Aim of the session: To critically explore cross-national theories accounting for the formation of cabinets and to assess empirical strategies for testing these theories.
Discussion topics:
(a) Which aspects of coalition formation and portfolio allocation can the size of parties and their policy preferences account for?
(b) In what way do institutions shape coalition formation and portfolio allocation?
(c) Assess the empirical strategies that have been used to test coalition theories.
Readings:
(a) The size of parties & policy preferences
· Riker, William (1962), The Theory of Political Coalitions
· Axelrod, Robert (1970), Conflict of Interests
· DeSwaan, Abram (1973), Coalition Theories and Government Formation. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
· Laver, M. (1998), ‘Models of government formation.’ Annual Review of Political Science: 1-25.
· Strøm, Kaare (1990), Minority Government and Majority Rule
· Or Strøm, Kaare (1984), ‘Minority Governments in Parliamentary democracies: The rationality of non-winning cabinet solutions’. Comparative Political Studies Vol. 17, No. 2, 199-227 (1984)
· van Roozenthal, Peter (1992), ‘The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability.’ Legislative Studies Quarterly 17: 5-36.
· Laver, Michael J. and Norman Schofield (1990), Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
· Laver, Michael J. and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1996), Making and Breaking Governments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
· Volden, Craig and Clifford J. Carruba (2004), ‘The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies.’ American Journal of Political Science 48: 521-537.
· Paul V. Warwick, James N. Druckman (2006), The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship. European Journal of Political Research, 45 Issue 4, 635-665.
(b) Institutions:
· Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks (1988), ‘Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes.’ American Political Science Review 82(2): 405-422.
· Baron, David B. (1991), ‘A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems.’ American Political Science Review 85: 137-164.
· Baron, David B. (1993), ‘Government Formation and Endogenous Parties.’ American Political Science Review 83: 1181-1206.
· Strøm, Kaare, Ian Budge and Michael J. Laver (1994), ‘Constraints on Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems.’ American Journal of Political Science 38: 303-335.
· Diermeier, D. (2006), ‘Coalition Government’ (chapter 9), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, 162-179.
· Diermeier, D. and A. Merlo (2004), ‘An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures.’ Journal of Public Economics 8: 783-797.
· Druckman, James N. and Michael F. Thies (2002), ‘The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration.’ American Journal of Political Science 46: 760-771.
· Ansolabhere, Stephen, James M. Snyder Jr., Aaron B. Strauss, and Michael M. Ting (2005), ‘Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments.’ American Journal of Political Science 49(3): 550-563.
· Mershon, C. (1996). "The Costs of Coalition: Coalition Theories and Italian Governments." The American Political Science Review 90(3): 534-554.
· Martin, Lanny W. and Randolph T. Stevenson (2001), ‘Government Formation in
Parliamentary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science, 45: 33-50. 18
· Warwick, Paul (1996), ‘Coalition Government Membership in Western European Parliamentary Democracies.’ British Journal of Political Science 26: 471-499.
· Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strøm, eds. (2000), Coalition Governments in Western Europe.
· Amorim Neto, Octavio and Kaare Strom (2006), ‘Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science, 36(4): 619-643.
