)
Consolidation should be operationalised in such a way that it is not tautological, i.e. not just based on the length of the regime's survival
Public statements from elites (particularly at a time a new constitution is being drafted and ratified) can give an indication of elite consensus. this seems very subjective...
Antisystem parties with consistently high levels of support demonstrate lack of consolidation. May try to subvert existing institutions or vote against a democratic constitution.
(8)
Elites, definition: persons who are able to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially. again a very subjective definition
The key decision makers in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, cultural organisations and movements.
Large countries e.g. US/Soviet Union there may be >10,000 elites. Quite small countries e.g. Portugal <1000 style="font-style: italic;">We are thinking about elites, conceptualising this variable, on the basis of individuals. Should we be thinking about groups or organisations instead? What if elite organisations are bounded by strong constitutions?
Elites relevant to democratic transitions are in opposition to authoritarian regimes. Unless (spontaneous) outbursts are directed by acknowledged leaders and are organised, popular outbursts usually dissipate or are promtly suppressed.
Important variable: protest groups require an "acknowledged and organised" set of elites, either within or without the authoritarian regime.
Unorganised forces are unlikely to establish a stable democracy even if successful in toppling a regime.
Democratic stability depends on agreements that can be struck only among elites which then need to impose these agreements on their followers and gain support for them.
(10)
Types of elites
Structural integration and value consensus are the two dimensions of elite functioning.
Disunified elite - struct integ and val consens are minimal.
Consensually unified elite - the 2 dimensions are relatively inclusive
They tend to perceive politics as positive sum or politics as bargaining (Sartori 1987)
Share an underlying consensus about rules of the game and worth of democratic institutions
Reduces the cost of political defeat (incentive structure)
Ideologically unified elite - structural integration and value consensus are monolithic (totalitarian)
Emergence of democracy takes place when elite transformations occur. Settlement and convergence.
(13)
Elite settlement
Elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganise their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements (Burton and Higley 1987)
Can create patterns of peaceful and open competition between elites (basis for a stable limited democracy)
Can facilitate emergence of a consolidated democracy (though no guarantee)
Two sets of circumstances foster elite settlements:
Prior conflict with both sides suffering heavy losses. Involves situation of uncertainty and/or situation where fighting is more costly than conceding some powers.
Major crisis that threatened the resumption of widespread violence.
Elite cooperation had to be sustained and there were usually some elites seeking to undercut any agreement. Do we know systematically why such elite pacts were signed? Must be about beliefs and incentives but it is difficult to translate this to reality.
(18)
Feature of elite settlements was the predominance of experienced political leaders rather than "new men". Again adds colour but is hardly a systematic approach
At the time elites reached settlements in England, Sweden, Columbia and Venezuela, their countries were at a relatively low level of socio-economic development.
England and Sweden were predominantly agrarian societies. Neither Col or Venez were highly industrialised. Suggests that the national elites enjoyed considerable autonomy from mass followings and pressures. Elites could be more dynamic in forging a consensus.
"Settlements cannot occur in a democratic or mass-media fishbowl" because elites require autonomy. Seems like dodgy reasoning/hardly backed up by much evidence or theory
Leadership positions of elites must be strong enough to negotiate away important concessions to traditional enemies without being ousted.
The situations for successful elite settlement and the formation of a consolidated democracy are very rare hence we rarely see this in reality.
(20)
Elite settlements and democratic consolidation
there can be a significant time lag while democratic participation increases to a sufficient level. There is a strong link between socioeconomic development and mass participation in democratic politics (Almond and Verba 1963; Lipset 1960).
Subsistence economies are normally associated with populations that are illiterate, geographically isolated, deferential to local elites, and uninvolved in national politics. Economic mobilisation goes hand in hand with political mobilisation.
As in England and Sweden, consensually unified elites may gradually coopt the elites that later emerge from mass parties and movements spawned by industrialisation and modernisation.
An elite settlement needs to coopt all important elites so as new elites develop as society changes, they too need to be brought in, otherwise the regime is unconsolidated.
(23)
The mass mobilisation/protest/action often necessary/influential in bringing down an authoritarian regime may make subsequent democratic consolidation difficult (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
Elites may need to demobilise their supporters once the regime falls.
Elite Convergence (occurs in unconsolidated democracies)
Elites realise that by forming a broad coalition they can mobilise a reliable majority of voters, win elections repeatedly, protect their interests by dominating government executive power.
Signalled by electoral victory of previously dissident elites.
Polarised elites must moderate their distinctive ideological and policy positions.
Is it possible to identify these situations ex ante as well as ex post?
(29)
Key facilitating circumstances (based on the French situation) are a high level of socioeconomic development and a strong leader.
(more)
MT09 - Week 6 Tutorial - Why democratise?
“Whilst we now have good explanations to why democracies consolidate, it remains difficult to explain systematically why they become democracies in the first place.” Discuss. (Week 6).
Consult the course reading list. You might also take a look at:
*John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1991) ch. 1. On the same theme, see: Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds), Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); John Higley, ‘The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns’, American Sociological Review, vol. 54, pp 17-32
Samuel Huntington, 'How Countries Democratise', Political Science Quarterly, 106:4, 1991-92
Lucian Pye, 'Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism', American Political Science Review, 84, 1990
Baohui Zhang, ‘Corporatism, Totalitarianism and the Transition to Democracy’, Comparative Political Studies, vol 27, 1, 1994
*John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1991) ch. 1. On the same theme, see: Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds), Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); John Higley, ‘The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns’, American Sociological Review, vol. 54, pp 17-32
Samuel Huntington, 'How Countries Democratise', Political Science Quarterly, 106:4, 1991-92
Lucian Pye, 'Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism', American Political Science Review, 84, 1990
Baohui Zhang, ‘Corporatism, Totalitarianism and the Transition to Democracy’, Comparative Political Studies, vol 27, 1, 1994
Essay plan:
What is democratic consolidation? Do we have good explanations for it. Short bit on this.
Emergence to democracy. Why did some countries become democracies?
Why do some states not become democracies?
State theory- why do we need states - why do democratic states serve this purpose?
(more)
State theory- why do we need states - why do democratic states serve this purpose?
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