Cappocia, Giovanni. Defending Democracy; Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe
Reading MT09 Week 4 - Chp 3 pp. 47-67.
Notes.
(more)
Wednesday 28 October 2009
Mansfield and Snyder (2005) Electing to Fight...
Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder, (2005) Electing to Fight Why Emerging Democracies go to War.
Reading list MT09 Week 4: Chapt 3 pp.39-68.
Notes. (more)
Reading list MT09 Week 4: Chapt 3 pp.39-68.
Notes. (more)
Levitsky and Way ( ) Competitive Authoritarianism
Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Evolution of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era (with Lucan A. Way). New York: Cambridge University Press Chapter 1 and conclusion.
Notes. (more)
Notes. (more)
Howard and Roessler (2006) Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritaran Regimes
Howard, Marc Morjé, and Philip G. Roessler (2006) ? Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes ? American Journal of Political Science 50 (2), 365–381.
Notes. (more)
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes ? American Journal of Political Science 50 (2), 365–381.
Notes. (more)
Diamond and Morlino (2004) The Quality of Democracy: An Overview
Diamond, Larry and Leonardo Morlino 2004 “The Quality of Democracy: An Overview” J D 15
(4) 20-31.
Notes (more)
(4) 20-31.
Notes (more)
Carothers (2002) The End of the Transition Paradigm
Carothers, Thomas 2002 “The End of the Transition Paradigm” JD 13:1 pp5-21.
This piece looks at cases after the supposed "third wave" of democracy, in 1970-1990.
The transition paradigm no longer works.
1. Any country moving away from dictatorial rule is in transition to democracy
2. Democracy tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages
1. The opening - democratic ferment and political liberalisation, cracks appear, most prominent fault line between hardliners and softliners.
2. Breakthrough, collapse of the regime and a rapid installation of a democratic one
3. Consolidation - slow process democratic forms are translated into democratic substance
Criticism - it involves a lot of teleology
4. Belief that underlying conditions, e.g. economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions, etc. will not be critical factors. All that was necessary was a decision by the political elites and the ability to fend off threats from antidemo forces.
Belief in the value of elections - giving post dictatorial regimes legitimacy and increasing political participation
Gray (sic) zone - countries that are neither dictatorial nor heading towards democracy
Syndromes:
Feckless pluralism and Dominant-power politics are 2 gray zone alternatives
(more)
This piece looks at cases after the supposed "third wave" of democracy, in 1970-1990.
The transition paradigm no longer works.
1. Any country moving away from dictatorial rule is in transition to democracy
2. Democracy tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages
1. The opening - democratic ferment and political liberalisation, cracks appear, most prominent fault line between hardliners and softliners.
2. Breakthrough, collapse of the regime and a rapid installation of a democratic one
3. Consolidation - slow process democratic forms are translated into democratic substance
Criticism - it involves a lot of teleology
4. Belief that underlying conditions, e.g. economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions, etc. will not be critical factors. All that was necessary was a decision by the political elites and the ability to fend off threats from antidemo forces.
Belief in the value of elections - giving post dictatorial regimes legitimacy and increasing political participation
Gray (sic) zone - countries that are neither dictatorial nor heading towards democracy
Syndromes:
Feckless pluralism and Dominant-power politics are 2 gray zone alternatives
(more)
Brown (2001) Evaluating Russia's Democratisation
Brown, Archie 2001 “Evaluating Russia’s Democratization” in Archie Brown ed. Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader pp546-68.
And here is the rest of it. (more)
And here is the rest of it. (more)
Brownlee (2007) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization
Brownlee, Jason. (2007) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization pp 16-43. (c) Stalled (and Stopped) Transitions
Notes (more)
Notes (more)
Bellin (2004) The robustness of authoritarianism in the middle east
Bellin, Eva.(2004) “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: A Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics , 36, 2 (2004): 139-157.
