Available - SSL - E178.1.ZIN
Notes.
(more)
Monday, 15 February 2010
Sunday, 14 February 2010
Thelen (2004) How Institutions Evolve
Thelen, Kathleen Ann. How Institutions Evolve : The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Available - SSL - HF5549.5.T7.THE (and issue desk copy)
In conjunction with presentation for research methods class:
Class 2 (week 5): Case studies and small-n studies. (Bermeo/Whitefield).
Students should produce a critique of the strengths and weaknesses of two important case studies/small-N studies in the literature (Scharpf (1991) and Thelen (2004)).
Overview of issues to be addressed:
Available - SSL - HF5549.5.T7.THE (and issue desk copy)
In conjunction with presentation for research methods class:
Class 2 (week 5): Case studies and small-n studies. (Bermeo/Whitefield).
Students should produce a critique of the strengths and weaknesses of two important case studies/small-N studies in the literature (Scharpf (1991) and Thelen (2004)).
Overview of issues to be addressed:
- What do you see as the main strengths, what as the main weaknesses of the respective studies with respect to their research design?
- Briefly summarize the results of the respective studies, and assess their generalisability. Do the authors discuss generalisability?
- Having read the studies by Scharpf and Thelen, what are your thoughts about the practicability of the positions expressed in the debate between Lieberson and Savolainen?.
Thursday, 4 February 2010
HT10 - Week 4 Reading List - Cabinet Formation
Aim of the session: To critically explore cross-national theories accounting for the formation of cabinets and to assess empirical strategies for testing these theories.
Discussion topics:
(a) Which aspects of coalition formation and portfolio allocation can the size of parties and their policy preferences account for?
(b) In what way do institutions shape coalition formation and portfolio allocation?
(c) Assess the empirical strategies that have been used to test coalition theories.
Readings:
(a) The size of parties & policy preferences
· Riker, William (1962), The Theory of Political Coalitions
· Axelrod, Robert (1970), Conflict of Interests
· DeSwaan, Abram (1973), Coalition Theories and Government Formation. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
· Laver, M. (1998), ‘Models of government formation.’ Annual Review of Political Science: 1-25.
· Strøm, Kaare (1990), Minority Government and Majority Rule
· Or Strøm, Kaare (1984), ‘Minority Governments in Parliamentary democracies: The rationality of non-winning cabinet solutions’. Comparative Political Studies Vol. 17, No. 2, 199-227 (1984)
· van Roozenthal, Peter (1992), ‘The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability.’ Legislative Studies Quarterly 17: 5-36.
· Laver, Michael J. and Norman Schofield (1990), Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
· Laver, Michael J. and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1996), Making and Breaking Governments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
· Volden, Craig and Clifford J. Carruba (2004), ‘The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies.’ American Journal of Political Science 48: 521-537.
· Paul V. Warwick, James N. Druckman (2006), The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship. European Journal of Political Research, 45 Issue 4, 635-665.
(b) Institutions:
· Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks (1988), ‘Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes.’ American Political Science Review 82(2): 405-422.
· Baron, David B. (1991), ‘A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems.’ American Political Science Review 85: 137-164.
· Baron, David B. (1993), ‘Government Formation and Endogenous Parties.’ American Political Science Review 83: 1181-1206.
· Strøm, Kaare, Ian Budge and Michael J. Laver (1994), ‘Constraints on Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems.’ American Journal of Political Science 38: 303-335.
· Diermeier, D. (2006), ‘Coalition Government’ (chapter 9), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, 162-179.
· Diermeier, D. and A. Merlo (2004), ‘An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures.’ Journal of Public Economics 8: 783-797.
· Druckman, James N. and Michael F. Thies (2002), ‘The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration.’ American Journal of Political Science 46: 760-771.
· Ansolabhere, Stephen, James M. Snyder Jr., Aaron B. Strauss, and Michael M. Ting (2005), ‘Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments.’ American Journal of Political Science 49(3): 550-563.
· Mershon, C. (1996). "The Costs of Coalition: Coalition Theories and Italian Governments." The American Political Science Review 90(3): 534-554.
