Available - Link
Particular Articles/Notes
1. Gloppen. Introduction: the accountability function of the courts in new democracies
(more)
Wednesday, 13 January 2010
Taylor (1971) Interpretation and the Sciences of Man
Taylor, Charles. "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man." In Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985; originally published in Review of Metaphysics vol 25, 1971 pp3-51; reprinted in Martin and MacIntyre;
Available - JStor
Questions for discussion:
1. What are Taylor’s arguments against the eptistemological analysis related to verificationism?
2. What does ‘hermeneutical’ mean, and imply, for Taylor?
3. What is the relationship between ‘reality’ and ‘intersubjectivity, for Taylor?. (more)
Available - JStor
Questions for discussion:
1. What are Taylor’s arguments against the eptistemological analysis related to verificationism?
2. What does ‘hermeneutical’ mean, and imply, for Taylor?
3. What is the relationship between ‘reality’ and ‘intersubjectivity, for Taylor?. (more)
Weber (1949) Objectivity in the Social Sciences
Weber, Max, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy." In Max Weber: The Methodology of the Social Sciences, edited by Edward A Shils and Henry A Finch. New York: Macmillan, 1949
Available - PDF Link (?)
Available New College - PP.6 WEB
Notes. (more)
Available - PDF Link (?)
Available New College - PP.6 WEB
Notes. (more)
HT10 - Intermediate Social Statistics
Lectures Tuesday 2-4 Dept. Experimental Psychology
Classes Thurs 16:00-18:00 Weeks 3, 5,6,8
Course info PDF
Notes. (more)
Classes Thurs 16:00-18:00 Weeks 3, 5,6,8
Course info PDF
Notes. (more)
HT10 - Week 3 - Presidentialism vs Parlimentarianism
Petra Schleiter (petra.schleiter@politics.ox.ac.uk)
Democratic regimes structure representation, accountability and the policy process in
different ways. This session examines the nature of these regime type differences,
and the extent to which they affect political outcomes ranging from the survival of
democracy to budget balances.
Discussion topics:
(a) What are the main differences between parliamentarism and presidentialism, and do they have any substantive implications for the nature of democratic representation and accountability?
(b) Is parliamentarism conducive to better political outcomes than presidential systems? Why/Why not?
Readings:
(a) Regime type, representation and accountability
· Strom, K, Muller, W. and Bergman, T. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary
Democracies (2003), particularly chapter 3
· Lijphart, Arend (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty -Six Countries, New Haven: Yale UP, ch 7.
· Sartori, Giovanni (1997), Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, 2nd edition, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, part 2.
· Shugart and Carey (1992), Presidents and Assemblies
· Samuels, D. J. and M. S. Shugart (2003), ‘Presidentialism, Elections and Representation.’ Journal of Theoretical Politics 15(1): 33-60.
· Carey, J. M. (2007). "Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting." American Journal of Political Science 51(1): 92-107 or Carey, J. M. (2009). Legislative voting and accountability. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
· Samuels, David (2004), Presidentialism and Accountability for the Economy in Comparative Perspective, American Political Science Review, vol. 98, no. 3, August 2004
· Dahl, Robert, Ian Shapiro and Jose A. Cheibub (eds.) (2003), The Democracy Sourcebook. (Chs by Scott Mainwaring on Presidentialism, Multipartism and Democracy, and Joe Foweraker on Institutional Design, Party Systems and Governability).
(b) Regime type, Coalitions and Policy
· Tsebelis, G. (2002), Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work.
· Eaton, Kent, ‘Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism in the Policy Arena’, Comparative Politics 32, no. 3 (April 2000), 355-376. (Review of several key books on the effects of executive format on policy making.)
· Samuels, D. (2009 forthcoming). "Separation of Purpose and Corruption in Presidential Democracies." American Journal of Political Science.
· Weaver, R. Kent, and Bert A. Rockman, eds., (1993), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
· Powell, G. Bingham (1982), Contemporary Democracies. Participation, Stability and Violence.
· Lijphart, Arend (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty -Six Countries, New Haven: Yale UP, chs. 15-17
· Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2005), The Economic Effects of Constitutions.
