Przeworski (1988) Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts

Przeworski, Adam “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,” pp. 59-80 from Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

(60)
In authoritarian regimes "someone/something" has the capacity to prevent political outcomes adverse to their interests. Power apparatus capable of overturning the outcomes of the institutionalised political process.
Tutelary democracy has the democratic political institutions but retains an authoritarian structure (e.g. the military) which can intervene where it perceives unwanted outcomes.
(62)
Crucial moment in the passage to democracy is the threshold beyond which noone can intervene to reverse outcomes in the formal democratic process.

(64)
Democracy involves the creation of institutions that provide a guarantee to "relevant political forces" that their interests would not be too adversely affected in the course of democratic competition.
Each party in the negotiation behaves strategically in its self interest. The package includes the following compromise: at least one of the parties will agree to an outcome which will be best for it given the eventual retribution of the other parties, but not as good as it would have been had the other parties bound themselves to a course of action. Takes a Stackelberg equilibrium approach.
Thesis based on assumptions:
1) institutions have an impact among outcomes of conflicts
2) the protagonists believe that they do
3) institutions that would provide the relevant political forces with reasonable security can be found under some circumstances.
I think this idea of utility maximising conflicting agents/groups is a reasonable one but it needs to be combined with structural variables that predispose the groups towards democratic outcomes rather than a power sharing authoritarian regime. If civil society is not strong enough for example then participation may remain low.
Probability distribution of outcomes is political power determined jointly by the institutional arrangement and the resources which the parties bring into politics.
The alternative of an open, possibly violent conflict, and a democratic outcome which provides security but requires compromise, may benefit the latter. Need conflicting groups with relatively equal bargaining power and the ability to forge a compromise.
Think of this in the context of veto players.

(70)
III - Is an institutional solution always possible?
Analysis limited to a negotiated devolution of power, a ruptura but a ruptura pactada.
Where a democratic Right is in existence the parties can find support appealing to the values of property and democracy - the power block can be quite certain that properly designed institutions will protect its interests.
Where the Right is antidemocratic - it values protection of property more than its own political autonomy - no one whom the authoritarian block can delegate the representation of its interests under democratic conditions.
(72)
Only where the Left lost the first democratic election did democracy not get reversed.
Mass support is required at the stage where there are no institutions that could serve the autonomous organisations as a forum of expression and negotiation. The decalage between autonomous organisation of the civil society and the closed character of state institutions means democracy must assume a mass character - mass movement is needed as a means of pressure - the street becomes the chief arena of expression before the other channels exist.
Workers are typically the first and largest force to organise autonomously. Places of work and markets are the only places people can meet naturally without police supervision. Political rights are necessary for workers to struggle for economic interests.
(more)