Cappocia, Giovanni. Defending Democracy; Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe
Reading MT09 Week 4 - Chp 3 pp. 47-67.
Notes.
(more)
Wednesday 28 October 2009
Mansfield and Snyder (2005) Electing to Fight...
Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder, (2005) Electing to Fight Why Emerging Democracies go to War.
Reading list MT09 Week 4: Chapt 3 pp.39-68.
Notes. (more)
Reading list MT09 Week 4: Chapt 3 pp.39-68.
Notes. (more)
Levitsky and Way ( ) Competitive Authoritarianism
Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Evolution of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era (with Lucan A. Way). New York: Cambridge University Press Chapter 1 and conclusion.
Notes. (more)
Notes. (more)
Howard and Roessler (2006) Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritaran Regimes
Howard, Marc Morjé, and Philip G. Roessler (2006) ? Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes ? American Journal of Political Science 50 (2), 365–381.
Notes. (more)
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes ? American Journal of Political Science 50 (2), 365–381.
Notes. (more)
Diamond and Morlino (2004) The Quality of Democracy: An Overview
Diamond, Larry and Leonardo Morlino 2004 “The Quality of Democracy: An Overview” J D 15
(4) 20-31.
Notes (more)
(4) 20-31.
Notes (more)
Carothers (2002) The End of the Transition Paradigm
Carothers, Thomas 2002 “The End of the Transition Paradigm” JD 13:1 pp5-21.
This piece looks at cases after the supposed "third wave" of democracy, in 1970-1990.
The transition paradigm no longer works.
1. Any country moving away from dictatorial rule is in transition to democracy
2. Democracy tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages
1. The opening - democratic ferment and political liberalisation, cracks appear, most prominent fault line between hardliners and softliners.
2. Breakthrough, collapse of the regime and a rapid installation of a democratic one
3. Consolidation - slow process democratic forms are translated into democratic substance
Criticism - it involves a lot of teleology
4. Belief that underlying conditions, e.g. economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions, etc. will not be critical factors. All that was necessary was a decision by the political elites and the ability to fend off threats from antidemo forces.
Belief in the value of elections - giving post dictatorial regimes legitimacy and increasing political participation
Gray (sic) zone - countries that are neither dictatorial nor heading towards democracy
Syndromes:
Feckless pluralism and Dominant-power politics are 2 gray zone alternatives
(more)
This piece looks at cases after the supposed "third wave" of democracy, in 1970-1990.
The transition paradigm no longer works.
1. Any country moving away from dictatorial rule is in transition to democracy
2. Democracy tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages
1. The opening - democratic ferment and political liberalisation, cracks appear, most prominent fault line between hardliners and softliners.
2. Breakthrough, collapse of the regime and a rapid installation of a democratic one
3. Consolidation - slow process democratic forms are translated into democratic substance
Criticism - it involves a lot of teleology
4. Belief that underlying conditions, e.g. economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions, etc. will not be critical factors. All that was necessary was a decision by the political elites and the ability to fend off threats from antidemo forces.
Belief in the value of elections - giving post dictatorial regimes legitimacy and increasing political participation
Gray (sic) zone - countries that are neither dictatorial nor heading towards democracy
Syndromes:
Feckless pluralism and Dominant-power politics are 2 gray zone alternatives
(more)
Brown (2001) Evaluating Russia's Democratisation
Brown, Archie 2001 “Evaluating Russia’s Democratization” in Archie Brown ed. Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader pp546-68.
And here is the rest of it. (more)
And here is the rest of it. (more)
Brownlee (2007) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization
Brownlee, Jason. (2007) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization pp 16-43. (c) Stalled (and Stopped) Transitions
Notes (more)
Notes (more)
Bellin (2004) The robustness of authoritarianism in the middle east
Bellin, Eva.(2004) “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: A Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics , 36, 2 (2004): 139-157.
Notes. (more)
Notes. (more)
Bermeo (2003) Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times...
Bermeo, Nancy (2003) Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy Introduction, Chp1 pp1 -20 and Chp 7 pp.221-256.
Notes.
Much of what elites attempt to do is conditioned by their judgement of how ordinary people will behave.
People -> individuality of the group's membership. Ordinary -> no extraordinary powers vis a vis the states in which they live.
Do they defend democracy or embrace dictatorship? And why/when etc.?
First challenge - "finding" ordinary people - disentangling them from civil society
Second challenge - two competing visions - ordinary people as "heroic", or as members of groups with destabilising influences
Study of Electoral Behaviour, Strikes, Demonstrations and Acts of Violence
Mass defections to extremist parties are rare
Extremist support usually a result of expansion of the franchise or mobilisation of non-voters (so non-voters are not ordinary people?). Changes in the composition of the electorate rather than changes in heart and mind caused extremist support to grow.
Blame lies with political elites
either wholly - their own democratic convictions were so weak they used public polarisation as a rationale for creating an authoritarian regime
Other times they "allowed" public polarisation to grow violent and threaten public order and the military as an institution - when the military was threatened, democracy was doomed
Chapter 1
What is civil society - why is it important?
