Brock (1998) The Seduction of Hillary Rodham

ADD
Available - American Inst VHL OpenShelf E 887 .C55 B76 1996

Notes. (more)

Skocpol (1996) Boomerang

Boomerang: Health Care Reform and the Turn against Government
Available - American Inst VHL OpenShelf RA 395 .A3 S56 1996
Available - Social Sci. SSL Main Lib RA395.A3.SKO

Notes. (more)

Johnson & Broder (1996) The System

The System: The American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point (Paperback)
~ Haynes Johnson (Author), David Broder (Author)
American Inst - VHL OpenShelf - RA 395 .A3 J64 1996
Social Sci. SSL Main Lib - RA395.A3.JOH

Notes. (more)

Schuster et al (1998) How good is healthcare in the US?

How Good Is the Quality of Health Care in the United States?
Author(s): Mark A. Schuster, Elizabeth A. McGlynn, Robert H. Brook
Source: The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 76, No. 4, Improving the Quality of Health Care (1998), pp. 517-563
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Milbank Memorial Fund
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3350511


Notes. (more)

Healthcare reform clarifying the concepts

Article - bit simplistic, from 1993 debate
Available - JStor PDF

Notes. (more)

Price et al (2006) Locating the Issue Public

LOCATING THE ISSUE PUBLIC:
The Multi-Dimensional Nature of Engagement with Health Care Reform
(Issue Publics and Healthcare reform)
Available - JStor PDF

Notes. (more)

Research Design Essay (plan)

Suggested plan for research design essay. Question "how did campaign finance affect voting on healthcare reform?" or "implied threats and implied bribes - Citizens United and legislator action"

Does spending help secure votes in congressional elections (literature review)
Theoretical basis for spending influence (lit review)

Does funding change legislator action?
Models - lobbyists give to legislators most different in views (persuasion/vote buying) - literature review
Lobbyists give to legislators most similar in views (legislative subsidy) - literature review

What is healthcare reform? Summary of historical background
Detailed explanation of the various bills/congressional discussions since 111th congress

Research methods - break down the bill - who voted for against? who voted for/against certain provisions, e.g. public option

Regression model - dependent variable - voting for provisions - independent variables - party, proportion of donations by PACs etc., polling info?

Process tracing for key actors
(more)

Palda (2002) Campaign Finance An Introductory Essay

Palda's views on campaign finance, coming from the freedom of speech angle - following on from his 1994 book "how much is your vote worth?"
Available - PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Financing the 2004 Election (Brookings Institution Press)

ADD
American Inst
VHL OpenShelf JK 1991 .F57 2006 Available

Notes. (more)

Brookings Institution Press - Financing the 2008 Election: Assessing Reform

Financing the 2008 Election: Assessing Reform (Paperback)
~ Anthony Corrado (Editor), David B. Magleby (Editor)
Available - Amazon Link
# Paperback: 240 pages
# Publisher: Brookings Institution Press (January 2010)
# Language: English
# ISBN-10: 0815703325
# ISBN-13: 978-0815703327


Notes. (more)

Campaign Finance - implied threats and implied bribes

Another approach to looking at the effect of money that isn't spent directly.

Implied Threat - since Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission can the threat of issue ads change actions of legislators/candidates?

Implied Bribe - what do legislators do after they leave office? Does this give them skewed incentives? (more)

Gais (1998) Improper Influence

Improper influence : campaign finance law, political interest groups, and the problem of equality / Thomas Gais.
Publisher Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, c1998
American Inst
VHL OpenShelf KF 4920 .G35 1998 Available

Notes. (more)

Biersack, Herrnson and Wilcox (1999) After the Revolution

After the revolution : PACs, lobbies, and the Republican Congress / Robert Biersack, Paul S. Herrnson, Clyde Wilcox, general editors.
Available - American Inst
VHL OpenShelf JK 1991 .A66 1999

Notes. (more)

Baron (1994) Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters

Electoral Competition with Informed and Uniformed Voters
Author(s): David P. Baron
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 33-47
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944880
Available - Google Docs

Formal analysis based on candidates designing policies to sell policies to interest groups to generate funds to appeal to uninformed voters, and choosing policies that appeal to informed voters.

Cited by: http://www.jstor.org/stable/info/2944880?seq=1&type=cite (more)

Austen-Smith (1995) Campaign Contributions and Access

Campaign Contributions and Access
Author(s): David Austen-Smith
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Sep., 1995), pp. 566-581
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082974

Goes through the 3 theories of campaign contributions and access.
Predicated on the idea that congressmen genuinely do have their own preferences and so PACs merely gain a chance to state their case in front of sympathetic legislators with consistent preferences. It is about providing information rather than changing prefs.