· Cheibub, Jose Antonio (2006), ‘Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget Balances in Democratic Systems’, American Political Science Review 100: 353-368.
· Shugart, M. S. (1999), ‘Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and the Provision of Collective Goods in Less-Developed Countries.’ Constitutional Political Economy 10(1): 53-88.
· Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Soberg Shugart (1997), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, Cambridge: CUP, chs. 1 and 11
· Haggard, Stephan, and Mathew McCubbins (2001), Presidents, Parliaments and Policy,
Cambridge: CUP.
· Cox, Gary and Morgenstern, Scott, ‘Latin America’s Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents’ Comparative Politics, January, 2001.
· Amorim Neto, ‘The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy-Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas’, Comparative Political Studies, vol.39, no.6, 2006
· Huber, John D. (1996), ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’ American Political Science Review, Vol.90, No.2, pp.269-282.
· Feigenbaum, Harvey, Richard Samuels, and R. Kent Weaver (1993), ‘Innovation, Coordination, and Implementation in Energy Policy’, in R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 42-109.
· Cowhey, Peter F., ‘Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States’, International Organization 47, no. 2 , spring 1993, 299-326.
(c) Regime type and the survival of democracy
· Lijphart, Arend ed. (1992), Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, (a collection of abridged relevant articles, including those from Linz, Duverger, Horowitz and Lipset) or:
· Linz, Juan J., ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy 1, no. 1, winter 1990.
· Horowitz, Donald, ‘Comparing Democratic Systems’, Journal of Democracy 1, no. 4, fall 1990. (Both at SSL Staff Desk.)
· Cheibub, Jose Antonio (2007), Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Democracy.
· Przeworski, Adam et al., ‘What Makes Democracies Endure?’ Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1 winter 1996, 39-55.
· Svolik, Milan (2008), “Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation”, American Political Science Review, vol. 102, no. 2.
· Shugart, Matthew (1995), ‘Parliaments over Presidents?’ Journal of Democracy 6 (2): 169-72.
· Stepan, Alfred and Cindy Skach (1993), ‘Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic
Consolidation’ World Politics 46.
· Mainwaring, Scott, and Shugart M.S. (1997), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America.
· Sartori, Giovanni (1997), Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, 2nd edition, Basingstoke: Macmillan, chs. 5-7.
· Bernhard, Michael, Timothy Nordstrom, and Christopher Reenock, ‘Economic Performance, Institutional Intermediation, and Democratic Survival’, Journal of Politics 63, no. 3, August 2001, 775-803. (more)
Democratic regimes structure representation, accountability and the policy process in
different ways. This session examines the nature of these regime type differences,
and the extent to which they affect political outcomes ranging from the survival of
democracy to budget balances.
Discussion topics:
(a) What are the main differences between parliamentarism and presidentialism, and do they have any substantive implications for the nature of democratic representation and accountability?
(b) Is parliamentarism conducive to better political outcomes than presidential systems? Why/Why not?
Readings:
(a) Regime type, representation and accountability
· Strom, K, Muller, W. and Bergman, T. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary
Democracies (2003), particularly chapter 3
· Lijphart, Arend (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty -Six Countries, New Haven: Yale UP, ch 7.
· Sartori, Giovanni (1997), Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, 2nd edition, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, part 2.
· Shugart and Carey (1992), Presidents and Assemblies
· Samuels, D. J. and M. S. Shugart (2003), ‘Presidentialism, Elections and Representation.’ Journal of Theoretical Politics 15(1): 33-60.
· Carey, J. M. (2007). "Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting." American Journal of Political Science 51(1): 92-107 or Carey, J. M. (2009). Legislative voting and accountability. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
· Samuels, David (2004), Presidentialism and Accountability for the Economy in Comparative Perspective, American Political Science Review, vol. 98, no. 3, August 2004
· Dahl, Robert, Ian Shapiro and Jose A. Cheibub (eds.) (2003), The Democracy Sourcebook. (Chs by Scott Mainwaring on Presidentialism, Multipartism and Democracy, and Joe Foweraker on Institutional Design, Party Systems and Governability).
(b) Regime type, Coalitions and Policy
· Tsebelis, G. (2002), Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work.