· Martin, Lanny W. and Randolph T. Stevenson (2001), ‘Government Formation in
Parliamentary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science, 45: 33-50. 18
· Warwick, Paul (1996), ‘Coalition Government Membership in Western European Parliamentary Democracies.’ British Journal of Political Science 26: 471-499.
· Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strøm, eds. (2000), Coalition Governments in Western Europe.
· Amorim Neto, Octavio and Kaare Strom (2006), ‘Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science, 36(4): 619-643. (more)
Discussion topics:
(a) Which aspects of coalition formation and portfolio allocation can the size of parties and their policy preferences account for?
(b) In what way do institutions shape coalition formation and portfolio allocation?
(c) Assess the empirical strategies that have been used to test coalition theories.
Readings:
(a) The size of parties & policy preferences
· Riker, William (1962), The Theory of Political Coalitions
· Axelrod, Robert (1970), Conflict of Interests
· DeSwaan, Abram (1973), Coalition Theories and Government Formation. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
· Laver, M. (1998), ‘Models of government formation.’ Annual Review of Political Science: 1-25.
· Strøm, Kaare (1990), Minority Government and Majority Rule
· Or Strøm, Kaare (1984), ‘Minority Governments in Parliamentary democracies: The rationality of non-winning cabinet solutions’. Comparative Political Studies Vol. 17, No. 2, 199-227 (1984)
· van Roozenthal, Peter (1992), ‘The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability.’ Legislative Studies Quarterly 17: 5-36.
· Laver, Michael J. and Norman Schofield (1990), Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
· Laver, Michael J. and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1996), Making and Breaking Governments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
· Volden, Craig and Clifford J. Carruba (2004), ‘The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies.’ American Journal of Political Science 48: 521-537.
· Paul V. Warwick, James N. Druckman (2006), The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship. European Journal of Political Research, 45 Issue 4, 635-665.
(b) Institutions:
· Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks (1988), ‘Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes.’ American Political Science Review 82(2): 405-422.
· Baron, David B. (1991), ‘A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems.’ American Political Science Review 85: 137-164.
· Baron, David B. (1993), ‘Government Formation and Endogenous Parties.’ American Political Science Review 83: 1181-1206.
· Strøm, Kaare, Ian Budge and Michael J. Laver (1994), ‘Constraints on Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems.’ American Journal of Political Science 38: 303-335.
· Diermeier, D. (2006), ‘Coalition Government’ (chapter 9), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, 162-179.
· Diermeier, D. and A. Merlo (2004), ‘An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures.’ Journal of Public Economics 8: 783-797.
· Druckman, James N. and Michael F. Thies (2002), ‘The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration.’ American Journal of Political Science 46: 760-771.
· Ansolabhere, Stephen, James M. Snyder Jr., Aaron B. Strauss, and Michael M. Ting (2005), ‘Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments.’ American Journal of Political Science 49(3): 550-563.
· Mershon, C. (1996). "The Costs of Coalition: Coalition Theories and Italian Governments." The American Political Science Review 90(3): 534-554.
· Martin, Lanny W. and Randolph T. Stevenson (2001), ‘Government Formation in
Parliamentary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science, 45: 33-50. 18
· Warwick, Paul (1996), ‘Coalition Government Membership in Western European Parliamentary Democracies.’ British Journal of Political Science 26: 471-499.
· Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strøm, eds. (2000), Coalition Governments in Western Europe.
· Amorim Neto, Octavio and Kaare Strom (2006), ‘Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science, 36(4): 619-643. (more)
Monday, 1 February 2010
Judicial Activism
Judicial Activism
A Synopsis
The issue of "Judicial Activism" is a live one in most countries of the common
law. The accusation that judges have exceeded their proper function is often
made by politicians, media commentators and even some lawyers. The
accusers allege that judges should stick to applying the law they
should not
make it.
The slightest familiarity with current and recent debates over judicial decisions
in Australia, Canada, India and the United States shows that "judicial
activism" is a topic that lawyers need to address seriously. In Australia,
following a closely divided decision of the High Court on native title in favour
of the Aboriginal claimants, the majority judges were accused of "activism".