Notes. (more)
Notes. (more)
Bermeo (2003) Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times...
Bermeo, Nancy (2003) Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy Introduction, Chp1 pp1 -20 and Chp 7 pp.221-256.
Notes.
Much of what elites attempt to do is conditioned by their judgement of how ordinary people will behave.
People -> individuality of the group's membership. Ordinary -> no extraordinary powers vis a vis the states in which they live.
Do they defend democracy or embrace dictatorship? And why/when etc.?
First challenge - "finding" ordinary people - disentangling them from civil society
Second challenge - two competing visions - ordinary people as "heroic", or as members of groups with destabilising influences
Study of Electoral Behaviour, Strikes, Demonstrations and Acts of Violence
Mass defections to extremist parties are rare
Extremist support usually a result of expansion of the franchise or mobilisation of non-voters (so non-voters are not ordinary people?). Changes in the composition of the electorate rather than changes in heart and mind caused extremist support to grow.
Blame lies with political elites
either wholly - their own democratic convictions were so weak they used public polarisation as a rationale for creating an authoritarian regime
Other times they "allowed" public polarisation to grow violent and threaten public order and the military as an institution - when the military was threatened, democracy was doomed
Chapter 1
What is civil society - why is it important?
"The network of formal and informal associations that mediate between individual actors and the state"
The offer the fellowship, resources and refinement that make acts of defiance seem feasible
Civil society as salvation
de Tocqueville regards it as the only way of preserving freedom
Lots of other positive adjectives about civil society
Civil society as a spoiler
in the 1970s it was cast in an ambiguous role
Huntingdon (1968) drew a distinction between institutionalised societies where the expansion of civil society reduces tensions, and praetorian societies in which participation of new groups exacerbates tensions.
Highly activist society can lead to democratic instability. Linz for example believes civil society should have no direct connections with those in power if democracy is to be preserved.
E.g. O'Donnell (1979) pre-coup Argentinian and Brazilian governments wre victimised by praetorian coalitions (and also collaborated in it)
When a certain level of development of society allows even the base to get organised, the trouble begins.
Elected officials can face a barely manageable schedule of political demands (can lead to unsolvable problems and crises?)
Tying in civil society with Linz theory - it leads to government incapacity by increasing the demands on government.
Hirschman (1970) - need a balance between alert and inert citizens
If civic organisations can work against democracy - it is logical that the individual actors that compose them be blamed
Bermeo's point - we can blame civil society but not individuals?
Strand of the literature claiming ordinary people are not ready for the freedom democracy allows (see P15) e.g. Working class authoritarianism (Lipset, 1960) had its roots in low education, low participation, little reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity and authoritarian family patterns.
Theory - in times of crisis ordinary people cannot be trusted to resist the lure of authoritarianism
For a regime to endure it has to continually prove its legitimacy, and can rely on loyalty to some extent but needs to prove to each generation
Institutions to control the populace
Sartori (1976) - party systems and party elites must restrain the forces of polarity inherent in political democracies. Party systems need to contain the ideological range and number of parties in the national legislature.
Conclusion - Ordinary people often play a PERIPHERAL role in the breakdown of democracy. In the cases where their role is more central, it's only partially captured by polarisation metaphor.
Mistaken the polarisation in "select and small groups" in civil society for polarisation in society as a whole. Voters generally did not polarise nor did public opinion shift to the edges of the left-right scale.
Chapter 7 - Polarisation and the ignorance of elites
In reality many people failed to polarise and Bermeo places the blame for democracy's demise overwhelmingly with political elites
Ordinary people rarely threw democracies off balance with their votes
Each of the many democracies studied (except Poland) fell to forces on the right but the democracies they replaced were of varied "hues".
The right do not necessarily unify against the left - e.g. if a right wing dictatorship takes over a right wing government - so the polarisation metaphor is not always accurate.
[Why would we need to assume polarisation? It's just one form of instability]
At the polls: even in Italy where the centre collapsed among political elites it still held its own at the polls.