· Eaton, Kent, ‘Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism in the Policy Arena’, Comparative Politics 32, no. 3 (April 2000), 355-376. (Review of several key books on the effects of executive format on policy making.)
· Samuels, D. (2009 forthcoming). "Separation of Purpose and Corruption in Presidential Democracies." American Journal of Political Science.
· Weaver, R. Kent, and Bert A. Rockman, eds., (1993), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
· Powell, G. Bingham (1982), Contemporary Democracies. Participation, Stability and Violence.
· Lijphart, Arend (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty -Six Countries, New Haven: Yale UP, chs. 15-17
· Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2005), The Economic Effects of Constitutions.
· Cheibub, Jose Antonio (2006), ‘Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget Balances in Democratic Systems’, American Political Science Review 100: 353-368.
· Shugart, M. S. (1999), ‘Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and the Provision of Collective Goods in Less-Developed Countries.’ Constitutional Political Economy 10(1): 53-88.
· Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Soberg Shugart (1997), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, Cambridge: CUP, chs. 1 and 11
· Haggard, Stephan, and Mathew McCubbins (2001), Presidents, Parliaments and Policy,
Cambridge: CUP.
· Cox, Gary and Morgenstern, Scott, ‘Latin America’s Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents’ Comparative Politics, January, 2001.
· Amorim Neto, ‘The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy-Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas’, Comparative Political Studies, vol.39, no.6, 2006
· Huber, John D. (1996), ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’ American Political Science Review, Vol.90, No.2, pp.269-282.
· Feigenbaum, Harvey, Richard Samuels, and R. Kent Weaver (1993), ‘Innovation, Coordination, and Implementation in Energy Policy’, in R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 42-109.
· Cowhey, Peter F., ‘Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States’, International Organization 47, no. 2 , spring 1993, 299-326.
(c) Regime type and the survival of democracy
· Lijphart, Arend ed. (1992), Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, (a collection of abridged relevant articles, including those from Linz, Duverger, Horowitz and Lipset) or:
· Linz, Juan J., ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy 1, no. 1, winter 1990.
· Horowitz, Donald, ‘Comparing Democratic Systems’, Journal of Democracy 1, no. 4, fall 1990. (Both at SSL Staff Desk.)
· Cheibub, Jose Antonio (2007), Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Democracy.
· Przeworski, Adam et al., ‘What Makes Democracies Endure?’ Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1 winter 1996, 39-55.
· Svolik, Milan (2008), “Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation”, American Political Science Review, vol. 102, no. 2.
· Shugart, Matthew (1995), ‘Parliaments over Presidents?’ Journal of Democracy 6 (2): 169-72.
· Stepan, Alfred and Cindy Skach (1993), ‘Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic
Consolidation’ World Politics 46.
· Mainwaring, Scott, and Shugart M.S. (1997), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America.
· Sartori, Giovanni (1997), Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, 2nd edition, Basingstoke: Macmillan, chs. 5-7.
· Bernhard, Michael, Timothy Nordstrom, and Christopher Reenock, ‘Economic Performance, Institutional Intermediation, and Democratic Survival’, Journal of Politics 63, no. 3, August 2001, 775-803. (more)
TT10 - Tutorial 2 - Principal Agent Theory
QUESTION 2: ‘Principal-agent theory is useful for framing questions, not for answering them.' Discuss.