"The network of formal and informal associations that mediate between individual actors and the state"
The offer the fellowship, resources and refinement that make acts of defiance seem feasible
Civil society as salvation
de Tocqueville regards it as the only way of preserving freedom
Lots of other positive adjectives about civil society
Civil society as a spoiler
in the 1970s it was cast in an ambiguous role
Huntingdon (1968) drew a distinction between institutionalised societies where the expansion of civil society reduces tensions, and praetorian societies in which participation of new groups exacerbates tensions.
Highly activist society can lead to democratic instability. Linz for example believes civil society should have no direct connections with those in power if democracy is to be preserved.
E.g. O'Donnell (1979) pre-coup Argentinian and Brazilian governments wre victimised by praetorian coalitions (and also collaborated in it)
When a certain level of development of society allows even the base to get organised, the trouble begins.
Elected officials can face a barely manageable schedule of political demands (can lead to unsolvable problems and crises?)
Tying in civil society with Linz theory - it leads to government incapacity by increasing the demands on government.
Hirschman (1970) - need a balance between alert and inert citizens
If civic organisations can work against democracy - it is logical that the individual actors that compose them be blamed
Bermeo's point - we can blame civil society but not individuals?
Strand of the literature claiming ordinary people are not ready for the freedom democracy allows (see P15) e.g. Working class authoritarianism (Lipset, 1960) had its roots in low education, low participation, little reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity and authoritarian family patterns.
Theory - in times of crisis ordinary people cannot be trusted to resist the lure of authoritarianism
For a regime to endure it has to continually prove its legitimacy, and can rely on loyalty to some extent but needs to prove to each generation
Institutions to control the populace
Sartori (1976) - party systems and party elites must restrain the forces of polarity inherent in political democracies. Party systems need to contain the ideological range and number of parties in the national legislature.
Conclusion - Ordinary people often play a PERIPHERAL role in the breakdown of democracy. In the cases where their role is more central, it's only partially captured by polarisation metaphor.
Mistaken the polarisation in "select and small groups" in civil society for polarisation in society as a whole. Voters generally did not polarise nor did public opinion shift to the edges of the left-right scale.
Chapter 7 - Polarisation and the ignorance of elites
In reality many people failed to polarise and Bermeo places the blame for democracy's demise overwhelmingly with political elites
Ordinary people rarely threw democracies off balance with their votes
Each of the many democracies studied (except Poland) fell to forces on the right but the democracies they replaced were of varied "hues".
The right do not necessarily unify against the left - e.g. if a right wing dictatorship takes over a right wing government - so the polarisation metaphor is not always accurate.
[Why would we need to assume polarisation? It's just one form of instability]
At the polls: even in Italy where the centre collapsed among political elites it still held its own at the polls.
Reason - loyalty and inertia - party identification is not easily changed - remarkably resistant to passing political events
If the party collapses by itself - or - if the composition of the electorate changes
Opportunity costs of political participation - collecting information is costly and party switching seems to be correlated with high levels of information (see p.224; Converse, in Campbell et al)
Weakness of using the unilinear, bipolar schema
Many parties don't particularly fit onto it
Often electoral alliances between parties with seemingly inconsistent ideologies made representation of particular votes difficult in countries such as Italy, Poland, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay.
Prefers to think of the policy landscape as a sphere
Polarisation in multiple arenas
It's a process as well as a condition. Growth of mutually antagonistic self identified groups. They are extremist (G Bingham Powell) if they offer the chance of radical change in the social, economic and political fabric of the existing system. (Is extremist the right word to use here?)
Different processes of polarisation:
- in public spaces
- at the polls
- in public opinion
- among political elites
Important to trace the trajectories of polarisation in different arenas because a democratic regime is itself composed of partial-regimes (Schmitter 1992)
Linz and Stepan (1996) "democracy is more than a regime" - it is an interacting system composed of 5 interrelated arenas - political society, civil society, economic society, rule of law, state apparatus.
[regimes need to maintain legitimacy in all of those areas in order to endure]
Role of elites - acting on the (generally) mistaken impression that polarisation in the streets was representative of high levels of polarisation in society generally - they reacted to it by exacerbating polarisation in political society
[so wouldn't those elites have been involved in the polarisation "on the streets"?]
They demanded increased concessions for the mobilised and extended toleration of disruption
Political polarisation let to military elites considering intervention
Polarisation can be contagious from one arena to another
Timing
None of the 17 cases studied here suffered a regime change during an economic boom. But bad economic performance was not unambiguously associated with regime breakdown
-Social movement literature - social movements emerge and lead to public polarisation when there are changes in political opportunity structures
Tarrow - the opening up of access to power / shifts in ruling alignments / availability of influential allies
Intensity - related to the density of social movements
Saliency - elites misjudged the size of social movements because they did not have good information on them [but how can you tell the real size of the social movements retrospectively.. just by using voting behaviour? is this a good measure? why did elites always get it wrong? would elites have had the capacity to put down these movements anyway?]