Reason - loyalty and inertia - party identification is not easily changed - remarkably resistant to passing political events
If the party collapses by itself - or - if the composition of the electorate changes
Opportunity costs of political participation - collecting information is costly and party switching seems to be correlated with high levels of information (see p.224; Converse, in Campbell et al)
Weakness of using the unilinear, bipolar schema
Many parties don't particularly fit onto it
Often electoral alliances between parties with seemingly inconsistent ideologies made representation of particular votes difficult in countries such as Italy, Poland, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay.
Prefers to think of the policy landscape as a sphere
Polarisation in multiple arenas
It's a process as well as a condition. Growth of mutually antagonistic self identified groups. They are extremist (G Bingham Powell) if they offer the chance of radical change in the social, economic and political fabric of the existing system. (Is extremist the right word to use here?)
Different processes of polarisation:
- in public spaces
- at the polls
- in public opinion
- among political elites
Important to trace the trajectories of polarisation in different arenas because a democratic regime is itself composed of partial-regimes (Schmitter 1992)
Linz and Stepan (1996) "democracy is more than a regime" - it is an interacting system composed of 5 interrelated arenas - political society, civil society, economic society, rule of law, state apparatus.
[regimes need to maintain legitimacy in all of those areas in order to endure]
Role of elites - acting on the (generally) mistaken impression that polarisation in the streets was representative of high levels of polarisation in society generally - they reacted to it by exacerbating polarisation in political society
[so wouldn't those elites have been involved in the polarisation "on the streets"?]
They demanded increased concessions for the mobilised and extended toleration of disruption
Political polarisation let to military elites considering intervention
Polarisation can be contagious from one arena to another
Timing
None of the 17 cases studied here suffered a regime change during an economic boom. But bad economic performance was not unambiguously associated with regime breakdown
-Social movement literature - social movements emerge and lead to public polarisation when there are changes in political opportunity structures
Tarrow - the opening up of access to power / shifts in ruling alignments / availability of influential allies
Intensity - related to the density of social movements
Saliency - elites misjudged the size of social movements because they did not have good information on them [but how can you tell the real size of the social movements retrospectively.. just by using voting behaviour? is this a good measure? why did elites always get it wrong? would elites have had the capacity to put down these movements anyway?]
[Election results wouldn't be a good measure if a large part of the electorate felt disenfranchised or if party competition was limited/sham-like, or voting inertia hid true support for other groups]
pg.234
(more)
Notes.
Much of what elites attempt to do is conditioned by their judgement of how ordinary people will behave.
People -> individuality of the group's membership. Ordinary -> no extraordinary powers vis a vis the states in which they live.
Do they defend democracy or embrace dictatorship? And why/when etc.?
First challenge - "finding" ordinary people - disentangling them from civil society
Second challenge - two competing visions - ordinary people as "heroic", or as members of groups with destabilising influences
Study of Electoral Behaviour, Strikes, Demonstrations and Acts of Violence
Mass defections to extremist parties are rare
Extremist support usually a result of expansion of the franchise or mobilisation of non-voters (so non-voters are not ordinary people?). Changes in the composition of the electorate rather than changes in heart and mind caused extremist support to grow.
Blame lies with political elites
either wholly - their own democratic convictions were so weak they used public polarisation as a rationale for creating an authoritarian regime
Other times they "allowed" public polarisation to grow violent and threaten public order and the military as an institution - when the military was threatened, democracy was doomed
Chapter 1
What is civil society - why is it important?
"The network of formal and informal associations that mediate between individual actors and the state"
The offer the fellowship, resources and refinement that make acts of defiance seem feasible
Civil society as salvation
de Tocqueville regards it as the only way of preserving freedom
Lots of other positive adjectives about civil society
Civil society as a spoiler
in the 1970s it was cast in an ambiguous role
Huntingdon (1968) drew a distinction between institutionalised societies where the expansion of civil society reduces tensions, and praetorian societies in which participation of new groups exacerbates tensions.