See the departmental reading list reading list for Hilary Week 7(a) . You might also take a look at:
Overview
Horn, Murray J (1995) The Political Economy of Public Administration, 1995
Miller, G.J., The political evolution of principal-agent models, Annual Review of Political Science, 8: 203-225, 2005
Waterman, Richard W. and Kenneth J. Meier, "Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?" Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 8 (April): 173-202, 1998
Lane, Jan-Erik, Public Administration and Public Management: The Principal-Agent Perspective, 2005
Application of the theory
Krause, G A. and K J. Meier (eds.), Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy, esp. the Conclusion, 2003
Special issue of the European Journal of Political Research, 37 (3), 2000
Weingast, Barry “The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal-agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)” in Public Choice 44 1984 pp. 147–88
Weingast and Moran “Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? “Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission” in Journal of. Political Economy 91 1983 pp. 765–800
McCubbins, M, Noll and Weingast “Administrative Procedures and Political Control” in Journal of Law Economics and Organization 1987 3 (2) pp. 243-279
Banks, J.S. and Weingast B.R. “The Political Control of Bureaucracies Under Asymmetric Information” American Journal of Political Science 1992 36(2)
Huwang, Y. “Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economics Perspective” in Political Studies: 2002 Vol. 50 pp. 61–79. (more)
See the departmental reading list reading list for Hilary Week 7(a) . You might also take a look at:
Overview
Horn, Murray J (1995) The Political Economy of Public Administration, 1995
Miller, G.J., The political evolution of principal-agent models, Annual Review of Political Science, 8: 203-225, 2005
Waterman, Richard W. and Kenneth J. Meier, "Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?" Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 8 (April): 173-202, 1998
Lane, Jan-Erik, Public Administration and Public Management: The Principal-Agent Perspective, 2005
Application of the theory
Krause, G A. and K J. Meier (eds.), Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy, esp. the Conclusion, 2003
Special issue of the European Journal of Political Research, 37 (3), 2000
Weingast, Barry “The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal-agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)” in Public Choice 44 1984 pp. 147–88
Weingast and Moran “Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? “Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission” in Journal of. Political Economy 91 1983 pp. 765–800
McCubbins, M, Noll and Weingast “Administrative Procedures and Political Control” in Journal of Law Economics and Organization 1987 3 (2) pp. 243-279
Banks, J.S. and Weingast B.R. “The Political Control of Bureaucracies Under Asymmetric Information” American Journal of Political Science 1992 36(2)
Huwang, Y. “Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economics Perspective” in Political Studies: 2002 Vol. 50 pp. 61–79. (more)
TT10 - Tutorial 1 - Cultural Analysis
Paul Chaisty
QUESTION 1: Does cultural analysis of political behaviour enhance or undermine the comparative method?
See the departmental reading list reading list for Hilary Week 6. You might also take a look at:
Kohli, A. et. al, ‘The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium’, World Politics,
48: 1-49, 1995
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25053951.pdf
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 'Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?' in his Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy, 1984.
(Other paper - Przeworski - Is the science of comparative politics possible - might be worth constrasting it with the macintyre one - http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/isthescience.pdf (more)
QUESTION 1: Does cultural analysis of political behaviour enhance or undermine the comparative method?
See the departmental reading list reading list for Hilary Week 6. You might also take a look at:
Kohli, A. et. al, ‘The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium’, World Politics,
48: 1-49, 1995
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25053951.pdf
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 'Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?' in his Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy, 1984.
(Other paper - Przeworski - Is the science of comparative politics possible - might be worth constrasting it with the macintyre one - http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/isthescience.pdf (more)
Ruggie (1998) Constructing the World Polity
Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalisation (New International Relations)
Notes. (more)
Notes. (more)
Wachendorfer-Schmidt, Ute ed (2000) Federalism and Political Performance
Wachendorfer-Schmidt, Ute ed (2000) Federalism and Political Performance
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Watts, Ronald (1996), Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s
Watts, Ronald (1996), Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s
Available - Google Docs 1, Google Docs 2
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs 1, Google Docs 2
Notes. (more)
Scharpf, Fritz (1988) ‘The Joint-Decision Trap
Scharpf, Fritz (1988) ‘The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from West German Federalism and European Integration’ Public Administration 66
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Nicolaidis, Kalypso and Robert Howse (2001) The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union
Nicolaidis, Kalypso and Robert Howse (2001) The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Stepan (2004) Electorally generated Veto Players in Unitary and Federal Systems
Stepan, Alfred “Electorally generated Veto Players in Unitary and Federal Systems” in Edward Gibson ed. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America pp323-355
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Dahl, Robert Democracy and Its Critics pp193-209 or Dahl, 1986 “Federalism and the Democratic Process’
Dahl, Robert Democracy and Its Critics pp193-209 or Dahl, 1986 “Federalism and the
Democratic Process’ in Democracy, Identity and Equality
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Democratic Process’ in Democracy, Identity and Equality
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Bunce (2003) Federalism and Territorial Cleavages
Bunce, Valerie 2003 in Ugo Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo eds. Federalism and Territorial Cleavages
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Bermeo, Nancy 2002 The Import of Institutions
Bermeo, Nancy 2002 The Import of Institutions J D April , vol 13.no 2 pp 96-110
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Jonathan Rodden. “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement,”
Jonathan Rodden. “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and
Measurement,” Comparative Politics. 36, 4 (2004).