[Election results wouldn't be a good measure if a large part of the electorate felt disenfranchised or if party competition was limited/sham-like, or voting inertia hid true support for other groups]
pg.234
(more)
Notes.
Much of what elites attempt to do is conditioned by their judgement of how ordinary people will behave.
People -> individuality of the group's membership. Ordinary -> no extraordinary powers vis a vis the states in which they live.
Do they defend democracy or embrace dictatorship? And why/when etc.?
First challenge - "finding" ordinary people - disentangling them from civil society
Second challenge - two competing visions - ordinary people as "heroic", or as members of groups with destabilising influences
Study of Electoral Behaviour, Strikes, Demonstrations and Acts of Violence
Mass defections to extremist parties are rare
Extremist support usually a result of expansion of the franchise or mobilisation of non-voters (so non-voters are not ordinary people?). Changes in the composition of the electorate rather than changes in heart and mind caused extremist support to grow.
Blame lies with political elites
either wholly - their own democratic convictions were so weak they used public polarisation as a rationale for creating an authoritarian regime
Other times they "allowed" public polarisation to grow violent and threaten public order and the military as an institution - when the military was threatened, democracy was doomed
Chapter 1
What is civil society - why is it important?
"The network of formal and informal associations that mediate between individual actors and the state"
The offer the fellowship, resources and refinement that make acts of defiance seem feasible
Civil society as salvation
de Tocqueville regards it as the only way of preserving freedom
Lots of other positive adjectives about civil society
Civil society as a spoiler
in the 1970s it was cast in an ambiguous role
Huntingdon (1968) drew a distinction between institutionalised societies where the expansion of civil society reduces tensions, and praetorian societies in which participation of new groups exacerbates tensions.
Highly activist society can lead to democratic instability. Linz for example believes civil society should have no direct connections with those in power if democracy is to be preserved.
E.g. O'Donnell (1979) pre-coup Argentinian and Brazilian governments wre victimised by praetorian coalitions (and also collaborated in it)
When a certain level of development of society allows even the base to get organised, the trouble begins.
Elected officials can face a barely manageable schedule of political demands (can lead to unsolvable problems and crises?)
Tying in civil society with Linz theory - it leads to government incapacity by increasing the demands on government.
Hirschman (1970) - need a balance between alert and inert citizens
If civic organisations can work against democracy - it is logical that the individual actors that compose them be blamed
Bermeo's point - we can blame civil society but not individuals?
Strand of the literature claiming ordinary people are not ready for the freedom democracy allows (see P15) e.g. Working class authoritarianism (Lipset, 1960) had its roots in low education, low participation, little reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity and authoritarian family patterns.
Theory - in times of crisis ordinary people cannot be trusted to resist the lure of authoritarianism
For a regime to endure it has to continually prove its legitimacy, and can rely on loyalty to some extent but needs to prove to each generation
Institutions to control the populace
Sartori (1976) - party systems and party elites must restrain the forces of polarity inherent in political democracies. Party systems need to contain the ideological range and number of parties in the national legislature.
Conclusion - Ordinary people often play a PERIPHERAL role in the breakdown of democracy. In the cases where their role is more central, it's only partially captured by polarisation metaphor.
Mistaken the polarisation in "select and small groups" in civil society for polarisation in society as a whole. Voters generally did not polarise nor did public opinion shift to the edges of the left-right scale.
Chapter 7 - Polarisation and the ignorance of elites
In reality many people failed to polarise and Bermeo places the blame for democracy's demise overwhelmingly with political elites
Ordinary people rarely threw democracies off balance with their votes
Each of the many democracies studied (except Poland) fell to forces on the right but the democracies they replaced were of varied "hues".
The right do not necessarily unify against the left - e.g. if a right wing dictatorship takes over a right wing government - so the polarisation metaphor is not always accurate.
[Why would we need to assume polarisation? It's just one form of instability]
At the polls: even in Italy where the centre collapsed among political elites it still held its own at the polls.
Reason - loyalty and inertia - party identification is not easily changed - remarkably resistant to passing political events
If the party collapses by itself - or - if the composition of the electorate changes
Opportunity costs of political participation - collecting information is costly and party switching seems to be correlated with high levels of information (see p.224; Converse, in Campbell et al)
Weakness of using the unilinear, bipolar schema
Many parties don't particularly fit onto it
Often electoral alliances between parties with seemingly inconsistent ideologies made representation of particular votes difficult in countries such as Italy, Poland, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay.
Prefers to think of the policy landscape as a sphere
Polarisation in multiple arenas
It's a process as well as a condition. Growth of mutually antagonistic self identified groups. They are extremist (G Bingham Powell) if they offer the chance of radical change in the social, economic and political fabric of the existing system. (Is extremist the right word to use here?)