Highly activist society can lead to democratic instability. Linz for example believes civil society should have no direct connections with those in power if democracy is to be preserved.
E.g. O'Donnell (1979) pre-coup Argentinian and Brazilian governments wre victimised by praetorian coalitions (and also collaborated in it)
When a certain level of development of society allows even the base to get organised, the trouble begins.
Elected officials can face a barely manageable schedule of political demands (can lead to unsolvable problems and crises?)
Tying in civil society with Linz theory - it leads to government incapacity by increasing the demands on government.
Hirschman (1970) - need a balance between alert and inert citizens
If civic organisations can work against democracy - it is logical that the individual actors that compose them be blamed
Bermeo's point - we can blame civil society but not individuals?
Strand of the literature claiming ordinary people are not ready for the freedom democracy allows (see P15) e.g. Working class authoritarianism (Lipset, 1960) had its roots in low education, low participation, little reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity and authoritarian family patterns.
Theory - in times of crisis ordinary people cannot be trusted to resist the lure of authoritarianism
For a regime to endure it has to continually prove its legitimacy, and can rely on loyalty to some extent but needs to prove to each generation
Institutions to control the populace
Sartori (1976) - party systems and party elites must restrain the forces of polarity inherent in political democracies. Party systems need to contain the ideological range and number of parties in the national legislature.
Conclusion - Ordinary people often play a PERIPHERAL role in the breakdown of democracy. In the cases where their role is more central, it's only partially captured by polarisation metaphor.
Mistaken the polarisation in "select and small groups" in civil society for polarisation in society as a whole. Voters generally did not polarise nor did public opinion shift to the edges of the left-right scale.
Chapter 7 - Polarisation and the ignorance of elites
In reality many people failed to polarise and Bermeo places the blame for democracy's demise overwhelmingly with political elites
Ordinary people rarely threw democracies off balance with their votes
Each of the many democracies studied (except Poland) fell to forces on the right but the democracies they replaced were of varied "hues".
The right do not necessarily unify against the left - e.g. if a right wing dictatorship takes over a right wing government - so the polarisation metaphor is not always accurate.
[Why would we need to assume polarisation? It's just one form of instability]
At the polls: even in Italy where the centre collapsed among political elites it still held its own at the polls.
Reason - loyalty and inertia - party identification is not easily changed - remarkably resistant to passing political events
If the party collapses by itself - or - if the composition of the electorate changes
Opportunity costs of political participation - collecting information is costly and party switching seems to be correlated with high levels of information (see p.224; Converse, in Campbell et al)
Weakness of using the unilinear, bipolar schema
Many parties don't particularly fit onto it
Often electoral alliances between parties with seemingly inconsistent ideologies made representation of particular votes difficult in countries such as Italy, Poland, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay.
Prefers to think of the policy landscape as a sphere
Polarisation in multiple arenas
It's a process as well as a condition. Growth of mutually antagonistic self identified groups. They are extremist (G Bingham Powell) if they offer the chance of radical change in the social, economic and political fabric of the existing system. (Is extremist the right word to use here?)
Different processes of polarisation:
- in public spaces
- at the polls
- in public opinion
- among political elites
Important to trace the trajectories of polarisation in different arenas because a democratic regime is itself composed of partial-regimes (Schmitter 1992)
Linz and Stepan (1996) "democracy is more than a regime" - it is an interacting system composed of 5 interrelated arenas - political society, civil society, economic society, rule of law, state apparatus.
[regimes need to maintain legitimacy in all of those areas in order to endure]
Role of elites - acting on the (generally) mistaken impression that polarisation in the streets was representative of high levels of polarisation in society generally - they reacted to it by exacerbating polarisation in political society
[so wouldn't those elites have been involved in the polarisation "on the streets"?]