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Measurement,” Comparative Politics. 36, 4 (2004).
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Riker (1964) Federalism
William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964, chapt 1 and Chpt 2 sectionsI-III.
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Gibson, Edward (2004) “Federalism and Democracy” in Edward Gibson ed. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America
Gibson, Edward (2004) “Federalism and Democracy” in Edward Gibson ed. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America pp1-27
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Stepan, A (1999) ‘Federalism and Democracy Beyond the US Model’
Stepan, A (1999) ‘Federalism and Democracy Beyond the US Model’, J D, 10: 19-34
Available - PDF Link
Notes. (more)
Available - PDF Link
Notes. (more)
Riker, William H (1975) ‘Federalism’
Riker, William H (1975) ‘Federalism’ in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby eds Handbook of Political Science, Vol 5
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Elazar, Daniel (1997) ‘Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems’
Elazar, Daniel (1997) ‘Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems’ IPSR vol 18 no3 pp237-251
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
HT10 - Week 1 - Federalism
Aim of the session: To understand the varied origins, forms and effects of federalism.
Discussion topics
(a) Why, and how, do federal systems come into being?
(b) What are the patterns of democratic federalism?
(b) How do the effects of these different patterns of democratic federalism vary and why?
Readings:
(a) Origins and Patterns
· Elazar, Daniel (1997) ‘Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems’ IPSR vol 18 no3 pp237-251
· Riker, William H (1975) ‘Federalism’ in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby eds Handbook of Political Science, Vol 5
· Stepan, A (1999) ‘Federalism and Democracy Beyond the US Model’, J D, 10: 19-34
(b) Varieties and Effects
· Gibson, Edward (2004) “Federalism and Democracy” in Edward Gibson ed. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America pp1-27
· Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison and John Jay.. The Federalist Papers, 10 and 51.
· William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964, chapt 1 and Chpt 2 sectionsI-III.
· Jonathan Rodden. “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and
Measurement,” Comparative Politics. 36, 4 (2004).
· Bermeo, Nancy 2002 The Import of Institutions J D April , vol 13.no 2 pp 96-110
· Bunce, Valerie 2003 in Ugo Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo eds. Federalism and Territorial Cleavages
· Rodden, Jonathan 2006 Hamilton’s Paradox The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism
· Dahl, Robert Democracy and Its Critics pp193-209 or Dahl, 1986 “Federalism and the
Democratic Process’ in Democracy, Identity and Equality
· Stepan, Alfred “Electorally generated Veto Players in Unitary and Federal Systems” in Edward Gibson ed. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America pp323-355
· Stepan, Alfred (2001), ‘Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism: (Multi)-Nationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism, ch 15 in Stepan, A, Arguing Comparative Politics
· Elazar, Daniel (1991) Exploring Federalism
· Forsyth, Murray (1989) Federalism and Nationalism
· Hesse, Jens and Wright, Vincent eds (1995) Federalizing Europe?
· Peterson, Paul E (1995) The Price of Federalism (a focus on the US)
· Kelemen, Daniel (2004) The Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU Chapt 1
· Nicolaidis, Kalypso and Robert Howse (2001) The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union
· Scharpf, Fritz (1988) ‘The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from West German Federalism and European Integration’ Public Administration 66
· Wheare, Kenneth (4th ed 1963) Federal Government
· Wachendorfer-Schmidt, Ute ed (2000) Federalism and Political Performance
· Watts, Ronald (1996), Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s
· Braun, D (ed) (2000), Public Policy and Federalism (2000) (more)
Discussion topics
(a) Why, and how, do federal systems come into being?
(b) What are the patterns of democratic federalism?
(b) How do the effects of these different patterns of democratic federalism vary and why?