Different processes of polarisation:
- in public spaces
- at the polls
- in public opinion
- among political elites
Important to trace the trajectories of polarisation in different arenas because a democratic regime is itself composed of partial-regimes (Schmitter 1992)
Linz and Stepan (1996) "democracy is more than a regime" - it is an interacting system composed of 5 interrelated arenas - political society, civil society, economic society, rule of law, state apparatus.
[regimes need to maintain legitimacy in all of those areas in order to endure]
Role of elites - acting on the (generally) mistaken impression that polarisation in the streets was representative of high levels of polarisation in society generally - they reacted to it by exacerbating polarisation in political society
[so wouldn't those elites have been involved in the polarisation "on the streets"?]
They demanded increased concessions for the mobilised and extended toleration of disruption
Political polarisation let to military elites considering intervention
Polarisation can be contagious from one arena to another
Timing
None of the 17 cases studied here suffered a regime change during an economic boom. But bad economic performance was not unambiguously associated with regime breakdown
-Social movement literature - social movements emerge and lead to public polarisation when there are changes in political opportunity structures
Tarrow - the opening up of access to power / shifts in ruling alignments / availability of influential allies
Intensity - related to the density of social movements
Saliency - elites misjudged the size of social movements because they did not have good information on them [but how can you tell the real size of the social movements retrospectively.. just by using voting behaviour? is this a good measure? why did elites always get it wrong? would elites have had the capacity to put down these movements anyway?]
[Election results wouldn't be a good measure if a large part of the electorate felt disenfranchised or if party competition was limited/sham-like, or voting inertia hid true support for other groups]
pg.234
(more)
Linz (1978) Crisis, Breakdown and Re -equilibration
Linz, Juan (1978) Crisis, Breakdown and Re -equilibration
Reading list MT09 Week 4: Chp 3-4 pp50-86.
Chapter 3 - The Process of Breakdown.
How does a democratic regime break down? Disloyal versus loyal actors. The former want to end the regime, the latter to preserve it. As long as the electoral strength or the parliamentary representation of the disloyal parties does not constitute an absolute majority, a democratic regime can survive.
As long as it has legitimacy, the democratic regime can count on the passive obedience of most citizens and successfully repress violent challenges.
When the government is unable to solve a problem for which the disloyal opposition offers itself as a solution, the regime is in danger. If parties loyal to the regime can not compromise on a particular issue/set of issues, one/some of them may be tempted to align with disloyal opposition to promote that issue.
This can weaken the legitimacy of the regime by destroying trust in the system (the very act of a loyal party joining with a disloyal party), and may result in societal polarisation, which is also damaging for democracy.
If it is not possible to solve a pressing problem within the system, people have to decide what is more important, the problem or the system.
Concept of a polarised, centrifugal, multiparty system that is both a cause an a consequence of unsolvable problems.
What type of problems are unsolvable?
- Structural problems (international influences, resource imbalances): rarely the cause of a breakdown but if they become acute can become destabilising - e.g. an economic crisis
- Some problems are unsolvable if maintaining democratic freedoms
- Mistakes made by elites turning solvable problems into insuperable ones
- International problem involving domestic concession (e.g. climate change?)
Losing the support of the military/military leadership
Creates a military challenge to civil authority
Loss of the monopoly on organised political force
Government loses legitimacy when it allows groups with paramilitary discipline to emerge for political reasons. Tolerance of disloyal paramilitaries helped the disintegration of democratic rule in Italy, Germany, Austria and to some extent Spain (footnote 18)
Can not be sure of using the military to quell dissent
One sidedness in dealing with violent acts can lead to a loss of legitimacy, polarisation (government needs to be able to distance itself)
It needs mass but moderate response to uprisings - democracies MAY need larger security forces than dictatorships as they rely on numbers not strength
Following incompatible goals leads to an incapacity to reconcile conflicting objectives
Particularly in a crisis, governments depend on party organisations as well as the electorate for support.
If it is the mid-level cadres (usually most ideological) who are most important, this creates difficulties (they might prefer ideology to democracy)
Complex problems + fragmented leadership further weakens the system.
Define revolution:
A sovereign is the one who can decide in the state of emergency
If the transfer of loyalties to another sovereign takes place, revolution occured (Tilly)
Regimes with a long history of stability are more likely to survive than those without, as it generates loyalty/legitimacy among the members/civilians. (using Hirschman's theory of loyalty).
Crisis strata - to what extent can people be mobilised for or against the regime?
Affects how durable the regime it.
Theory - Crisis stricken groups who have leadership qualities, free time, discipline, skills in violence
Difference in Spain compared to Germany
Role of violence: usually doesn't directly lead to breakdown but contributes to the loss of legitimacy, loss of power then power vacuum
Elites failing to deal properly with violence can lead to regime breakdown. E.g. excessive lenience towards violent acts on one side
Summary of the model
THE REGIME AN UNSOLVABLE Loss of legitimacy Challenge to
[Structural factors] > PROBLEM > Disloyalty > regime
Democratic crisis and multinational states
Loyalty of citizens to the state should be greater than loyalty to another state in the making
Disloyal minority may become a majority by persuading people to take their view, or slowly change the social structure to become a majority
Consociationalism may reduce nationalist/seccessionist minority strains but preconditions for its success not always present and not easily achieved.