The Acting Prime Minister of Australia promised to appoint "Capital C
Conservatives" to replace them when their positions fell vacant. The majority
decision of the US Supreme Court in Bush v Gore was denounced by its
critics as "judicial activism" as
was the more recent decision in Lawrence v
Texas declaring that State sodomy offences were unconstitutional. The more
recent court decisions over the recall of the Governor of California have been
described by opponents as instances of "judicial activism". In Canada, the
court decisions upholding the right of homosexuals to "gay marriage" was
defended by supporters as an example of equal rights under the Charter of
Rights. But to others it was a case of "judicial activism", usurping the role of
the elected government and parliament.
In these lectures, Justice Kirby explores these and other cases. Upon one
view, the common law is a continuous legacy of judicial activism over nearly
800 years. But when is judicial creativity in the construction of a written
constitution, the interpretation of legislation or the creation of new principles of
the common law a proper case of judicial reasoning? And when is it an
impermissible instance of judicial activism that exceeds the judge's function?
In examining the judicial method in a topical context, Justice Kirby suggests
that the debate over judicial activism has so far largely passed the judiciary of
the United Kingdom by. However, he points out that recent developments
make it unlikely that this state of affairs will persist. The developments he
mentions include the proposed creation of a Supreme Court for the United
Kingdom, the resulting identification of the Supreme Court judges as public
figures, the increased roles of the judge in reviewing legislation under the
Humans Rights Act, the developments in judicial review of administrative
action and the new procedures for selecting and training judges and changes
in the arrangements affecting the senior members of the Bar from whom the
judges are chosen. The role of the courts under the proposed European
Constitution is another potential agent of change.
Link to article
Notes. (more)
A Synopsis
The issue of "Judicial Activism" is a live one in most countries of the common
law. The accusation that judges have exceeded their proper function is often
made by politicians, media commentators and even some lawyers. The
accusers allege that judges should stick to applying the law they
should not
make it.
The slightest familiarity with current and recent debates over judicial decisions
in Australia, Canada, India and the United States shows that "judicial
activism" is a topic that lawyers need to address seriously. In Australia,
following a closely divided decision of the High Court on native title in favour
of the Aboriginal claimants, the majority judges were accused of "activism".
The Acting Prime Minister of Australia promised to appoint "Capital C
Conservatives" to replace them when their positions fell vacant. The majority
decision of the US Supreme Court in Bush v Gore was denounced by its
critics as "judicial activism" as
was the more recent decision in Lawrence v
Texas declaring that State sodomy offences were unconstitutional. The more
recent court decisions over the recall of the Governor of California have been
described by opponents as instances of "judicial activism". In Canada, the
court decisions upholding the right of homosexuals to "gay marriage" was
defended by supporters as an example of equal rights under the Charter of
Rights. But to others it was a case of "judicial activism", usurping the role of
the elected government and parliament.
In these lectures, Justice Kirby explores these and other cases. Upon one
view, the common law is a continuous legacy of judicial activism over nearly
800 years. But when is judicial creativity in the construction of a written
constitution, the interpretation of legislation or the creation of new principles of
the common law a proper case of judicial reasoning? And when is it an
impermissible instance of judicial activism that exceeds the judge's function?
In examining the judicial method in a topical context, Justice Kirby suggests
that the debate over judicial activism has so far largely passed the judiciary of
the United Kingdom by. However, he points out that recent developments
make it unlikely that this state of affairs will persist. The developments he
mentions include the proposed creation of a Supreme Court for the United
Kingdom, the resulting identification of the Supreme Court judges as public
figures, the increased roles of the judge in reviewing legislation under the
Humans Rights Act, the developments in judicial review of administrative
action and the new procedures for selecting and training judges and changes
in the arrangements affecting the senior members of the Bar from whom the
judges are chosen. The role of the courts under the proposed European
Constitution is another potential agent of change.
Link to article
Notes. (more)
Thursday, 28 January 2010
Strom et al (2005) Delegation and Accountability in New Democracies
Strom, Muller, Bergman (2005) Delegation and Accountability in New Democracies
Available - Chapter PDF links
Notes. (more)
Available - Chapter PDF links
Notes. (more)
Holstrom (1994) Judicialisation of Policy in Sweden
IRSR 1994 Volume 15 Number 2
Available - Link http://ips.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/15/2/153 PDF Link
Notes. (more)
Available - Link http://ips.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/15/2/153 PDF Link
Notes. (more)
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