Readings:
(a) Origins and Patterns
· Elazar, Daniel (1997) ‘Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems’ IPSR vol 18 no3 pp237-251
· Riker, William H (1975) ‘Federalism’ in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby eds Handbook of Political Science, Vol 5
· Stepan, A (1999) ‘Federalism and Democracy Beyond the US Model’, J D, 10: 19-34
(b) Varieties and Effects
· Gibson, Edward (2004) “Federalism and Democracy” in Edward Gibson ed. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America pp1-27
· Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison and John Jay.. The Federalist Papers, 10 and 51.
· William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964, chapt 1 and Chpt 2 sectionsI-III.
· Jonathan Rodden. “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and
Measurement,” Comparative Politics. 36, 4 (2004).
· Bermeo, Nancy 2002 The Import of Institutions J D April , vol 13.no 2 pp 96-110
· Bunce, Valerie 2003 in Ugo Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo eds. Federalism and Territorial Cleavages
· Rodden, Jonathan 2006 Hamilton’s Paradox The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism
· Dahl, Robert Democracy and Its Critics pp193-209 or Dahl, 1986 “Federalism and the
Democratic Process’ in Democracy, Identity and Equality
· Stepan, Alfred “Electorally generated Veto Players in Unitary and Federal Systems” in Edward Gibson ed. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America pp323-355
· Stepan, Alfred (2001), ‘Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism: (Multi)-Nationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism, ch 15 in Stepan, A, Arguing Comparative Politics
· Elazar, Daniel (1991) Exploring Federalism
· Forsyth, Murray (1989) Federalism and Nationalism
· Hesse, Jens and Wright, Vincent eds (1995) Federalizing Europe?
· Peterson, Paul E (1995) The Price of Federalism (a focus on the US)
· Kelemen, Daniel (2004) The Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU Chapt 1
· Nicolaidis, Kalypso and Robert Howse (2001) The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union
· Scharpf, Fritz (1988) ‘The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from West German Federalism and European Integration’ Public Administration 66
· Wheare, Kenneth (4th ed 1963) Federal Government
· Wachendorfer-Schmidt, Ute ed (2000) Federalism and Political Performance
· Watts, Ronald (1996), Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s
· Braun, D (ed) (2000), Public Policy and Federalism (2000) (more)
HT10 - Tutorial Week 7 - Parliamentary vs Presidential Regimes
QUESTION 2: In what ways, if any, does the distinction between parliamentary and presidential regimes advance the comparative analysis of political systems?
See the departmental reading list for Hilary Week 3. You might also take a look at:
Robert Elgie, ‘From Linz to Tsebelis: Three Waves of Presidential/Parliamentary Studies?’, Democratization, 12: 1 (2005), pp. 106-122 (more)
See the departmental reading list for Hilary Week 3. You might also take a look at:
Robert Elgie, ‘From Linz to Tsebelis: Three Waves of Presidential/Parliamentary Studies?’, Democratization, 12: 1 (2005), pp. 106-122 (more)
HT 10 - Tutorial Week 3 - Judicialism and Democracy
QUESTION 1: 'In practice courts do not try to overturn major aspects of a government's policies, so that to talk of their having political power is misleading.' Discuss.
See the departmental reading list for Hilary Week 2 (a). You might also take a look at:
Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Bonchek, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Insitutions, ch. 15
George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, pp. 225-235 (more)
See the departmental reading list for Hilary Week 2 (a). You might also take a look at:
Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Bonchek, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Insitutions, ch. 15
George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, pp. 225-235 (more)
HT10 - Intro to Comp Gov II - Paul Chaisty
QUESTION 1: 'In practice courts do not try to overturn major aspects of a government's policies, so that to talk of their having political power is misleading.' Discuss.