They demanded increased concessions for the mobilised and extended toleration of disruption
Political polarisation let to military elites considering intervention
Polarisation can be contagious from one arena to another
Timing
None of the 17 cases studied here suffered a regime change during an economic boom. But bad economic performance was not unambiguously associated with regime breakdown
-Social movement literature - social movements emerge and lead to public polarisation when there are changes in political opportunity structures
Tarrow - the opening up of access to power / shifts in ruling alignments / availability of influential allies
Intensity - related to the density of social movements
Saliency - elites misjudged the size of social movements because they did not have good information on them [but how can you tell the real size of the social movements retrospectively.. just by using voting behaviour? is this a good measure? why did elites always get it wrong? would elites have had the capacity to put down these movements anyway?]
[Election results wouldn't be a good measure if a large part of the electorate felt disenfranchised or if party competition was limited/sham-like, or voting inertia hid true support for other groups]
pg.234
(more)
Linz (1978) Crisis, Breakdown and Re -equilibration
Linz, Juan (1978) Crisis, Breakdown and Re -equilibration
Reading list MT09 Week 4: Chp 3-4 pp50-86.
Chapter 3 - The Process of Breakdown.
How does a democratic regime break down? Disloyal versus loyal actors. The former want to end the regime, the latter to preserve it. As long as the electoral strength or the parliamentary representation of the disloyal parties does not constitute an absolute majority, a democratic regime can survive.
As long as it has legitimacy, the democratic regime can count on the passive obedience of most citizens and successfully repress violent challenges.
When the government is unable to solve a problem for which the disloyal opposition offers itself as a solution, the regime is in danger. If parties loyal to the regime can not compromise on a particular issue/set of issues, one/some of them may be tempted to align with disloyal opposition to promote that issue.
This can weaken the legitimacy of the regime by destroying trust in the system (the very act of a loyal party joining with a disloyal party), and may result in societal polarisation, which is also damaging for democracy.
If it is not possible to solve a pressing problem within the system, people have to decide what is more important, the problem or the system.
Concept of a polarised, centrifugal, multiparty system that is both a cause an a consequence of unsolvable problems.
What type of problems are unsolvable?
- Structural problems (international influences, resource imbalances): rarely the cause of a breakdown but if they become acute can become destabilising - e.g. an economic crisis
- Some problems are unsolvable if maintaining democratic freedoms
- Mistakes made by elites turning solvable problems into insuperable ones
- International problem involving domestic concession (e.g. climate change?)
Losing the support of the military/military leadership
Creates a military challenge to civil authority
Loss of the monopoly on organised political force
Government loses legitimacy when it allows groups with paramilitary discipline to emerge for political reasons. Tolerance of disloyal paramilitaries helped the disintegration of democratic rule in Italy, Germany, Austria and to some extent Spain (footnote 18)
Can not be sure of using the military to quell dissent
One sidedness in dealing with violent acts can lead to a loss of legitimacy, polarisation (government needs to be able to distance itself)
It needs mass but moderate response to uprisings - democracies MAY need larger security forces than dictatorships as they rely on numbers not strength
Following incompatible goals leads to an incapacity to reconcile conflicting objectives
Particularly in a crisis, governments depend on party organisations as well as the electorate for support.
If it is the mid-level cadres (usually most ideological) who are most important, this creates difficulties (they might prefer ideology to democracy)
Complex problems + fragmented leadership further weakens the system.
Define revolution:
A sovereign is the one who can decide in the state of emergency
If the transfer of loyalties to another sovereign takes place, revolution occured (Tilly)
Regimes with a long history of stability are more likely to survive than those without, as it generates loyalty/legitimacy among the members/civilians. (using Hirschman's theory of loyalty).
Crisis strata - to what extent can people be mobilised for or against the regime?
Affects how durable the regime it.