How is this measure of preferences made?

// Read this piece - overview of theoretical literature based on formal analysis
Is access what's important? (more)

Coleman and Manna (2000) Campaign Spending and the Quality of Democracy

Congressional Campaign Spending and the Quality of Democracy
Author(s): John J. Coleman and Paul F. Manna
Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Aug., 2000), pp. 757-789
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science
Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647959

Their result is that more spending does have some positive outcomes, based on survey data of various types of political attitudes. Based on 1994-1996 House Elections only.

How they state their claim "Despite the concerns of reformers, we find that campaign spending produces generally beneficial effects. Campaign spending contributes importantly to key aspects of democracy and political community such as knowledge and affect, while not damaging public trust or involvement."

Did they get the direction of causation right? Need to check that higher spending not a result of higher contributions which is a result of higher levels of all these variables... (more)

Bonneau (2007) The Effects of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections

The Effects of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections
Author(s): Chris W. Bonneau
Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 489-499
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4623847
Available - PDF

Conclusion is that spending more money helps the challenger, not the incumbent
The incumbent already has free publicity so spending more money doesn't help (as much)
Argument therefore that limiting campaign contributions (for state supreme court judges) would serve to increase incumbency advantage (more)

Artes Vinuela (2007) Campaign spending and office seeking motivations

Campaign spending and office-seeking motivations: an
empirical analysis
Available - http://www.springerlink.com/content/k705751136445576/fulltext.pdf

Campaign spending per capita increases with stakes for winner (measured by appointment power of office).

campaign spending per capita increases with the level of self-government of the region. Our results concord with those reported for other countries with very different systems of campaign funding

// So people spend more to win more important races. Hardly surprising. Suggests actors believe in a link between campaign spending and vote share. Would go against rational choice view that policy is all that matters.
(more)

Stratman (2002) Can special interests buy congressional votes?

Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation
* Thomas Stratmann
* Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 45, No. 2, Part 1 (Oct., 2002), pp. 345-373
* Published by: The University of Chicago Press

Available - Google Docs
PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Hall and Wayman (1990) Buying time: Moneyed interests...

Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees
* Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman
* The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (Sep., 1990), pp. 797-820
* Published by: American Political Science Association

Available - Google Docs
PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Hall and Deardorf (2006) Lobbying as legislative subsidy

Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
Available - Google Docs
PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Esterling (2007) Campaign Contributions and Attention to Policy Analysis in Congressional Committees

Buying Expertise: Campaign Contributions and Attention to Policy
Analysis in Congressional Committees
KEVIN M. ESTERLING University of California, Riverside
Available - Google Docs
PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Confessore (2003) Welcome to the Machine

Confessore, Nicholas. 2003. “Welcome to the Machine.”Washington Monthly, July/
August
Available - Google Docs
Available - link

Notes. (more)

Baumgartner et al (1998) Basic Interests

Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of
Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Available - SSL JK1118.BAU

Notes. (more)

Zinn (1980) A People's History of the US

Available - SSL - E178.1.ZIN

Notes. (more)

Thelen (2004) How Institutions Evolve

Thelen, Kathleen Ann. How Institutions Evolve : The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Available - SSL - HF5549.5.T7.THE (and issue desk copy)

In conjunction with presentation for research methods class:
Class 2 (week 5): Case studies and small-n studies. (Bermeo/Whitefield).
Students should produce a critique of the strengths and weaknesses of two important case studies/small-N studies in the literature (Scharpf (1991) and Thelen (2004)).

Overview of issues to be addressed:

• What do you see as the main strengths, what as the main weaknesses of the respective studies with respect to their research design?
• Briefly summarize the results of the respective studies, and assess their generalisability. Do the authors discuss generalisability?
• Having read the studies by Scharpf and Thelen, what are your thoughts about the practicability of the positions expressed in the debate between Lieberson and Savolainen?.

(more)

Simon Johnson and James Kwak (2010) 13 Bankers

Released 30 March 2010
Available - ?

Notes. (more)

HT10 - Week 4 Reading List - Cabinet Formation

Aim of the session: To critically explore cross-national theories accounting for the formation of cabinets and to assess empirical strategies for testing these theories.

Discussion topics:
(a) Which aspects of coalition formation and portfolio allocation can the size of parties and their policy preferences account for?
(b) In what way do institutions shape coalition formation and portfolio allocation?
(c) Assess the empirical strategies that have been used to test coalition theories.