QUESTION 2: In what ways, if any, does the distinction between parliamentary and presidential regimes advance the comparative analysis of political systems? (more)
QUESTION 2: In what ways, if any, does the distinction between parliamentary and presidential regimes advance the comparative analysis of political systems? (more)
HT10 - Political Institutions Programme
9. Federalism Cindy Skach (cindy.skach@politics.ox.ac.uk)
10. Rights, Politics and Judicialisation Cindy Skach (cindy.skach@politics.ox.ac.uk)
11. Presidentialism and Parliamentarism Petra Schleiter (petra.schleiter@politics.ox.ac.uk)
12. Cabinet Formation Petra Schleiter (petra.schleiter@politics.ox.ac.uk)
13. Agency, Leadership, and Politics Scott Blinder (scott.blinder@politics.ox.ac.uk)
14. Culture and Democracy. Cindy Skach (cindy.skach@politics.ox.ac.uk)
15. Institutions and Rational Choice Ray Duch (raymond.duch@politics.ox.ac.uk)
16. Institutionalist Theories of Political
Economy: Varieties of Capitalism
Stewart Wood (stewart.wood@politics.ox.ac.uk)
(more)
10. Rights, Politics and Judicialisation Cindy Skach (cindy.skach@politics.ox.ac.uk)
11. Presidentialism and Parliamentarism Petra Schleiter (petra.schleiter@politics.ox.ac.uk)
12. Cabinet Formation Petra Schleiter (petra.schleiter@politics.ox.ac.uk)
13. Agency, Leadership, and Politics Scott Blinder (scott.blinder@politics.ox.ac.uk)
14. Culture and Democracy. Cindy Skach (cindy.skach@politics.ox.ac.uk)
15. Institutions and Rational Choice Ray Duch (raymond.duch@politics.ox.ac.uk)
16. Institutionalist Theories of Political
Economy: Varieties of Capitalism
Stewart Wood (stewart.wood@politics.ox.ac.uk)
(more)
Tate, C Neal and Vallinder, Torbjörn eds (1995), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power
Tate, C Neal and Vallinder, Torbjörn eds (1995), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Stone Sweet (2002), ‘Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy’
Stone Sweet (2002), ‘Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy’, West European Politics 25 (1): 77-100
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Shapiro and Sweet (2002) On Law, Politics and Judicialization
Shapiro, Martin, and Alec Stone Sweet (2002), On Law, Politics and Judicialization, Oxford: OUP.
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Schwartz (2000), The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe
Schwartz, Herman (2000), The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Guarnieri, Carlo, and Patrizia Pederzoli (2002), The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy
Guarnieri, Carlo, and Patrizia Pederzoli (2002), The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy, introduction and ch 3
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Garrett, Kelemen & Schulz (1998) The ECJ
Garrett, Geoffrey, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Heiner Schulz, ‘The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union’, International Organization 52, no. 1 (winter 1998), 149-176.
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Dworkin (1977) Taking Rights Seriously
Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously, pp. esp. 90-94 and Chapter 7.
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Sunstein (1993) Against Positive Rights
Sunstein, Cass. “Against Positive Rights,” East European Constitutional Review, Vol 2, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 35-38.
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Rosenberg, Gerald (1991), The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
Rosenberg, Gerald (1991), The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Kelemen (2001) The Limits of Judicial Power
Kelemen, R. Dan (2001), ‘The Limits of Judicial Power’, CPS, 34:6, pp. 622-650
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Gloppen et al (2003) - The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies.
Gloppen, Siri et al. Democratization 10:4 (winter 2003) – special issue on Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies.
Available -
Notes. (more)
Available -
Notes. (more)
Gillman (2002) How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas
Gillman, Howard (2002), ‘How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the US 1875-1891’, APSR 96 (3): 511-524
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Epp (1998) The Rights Revolution
Epp, Charles R. (1998), The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in
Comparative Perspective, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
Notes. (more)
Comparative Perspective, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
Notes. (more)
Benhabib (2004) The Rights of Others
Benhabib, S. The Rights of Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 1-24, and 171-22
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Barak (2005) A Purposive Interpretation in Law
Barak, A. Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), “Introduction.”
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Available - Google Docs
Notes. (more)
Barak (2002) A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy
Barak, A. “A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,” Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 116, November 2002.
Available - Google Docs (the 1997 article of the same title)
(Also the HLR article)
Notes. (more)
Review, Vol. 116, November 2002.