Theory - territory should be linked to culture and language otherwise risk of polarisation
Making a group a permanent minority through boundary setting can reduce legitimacy
If a minority is committed to maintaining its distinctive cultural heritage and cannot do so within the political system it could lead to secessionists aims.
Democracies are unstable in multinational states (footnote 27). Not many stable democracies in multinational states. Cause of breakdown?
Government instability / Political system causes
- Growing difficulty in forming coalitions
- Factionalisation and fragmentation of parties (see other lit on importance of parties)
- Shifts in electorates towards the extremes (other evidence - usually it's not the electorate that shifted to the extreme but the elites who mistakenly thought they did)
Coopting disloyal oppositions as the government is unwilling or unable to repress them
Does the electoral system promote competition or cooperation?
Abdication of democratic authenticity.
- e.g. turning political issues into supposedly technical issues to be dealt with by unelected officials or the judiciary
Presidentialism versus parlimentarianism
(more)
Reading list MT09 Week 4: Chp 3-4 pp50-86.
Chapter 3 - The Process of Breakdown.
How does a democratic regime break down? Disloyal versus loyal actors. The former want to end the regime, the latter to preserve it. As long as the electoral strength or the parliamentary representation of the disloyal parties does not constitute an absolute majority, a democratic regime can survive.
As long as it has legitimacy, the democratic regime can count on the passive obedience of most citizens and successfully repress violent challenges.
When the government is unable to solve a problem for which the disloyal opposition offers itself as a solution, the regime is in danger. If parties loyal to the regime can not compromise on a particular issue/set of issues, one/some of them may be tempted to align with disloyal opposition to promote that issue.
This can weaken the legitimacy of the regime by destroying trust in the system (the very act of a loyal party joining with a disloyal party), and may result in societal polarisation, which is also damaging for democracy.
If it is not possible to solve a pressing problem within the system, people have to decide what is more important, the problem or the system.
Concept of a polarised, centrifugal, multiparty system that is both a cause an a consequence of unsolvable problems.
What type of problems are unsolvable?
- Structural problems (international influences, resource imbalances): rarely the cause of a breakdown but if they become acute can become destabilising - e.g. an economic crisis
- Some problems are unsolvable if maintaining democratic freedoms
- Mistakes made by elites turning solvable problems into insuperable ones
- International problem involving domestic concession (e.g. climate change?)
Losing the support of the military/military leadership
Creates a military challenge to civil authority
Loss of the monopoly on organised political force
Government loses legitimacy when it allows groups with paramilitary discipline to emerge for political reasons. Tolerance of disloyal paramilitaries helped the disintegration of democratic rule in Italy, Germany, Austria and to some extent Spain (footnote 18)
Can not be sure of using the military to quell dissent
One sidedness in dealing with violent acts can lead to a loss of legitimacy, polarisation (government needs to be able to distance itself)
It needs mass but moderate response to uprisings - democracies MAY need larger security forces than dictatorships as they rely on numbers not strength
Following incompatible goals leads to an incapacity to reconcile conflicting objectives
Particularly in a crisis, governments depend on party organisations as well as the electorate for support.
If it is the mid-level cadres (usually most ideological) who are most important, this creates difficulties (they might prefer ideology to democracy)
Complex problems + fragmented leadership further weakens the system.
Define revolution:
A sovereign is the one who can decide in the state of emergency
If the transfer of loyalties to another sovereign takes place, revolution occured (Tilly)
Regimes with a long history of stability are more likely to survive than those without, as it generates loyalty/legitimacy among the members/civilians. (using Hirschman's theory of loyalty).
Crisis strata - to what extent can people be mobilised for or against the regime?
Affects how durable the regime it.
Theory - Crisis stricken groups who have leadership qualities, free time, discipline, skills in violence
Difference in Spain compared to Germany
Role of violence: usually doesn't directly lead to breakdown but contributes to the loss of legitimacy, loss of power then power vacuum
Elites failing to deal properly with violence can lead to regime breakdown. E.g. excessive lenience towards violent acts on one side
Summary of the model
THE REGIME AN UNSOLVABLE Loss of legitimacy Challenge to
[Structural factors] > PROBLEM > Disloyalty > regime
Democratic crisis and multinational states
Loyalty of citizens to the state should be greater than loyalty to another state in the making
Disloyal minority may become a majority by persuading people to take their view, or slowly change the social structure to become a majority
Consociationalism may reduce nationalist/seccessionist minority strains but preconditions for its success not always present and not easily achieved.
Theory - territory should be linked to culture and language otherwise risk of polarisation
Making a group a permanent minority through boundary setting can reduce legitimacy
If a minority is committed to maintaining its distinctive cultural heritage and cannot do so within the political system it could lead to secessionists aims.