Readings:
(a) The size of parties & policy preferences
· Riker, William (1962), The Theory of Political Coalitions
· Axelrod, Robert (1970), Conflict of Interests
· DeSwaan, Abram (1973), Coalition Theories and Government Formation. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
· Laver, M. (1998), ‘Models of government formation.’ Annual Review of Political Science: 1-25.
· Strøm, Kaare (1990), Minority Government and Majority Rule
· Or Strøm, Kaare (1984), ‘Minority Governments in Parliamentary democracies: The rationality of non-winning cabinet solutions’. Comparative Political Studies Vol. 17, No. 2, 199-227 (1984)
· van Roozenthal, Peter (1992), ‘The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability.’ Legislative Studies Quarterly 17: 5-36.
· Laver, Michael J. and Norman Schofield (1990), Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
· Laver, Michael J. and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1996), Making and Breaking Governments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
· Volden, Craig and Clifford J. Carruba (2004), ‘The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies.’ American Journal of Political Science 48: 521-537.
· Paul V. Warwick, James N. Druckman (2006), The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship. European Journal of Political Research, 45 Issue 4, 635-665.

(b) Institutions:
· Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks (1988), ‘Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes.’ American Political Science Review 82(2): 405-422.
· Baron, David B. (1991), ‘A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems.’ American Political Science Review 85: 137-164.
· Baron, David B. (1993), ‘Government Formation and Endogenous Parties.’ American Political Science Review 83: 1181-1206.
· Strøm, Kaare, Ian Budge and Michael J. Laver (1994), ‘Constraints on Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems.’ American Journal of Political Science 38: 303-335.
· Diermeier, D. (2006), ‘Coalition Government’ (chapter 9), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, 162-179.
· Diermeier, D. and A. Merlo (2004), ‘An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures.’ Journal of Public Economics 8: 783-797.
· Druckman, James N. and Michael F. Thies (2002), ‘The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration.’ American Journal of Political Science 46: 760-771.
· Ansolabhere, Stephen, James M. Snyder Jr., Aaron B. Strauss, and Michael M. Ting (2005), ‘Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments.’ American Journal of Political Science 49(3): 550-563.
· Mershon, C. (1996). "The Costs of Coalition: Coalition Theories and Italian Governments." The American Political Science Review 90(3): 534-554.
· Martin, Lanny W. and Randolph T. Stevenson (2001), ‘Government Formation in
Parliamentary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science, 45: 33-50. 18
· Warwick, Paul (1996), ‘Coalition Government Membership in Western European Parliamentary Democracies.’ British Journal of Political Science 26: 471-499.
· Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strøm, eds. (2000), Coalition Governments in Western Europe.
· Amorim Neto, Octavio and Kaare Strom (2006), ‘Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science, 36(4): 619-643. (more)

Judicial Activism

Judicial Activism
A Synopsis

The issue of "Judicial Activism" is a live one in most countries of the common
law. The accusation that judges have exceeded their proper function is often
made by politicians, media commentators and even some lawyers. The
accusers allege that judges should stick to applying the law they
should not
make it.

The slightest familiarity with current and recent debates over judicial decisions
in Australia, Canada, India and the United States shows that "judicial
activism" is a topic that lawyers need to address seriously. In Australia,
following a closely divided decision of the High Court on native title in favour
of the Aboriginal claimants, the majority judges were accused of "activism".
The Acting Prime Minister of Australia promised to appoint "Capital C
Conservatives" to replace them when their positions fell vacant. The majority
decision of the US Supreme Court in Bush v Gore was denounced by its
critics as "judicial activism" as
was the more recent decision in Lawrence v
Texas declaring that State sodomy offences were unconstitutional. The more
recent court decisions over the recall of the Governor of California have been
described by opponents as instances of "judicial activism". In Canada, the
court decisions upholding the right of homosexuals to "gay marriage" was
defended by supporters as an example of equal rights under the Charter of
Rights. But to others it was a case of "judicial activism", usurping the role of
the elected government and parliament.

In these lectures, Justice Kirby explores these and other cases. Upon one
view, the common law is a continuous legacy of judicial activism over nearly
800 years. But when is judicial creativity in the construction of a written
constitution, the interpretation of legislation or the creation of new principles of
the common law a proper case of judicial reasoning? And when is it an
impermissible instance of judicial activism that exceeds the judge's function?
In examining the judicial method in a topical context, Justice Kirby suggests
that the debate over judicial activism has so far largely passed the judiciary of
the United Kingdom by. However, he points out that recent developments
make it unlikely that this state of affairs will persist. The developments he
mentions include the proposed creation of a Supreme Court for the United
Kingdom, the resulting identification of the Supreme Court judges as public
figures, the increased roles of the judge in reviewing legislation under the
Humans Rights Act, the developments in judicial review of administrative
action and the new procedures for selecting and training judges and changes
in the arrangements affecting the senior members of the Bar from whom the
judges are chosen. The role of the courts under the proposed European
Constitution is another potential agent of change.


Link to article

Notes. (more)