Available - Google Docs (the 1997 article of the same title)
(Also the HLR article)
Notes. (more)
HT10 - Week 2 - Rights, Judicial Politics and Judicialisation
Aim of the session: To explore how to understand and explain the role of rights, courts, and judges, and the scope and extent of their influence, in democratic politics..
Discussion topics:
(a) Do courts play a unique or especially powerful role in constitutional politics?
(b) How far has ‘judicialisation’ progressed and why?
(c) Are there any affinities between particular rights, on the one hand, and specific institutional
configurations, on the other hand?
Readings:
(a) Judges as political actors, and the relationship between rights, courts and other institutions
· Barak, A. “A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 116, November 2002.
· Barak, A. Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), “Introduction.”
· Benhabib, S. The Rights of Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 1-24, and 171-22.
· Epp, Charles R. (1998), The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in
Comparative Perspective, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
· Gillman, Howard (2002), ‘How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas:
Federal Courts in the US 1875-1891’, APSR 96 (3): 511-524
· Gloppen, Siri et al. Democratization 10:4 (winter 2003) – special issue on Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies.
· Kelemen, R. Dan (2001), ‘The Limits of Judicial Power’, CPS, 34:6, pp. 622-650
· Rosenberg, Gerald (1991), The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
· Sunstein, Cass. “Against Positive Rights,” East European Constitutional Review, Vol 2, No. 1
(Winter 1993), pp. 35-38.
· Whittington, Keith E. (1999), Constitutional Construction.
b) Judicialisation
· Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously, pp. esp. 90-94 and Chapter 7.
· Garrett, Geoffrey, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Heiner Schulz, ‘The European Court of Justice,
National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union’, International Organization 52, no. 1 (winter 1998), 149-176.
· Guarnieri, Carlo, and Patrizia Pederzoli (2002), The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of
Courts and Democracy, introduction and ch 3
· Schwartz, Herman (2000), The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe
· Shapiro, Martin, and Alec Stone Sweet (2002), On Law, Politics and Judicialization, Oxford:
OUP.
· Stone Sweet, A. (2000), Governing with Judges OR
. Stone Sweet (2002), ‘Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy’, West European Politics 25 (1): 77-100
· Tate, C Neal and Vallinder, Torbjörn eds (1995), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power.. (more)
Discussion topics:
(a) Do courts play a unique or especially powerful role in constitutional politics?
(b) How far has ‘judicialisation’ progressed and why?
(c) Are there any affinities between particular rights, on the one hand, and specific institutional
configurations, on the other hand?
Readings:
(a) Judges as political actors, and the relationship between rights, courts and other institutions
· Barak, A. “A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 116, November 2002.
· Barak, A. Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), “Introduction.”
· Benhabib, S. The Rights of Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 1-24, and 171-22.
· Epp, Charles R. (1998), The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in
Comparative Perspective, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
· Gillman, Howard (2002), ‘How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas:
Federal Courts in the US 1875-1891’, APSR 96 (3): 511-524
· Gloppen, Siri et al. Democratization 10:4 (winter 2003) – special issue on Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies.
· Kelemen, R. Dan (2001), ‘The Limits of Judicial Power’, CPS, 34:6, pp. 622-650
· Rosenberg, Gerald (1991), The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
· Sunstein, Cass. “Against Positive Rights,” East European Constitutional Review, Vol 2, No. 1
(Winter 1993), pp. 35-38.
· Whittington, Keith E. (1999), Constitutional Construction.
b) Judicialisation
· Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously, pp. esp. 90-94 and Chapter 7.
· Garrett, Geoffrey, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Heiner Schulz, ‘The European Court of Justice,
National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union’, International Organization 52, no. 1 (winter 1998), 149-176.
· Guarnieri, Carlo, and Patrizia Pederzoli (2002), The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of
Courts and Democracy, introduction and ch 3
· Schwartz, Herman (2000), The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe
· Shapiro, Martin, and Alec Stone Sweet (2002), On Law, Politics and Judicialization, Oxford:
OUP.
· Stone Sweet, A. (2000), Governing with Judges OR
. Stone Sweet (2002), ‘Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy’, West European Politics 25 (1): 77-100
· Tate, C Neal and Vallinder, Torbjörn eds (1995), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power.. (more)
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