Theory - Crisis stricken groups who have leadership qualities, free time, discipline, skills in violence
Difference in Spain compared to Germany
Role of violence: usually doesn't directly lead to breakdown but contributes to the loss of legitimacy, loss of power then power vacuum
Elites failing to deal properly with violence can lead to regime breakdown. E.g. excessive lenience towards violent acts on one side
Summary of the model
THE REGIME AN UNSOLVABLE Loss of legitimacy Challenge to
[Structural factors] > PROBLEM > Disloyalty > regime
Democratic crisis and multinational states
Loyalty of citizens to the state should be greater than loyalty to another state in the making
Disloyal minority may become a majority by persuading people to take their view, or slowly change the social structure to become a majority
Consociationalism may reduce nationalist/seccessionist minority strains but preconditions for its success not always present and not easily achieved.
Theory - territory should be linked to culture and language otherwise risk of polarisation
Making a group a permanent minority through boundary setting can reduce legitimacy
If a minority is committed to maintaining its distinctive cultural heritage and cannot do so within the political system it could lead to secessionists aims.
Democracies are unstable in multinational states (footnote 27). Not many stable democracies in multinational states. Cause of breakdown?
Government instability / Political system causes
- Growing difficulty in forming coalitions
- Factionalisation and fragmentation of parties (see other lit on importance of parties)
- Shifts in electorates towards the extremes (other evidence - usually it's not the electorate that shifted to the extreme but the elites who mistakenly thought they did)
Coopting disloyal oppositions as the government is unwilling or unable to repress them
Does the electoral system promote competition or cooperation?
Abdication of democratic authenticity.
- e.g. turning political issues into supposedly technical issues to be dealt with by unelected officials or the judiciary
Presidentialism versus parlimentarianism
(more)
Reading list MT09 Week 4: Chp 3-4 pp50-86.
Chapter 3 - The Process of Breakdown.
How does a democratic regime break down? Disloyal versus loyal actors. The former want to end the regime, the latter to preserve it. As long as the electoral strength or the parliamentary representation of the disloyal parties does not constitute an absolute majority, a democratic regime can survive.
As long as it has legitimacy, the democratic regime can count on the passive obedience of most citizens and successfully repress violent challenges.
When the government is unable to solve a problem for which the disloyal opposition offers itself as a solution, the regime is in danger. If parties loyal to the regime can not compromise on a particular issue/set of issues, one/some of them may be tempted to align with disloyal opposition to promote that issue.
This can weaken the legitimacy of the regime by destroying trust in the system (the very act of a loyal party joining with a disloyal party), and may result in societal polarisation, which is also damaging for democracy.
If it is not possible to solve a pressing problem within the system, people have to decide what is more important, the problem or the system.
Concept of a polarised, centrifugal, multiparty system that is both a cause an a consequence of unsolvable problems.
What type of problems are unsolvable?
- Structural problems (international influences, resource imbalances): rarely the cause of a breakdown but if they become acute can become destabilising - e.g. an economic crisis
- Some problems are unsolvable if maintaining democratic freedoms
- Mistakes made by elites turning solvable problems into insuperable ones
- International problem involving domestic concession (e.g. climate change?)
Losing the support of the military/military leadership
Creates a military challenge to civil authority
Loss of the monopoly on organised political force
Government loses legitimacy when it allows groups with paramilitary discipline to emerge for political reasons. Tolerance of disloyal paramilitaries helped the disintegration of democratic rule in Italy, Germany, Austria and to some extent Spain (footnote 18)
Can not be sure of using the military to quell dissent
One sidedness in dealing with violent acts can lead to a loss of legitimacy, polarisation (government needs to be able to distance itself)
It needs mass but moderate response to uprisings - democracies MAY need larger security forces than dictatorships as they rely on numbers not strength
Following incompatible goals leads to an incapacity to reconcile conflicting objectives
Particularly in a crisis, governments depend on party organisations as well as the electorate for support.