Democracies are unstable in multinational states (footnote 27). Not many stable democracies in multinational states. Cause of breakdown?
Government instability / Political system causes
- Growing difficulty in forming coalitions
- Factionalisation and fragmentation of parties (see other lit on importance of parties)
- Shifts in electorates towards the extremes (other evidence - usually it's not the electorate that shifted to the extreme but the elites who mistakenly thought they did)
Coopting disloyal oppositions as the government is unwilling or unable to repress them
Does the electoral system promote competition or cooperation?
Abdication of democratic authenticity.
- e.g. turning political issues into supposedly technical issues to be dealt with by unelected officials or the judiciary
Presidentialism versus parlimentarianism
(more)
MT09 - Week 4 reading list - Democratization: Reversals, Prevention, and Poor Substitutes
Aim of the session: To analyse why democratization gets reversed, blocked or stalled.
Discussion topics:
(a) What factors have explained the breakdown of democracy in the past and are they likely to have validity in the future?
(b) What factors explain why the process of democratization gets blocked or stalled?
Readings:
(a) Democratization’s Reversals
· Linz, Juan (1978) Crisis, Breakdown and Re -equilibration Chp 3-4 pp50-86.
· Bermeo, Nancy (2003) Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy Introduction, Chp1 pp1 -20 and Chp 7 pp.221-256.
· Cappocia, Giovanni. Defending Democracy; Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe Chp 3 pp. 47-67.
(b) Preventing Democratization
· Bellin, Eva.(2004) “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: A Comparative
Perspective,” Comparative Politics , 36, 2 (2004): 139-157.
· Brownlee, Jason. (2007) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization pp 16-43. (c) Stalled (and Stopped) Transitions
· Brown, Archie 2001“Evaluating Russia’s Democratization” in Archie Brown ed. Contemporary
Russian Politics: A Reader pp546-68.
· Carothers, Thomas 2002 “The End of the Transition Paradigm” JD 13:1 pp5-21.
· Diamond, Larry and Leonardo Morlino 2004 “The Quality of Democracy: An Overview” J D 15
(4) 20-31.
· Howard, Marc Morjé, and Philip G. Roessler (2006) ? Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes ? American Journal of Political Science 50 (2), 365–381.
· Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Evolution of
Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era (with Lucan A. Way). New York: Cambridge University Press Chapter 1 and conclusion.
· Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder, (2005) Electing to Fight Why Emerging Democracies go to
War. Chapt 3 pp.39-68.
· Mainwaring, Scott, Ana Maria Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez eds (2006). The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes Chpt 1pp 1-35 and Chpt 10 295-332 if possible.
· Mattes, Robert and Michael Bratton (2007) Learning about Democracy in Africa:
Awareness, Performance, and Experience A J P S 51 (1), 192–217.
· McFaul, Michael, 2002 “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship” W P vol 54 n.2
pp212-44.
· O’Donnell, Guillermo (1999 )“Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies” in Andreas
Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner eds. The Self-restraining State: Power and
Accountability in New Democracies pp29-52.
· Schedler, Andreas 2002 “Elections without Democracy” “The Menu of Manipulation”J D
vol 13, n.2 April 2002 pp 36-50.
· Whitefield, Stephen (2006) “Mind the Representation Gap: Explaining Differences in Public Views of Representation in Post-communist Democracies” C P S. Vol. 39, Iss. 6; p. 733.
· Whitehead, Laurence (2002) Democratization Theory and Experience Chpt 7 165-185 and
Chpts 4 ,5 pp90- 135 if possible. (more)
Discussion topics:
(a) What factors have explained the breakdown of democracy in the past and are they likely to have validity in the future?
(b) What factors explain why the process of democratization gets blocked or stalled?
Readings:
(a) Democratization’s Reversals
· Linz, Juan (1978) Crisis, Breakdown and Re -equilibration Chp 3-4 pp50-86.
· Bermeo, Nancy (2003) Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy Introduction, Chp1 pp1 -20 and Chp 7 pp.221-256.
· Cappocia, Giovanni. Defending Democracy; Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe Chp 3 pp. 47-67.
(b) Preventing Democratization
· Bellin, Eva.(2004) “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: A Comparative
Perspective,” Comparative Politics , 36, 2 (2004): 139-157.
· Brownlee, Jason. (2007) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization pp 16-43. (c) Stalled (and Stopped) Transitions
· Brown, Archie 2001“Evaluating Russia’s Democratization” in Archie Brown ed. Contemporary
Russian Politics: A Reader pp546-68.
· Carothers, Thomas 2002 “The End of the Transition Paradigm” JD 13:1 pp5-21.
· Diamond, Larry and Leonardo Morlino 2004 “The Quality of Democracy: An Overview” J D 15
(4) 20-31.
· Howard, Marc Morjé, and Philip G. Roessler (2006) ? Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes ? American Journal of Political Science 50 (2), 365–381.
· Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Evolution of
Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era (with Lucan A. Way). New York: Cambridge University Press Chapter 1 and conclusion.
· Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder, (2005) Electing to Fight Why Emerging Democracies go to
War. Chapt 3 pp.39-68.
· Mainwaring, Scott, Ana Maria Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez eds (2006). The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes Chpt 1pp 1-35 and Chpt 10 295-332 if possible.
· Mattes, Robert and Michael Bratton (2007) Learning about Democracy in Africa:
Awareness, Performance, and Experience A J P S 51 (1), 192–217.
· McFaul, Michael, 2002 “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship” W P vol 54 n.2
pp212-44.
· O’Donnell, Guillermo (1999 )“Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies” in Andreas
Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner eds. The Self-restraining State: Power and
Accountability in New Democracies pp29-52.
· Schedler, Andreas 2002 “Elections without Democracy” “The Menu of Manipulation”J D
vol 13, n.2 April 2002 pp 36-50.
· Whitefield, Stephen (2006) “Mind the Representation Gap: Explaining Differences in Public Views of Representation in Post-communist Democracies” C P S. Vol. 39, Iss. 6; p. 733.
· Whitehead, Laurence (2002) Democratization Theory and Experience Chpt 7 165-185 and
Chpts 4 ,5 pp90- 135 if possible. (more)
Tuesday 27 October 2009
McLean (2002) Review Article: William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetics
McLean, Iain (2002), ‘Review Article: William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetic (s)’.British Journal of Political Science 32, 535-558.
Link to PDF.
Notes. (more)
Link to PDF.
Notes. (more)
Sunday 25 October 2009
Weber (1946) Structures of Power
Weber, Max (1946), ‘Structures of Power’, in H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Available: New College PP 6 WEB
SSL - H33.WEB
Notes. (more)
Available: New College PP 6 WEB
SSL - H33.WEB
Notes. (more)
Post (2004) Leaders and their followers in a dangerous world
Post, Jerrold, Leaders and their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political
Behavior, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2004, Chapt 2
Leaders and their followers in a dangerous world : the psychology of political behavior / Jerrold M. Post ; with a foreword by Alexander George.
Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2004. .
Notes. (more)
Behavior, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2004, Chapt 2
Leaders and their followers in a dangerous world : the psychology of political behavior / Jerrold M. Post ; with a foreword by Alexander George.
Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2004. .
Notes. (more)
McLean (2002) Rational choice and British Politics
McLean, Iain (2002), Rational Choice and British Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric and Manipulation
from Peel to Blair
Available online (link).
Notes. (more)
from Peel to Blair
Available online (link).
Notes. (more)
Brown (2000) Mikhail Gobachev: Systemic Transformer
Brown, Archie, ‘Mikhail Gorbachev: Systemic Transformer’ in Leaders of Transition, Martin
Westlake ed. (2000), New York: St. Martin’s Press
Available SSL - JC330.3.LEA.
Notes. (more)
Westlake ed. (2000), New York: St. Martin’s Press
Available SSL - JC330.3.LEA.
Notes. (more)
Bowles (2005) Nixon's business
Bowles, Nigel, Nixon’s Business: Authority and Power in Presidential Politics, chapters 1, 3, and 7
Available SSL - E855.BOW.
Notes. (more)
Available SSL - E855.BOW.
Notes. (more)
Nagel (1993) Populism, Heresthetics and Political Stability
Nagel, Jack H., ‘Populism, Heresthetics and Political Stability: Richard Seddon and the Art of
Majority Rule’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 2. (Apr., 1993), pp. 139-174
Link to Cambridge Journals page - http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayIssue?jid=JPS&volumeId=23&issueId=02#.
Notes. (more)
Majority Rule’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 2. (Apr., 1993), pp. 139-174
Link to Cambridge Journals page - http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayIssue?jid=JPS&volumeId=23&issueId=02#.
Notes. (more)
George (1969) The Operational Code
George, Alexander L., ‘The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of
Political Leaders and Decision-Making’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Jun.,
1969), pp. 190-222.
Link to PDF.
Notes. (more)
Political Leaders and Decision-Making’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Jun.,
1969), pp. 190-222.
Link to PDF.
Notes. (more)
Capoccia (2001) Defending democracy: reactions to political extremism in inter-war europe
Capoccia, Giovanni (2001), ‘Defending Democracy: Reactions to Political Extremism in
Inter-war Europe’, EJPR, 39
Link to PDF
Also available as PDF saved on computer
Notes. (more)
Inter-war Europe’, EJPR, 39
Link to PDF
Also available as PDF saved on computer
Notes. (more)
Bienen (1993) ‘Leaders, Violence, and the Absence of Change in Africa’
Bienen, Henry, ‘Leaders, Violence, and the Absence of Change in Africa’, Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 108, No. 2, Summer, 1993, pp. 271-282.
Link to PDF.
Notes. (more)
Quarterly, Vol. 108, No. 2, Summer, 1993, pp. 271-282.
Link to PDF.