If it is the mid-level cadres (usually most ideological) who are most important, this creates difficulties (they might prefer ideology to democracy)
Complex problems + fragmented leadership further weakens the system.
Define revolution:
A sovereign is the one who can decide in the state of emergency
If the transfer of loyalties to another sovereign takes place, revolution occured (Tilly)
Regimes with a long history of stability are more likely to survive than those without, as it generates loyalty/legitimacy among the members/civilians. (using Hirschman's theory of loyalty).
Crisis strata - to what extent can people be mobilised for or against the regime?
Affects how durable the regime it.
Theory - Crisis stricken groups who have leadership qualities, free time, discipline, skills in violence
Difference in Spain compared to Germany
Role of violence: usually doesn't directly lead to breakdown but contributes to the loss of legitimacy, loss of power then power vacuum
Elites failing to deal properly with violence can lead to regime breakdown. E.g. excessive lenience towards violent acts on one side
Summary of the model
THE REGIME AN UNSOLVABLE Loss of legitimacy Challenge to
[Structural factors] > PROBLEM > Disloyalty > regime
Democratic crisis and multinational states
Loyalty of citizens to the state should be greater than loyalty to another state in the making
Disloyal minority may become a majority by persuading people to take their view, or slowly change the social structure to become a majority
Consociationalism may reduce nationalist/seccessionist minority strains but preconditions for its success not always present and not easily achieved.
Theory - territory should be linked to culture and language otherwise risk of polarisation
Making a group a permanent minority through boundary setting can reduce legitimacy
If a minority is committed to maintaining its distinctive cultural heritage and cannot do so within the political system it could lead to secessionists aims.
Democracies are unstable in multinational states (footnote 27). Not many stable democracies in multinational states. Cause of breakdown?
Government instability / Political system causes
- Growing difficulty in forming coalitions
- Factionalisation and fragmentation of parties (see other lit on importance of parties)
- Shifts in electorates towards the extremes (other evidence - usually it's not the electorate that shifted to the extreme but the elites who mistakenly thought they did)
Coopting disloyal oppositions as the government is unwilling or unable to repress them
Does the electoral system promote competition or cooperation?
Abdication of democratic authenticity.
- e.g. turning political issues into supposedly technical issues to be dealt with by unelected officials or the judiciary
Presidentialism versus parlimentarianism
(more)
MT09 - Week 4 reading list - Democratization: Reversals, Prevention, and Poor Substitutes
Aim of the session: To analyse why democratization gets reversed, blocked or stalled.
Discussion topics:
(a) What factors have explained the breakdown of democracy in the past and are they likely to have validity in the future?
(b) What factors explain why the process of democratization gets blocked or stalled?
Readings:
(a) Democratization’s Reversals
· Linz, Juan (1978) Crisis, Breakdown and Re -equilibration Chp 3-4 pp50-86.
· Bermeo, Nancy (2003) Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy Introduction, Chp1 pp1 -20 and Chp 7 pp.221-256.
· Cappocia, Giovanni. Defending Democracy; Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe Chp 3 pp. 47-67.
(b) Preventing Democratization
· Bellin, Eva.(2004) “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: A Comparative
Perspective,” Comparative Politics , 36, 2 (2004): 139-157.
· Brownlee, Jason. (2007) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization pp 16-43. (c) Stalled (and Stopped) Transitions
· Brown, Archie 2001“Evaluating Russia’s Democratization” in Archie Brown ed. Contemporary
Russian Politics: A Reader pp546-68.
· Carothers, Thomas 2002 “The End of the Transition Paradigm” JD 13:1 pp5-21.
· Diamond, Larry and Leonardo Morlino 2004 “The Quality of Democracy: An Overview” J D 15
(4) 20-31.
· Howard, Marc Morjé, and Philip G. Roessler (2006) ? Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes ? American Journal of Political Science 50 (2), 365–381.
· Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Evolution of
Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era (with Lucan A. Way). New York: Cambridge University Press Chapter 1 and conclusion.
· Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder, (2005) Electing to Fight Why Emerging Democracies go to
War. Chapt 3 pp.39-68.
· Mainwaring, Scott, Ana Maria Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez eds (2006). The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes Chpt 1pp 1-35 and Chpt 10 295-332 if possible.
· Mattes, Robert and Michael Bratton (2007) Learning about Democracy in Africa:
Awareness, Performance, and Experience A J P S 51 (1), 192–217.
· McFaul, Michael, 2002 “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship” W P vol 54 n.2
pp212-44.
· O’Donnell, Guillermo (1999 )“Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies” in Andreas
Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner eds. The Self-restraining State: Power and
Accountability in New Democracies pp29-52.
· Schedler, Andreas 2002 “Elections without Democracy” “The Menu of Manipulation”J D
vol 13, n.2 April 2002 pp 36-50.
· Whitefield, Stephen (2006) “Mind the Representation Gap: Explaining Differences in Public Views of Representation in Post-communist Democracies” C P S. Vol. 39, Iss. 6; p. 733.
· Whitehead, Laurence (2002) Democratization Theory and Experience Chpt 7 165-185 and
Chpts 4 ,5 pp90- 135 if possible. (more)
Discussion topics:
(a) What factors have explained the breakdown of democracy in the past and are they likely to have validity in the future?
(b) What factors explain why the process of democratization gets blocked or stalled?
Readings:
(a) Democratization’s Reversals
· Linz, Juan (1978) Crisis, Breakdown and Re -equilibration Chp 3-4 pp50-86.
· Bermeo, Nancy (2003) Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy Introduction, Chp1 pp1 -20 and Chp 7 pp.221-256.
· Cappocia, Giovanni. Defending Democracy; Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe Chp 3 pp. 47-67.
(b) Preventing Democratization
· Bellin, Eva.(2004) “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: A Comparative
Perspective,” Comparative Politics , 36, 2 (2004): 139-157.
· Brownlee, Jason. (2007) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization pp 16-43. (c) Stalled (and Stopped) Transitions
· Brown, Archie 2001“Evaluating Russia’s Democratization” in Archie Brown ed. Contemporary
Russian Politics: A Reader pp546-68.
· Carothers, Thomas 2002 “The End of the Transition Paradigm” JD 13:1 pp5-21.
· Diamond, Larry and Leonardo Morlino 2004 “The Quality of Democracy: An Overview” J D 15
(4) 20-31.
· Howard, Marc Morjé, and Philip G. Roessler (2006) ? Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes ? American Journal of Political Science 50 (2), 365–381.
· Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Evolution of
Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era (with Lucan A. Way). New York: Cambridge University Press Chapter 1 and conclusion.
· Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder, (2005) Electing to Fight Why Emerging Democracies go to
War. Chapt 3 pp.39-68.
· Mainwaring, Scott, Ana Maria Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez eds (2006). The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes Chpt 1pp 1-35 and Chpt 10 295-332 if possible.
· Mattes, Robert and Michael Bratton (2007) Learning about Democracy in Africa:
Awareness, Performance, and Experience A J P S 51 (1), 192–217.
· McFaul, Michael, 2002 “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship” W P vol 54 n.2
pp212-44.
· O’Donnell, Guillermo (1999 )“Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies” in Andreas
Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner eds. The Self-restraining State: Power and
Accountability in New Democracies pp29-52.
· Schedler, Andreas 2002 “Elections without Democracy” “The Menu of Manipulation”J D
vol 13, n.2 April 2002 pp 36-50.
· Whitefield, Stephen (2006) “Mind the Representation Gap: Explaining Differences in Public Views of Representation in Post-communist Democracies” C P S. Vol. 39, Iss. 6; p. 733.
· Whitehead, Laurence (2002) Democratization Theory and Experience Chpt 7 165-185 and
Chpts 4 ,5 pp90- 135 if possible. (more)
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