Notes. (more)
Ayman, Clemens and Fiedler (1995) ‘The contingency model of leadership effectiveness: its levels of analysis’
Ayman, Roya; Clemens, Martin M., and Fiedler, Fred, ‘The contingency model of leadership
effectiveness: its levels of analysis’, The Leadership Quarterly , 6, 2, Summer 1995, pp. 147-167.
Link to PDF.
Notes. (more)
effectiveness: its levels of analysis’, The Leadership Quarterly , 6, 2, Summer 1995, pp. 147-167.
Link to PDF.
Notes. (more)
HT 10 - Week 5 Reading List - Agency, Leadership and Politics
To assess the relationship between institutional leadership and democratic values. It is often observed that the concept, practice, and processes of leadership are little studied by political scientists. It has in recent years also often been observed that agency’s role in determining political outcomes is little understood. In this class, we shall consider whether these cla ims are warranted and why. We shall also consider what role leadership plays in executive, legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic institutions; and what problems leadership poses for democrats.
Discussion topics:
(a) What is leadership? Under what circumstances and why does agency matter? The first question requires us to consider how ‘leadership’ should be conceptualized. The second requires consideration of the relationship between agency, structure, and culture in policy processes that often exhibit path-dependent characteristics.
(b) Are the qualities of leadership reconcilable with democratic values? This question invites us to consider an awkwardly fundamental question with which Weber struggled and about which he offers a clear view. How does his account sit with liberal understandings of the nature of the state? Is the concept an embarrassment to democrats in general and to liberals in particular?
(c) Why has political science paid so little attention to the concept and practice of leadership? Given that political scientists have written so extensively about the state, executives, power, and policy, why do the notions of agency and leadership feature so little?
Readings:
· Aristotle (1998), The Politics, Cambridge University Press, pp. ix-xxvii;
· Ayman, Roya; Clemens, Martin M., and Fiedler, Fred, ‘The contingency model of leadership effectiveness: its levels of analysis’, The Leadership Quarterly , 6, 2, Summer 1995, pp. 147-167.
· Bienen, Henry, ‘Leaders, Violence, and the Absence of Change in Africa’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 108, No. 2, Summer, 1993, pp. 271-282.
· Bowles, Nigel, Nixon’s Business: Authority and Power in Presidential Politics, chapters 1, 3, and 7
· Brown, Archie, ‘Mikhail Gorbachev: Systemic Transformer’ in Leaders of Transition, Martin Westlake ed. (2000), New York: St. Martin’s Press
· Capoccia, Giovanni (2001), ‘Defending Democracy: Reactions to Political Extremism in Inter-war Europe’, EJPR, 39.
· George, Alexander L., ‘The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Jun., 1969), pp. 190-222.
· Hargrove, Edwin (2004), ‘History, Political Science and the Study of Leadership’ Polity July 36 (4)
· MacGregor Burns, James, Leadership
· Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Prince, chapters XII - XIX
· McLean, Iain, Rational Choice and British Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric and Manipulation from Peel to Blair
· McLean, Iain (2002), ‘Review Article: William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetic (s)’. British Journal of Political Science 32, 535-558.
· Marable, Manning, Black Leadership
· Nagel, Jack H., ‘Populism, Heresthetics and Political Stability: Richard Seddon and the Art of Majority Rule’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 2. (Apr., 1993), pp. 139-174.
· Post, Jerrold, Leaders and their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2004, Chapt 2
· Weber, Max (1946), ‘Structures of Power’, in H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press.
· Weber, Max (1988), ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, London.
· Yukl, Gary (2001), Leadership in Organizations, Prentice-Hall. (more)
Discussion topics:
(a) What is leadership? Under what circumstances and why does agency matter? The first question requires us to consider how ‘leadership’ should be conceptualized. The second requires consideration of the relationship between agency, structure, and culture in policy processes that often exhibit path-dependent characteristics.
(b) Are the qualities of leadership reconcilable with democratic values? This question invites us to consider an awkwardly fundamental question with which Weber struggled and about which he offers a clear view. How does his account sit with liberal understandings of the nature of the state? Is the concept an embarrassment to democrats in general and to liberals in particular?
(c) Why has political science paid so little attention to the concept and practice of leadership? Given that political scientists have written so extensively about the state, executives, power, and policy, why do the notions of agency and leadership feature so little?
Readings:
· Aristotle (1998), The Politics, Cambridge University Press, pp. ix-xxvii;
· Ayman, Roya; Clemens, Martin M., and Fiedler, Fred, ‘The contingency model of leadership effectiveness: its levels of analysis’, The Leadership Quarterly , 6, 2, Summer 1995, pp. 147-167.
· Bienen, Henry, ‘Leaders, Violence, and the Absence of Change in Africa’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 108, No. 2, Summer, 1993, pp. 271-282.
· Bowles, Nigel, Nixon’s Business: Authority and Power in Presidential Politics, chapters 1, 3, and 7
· Brown, Archie, ‘Mikhail Gorbachev: Systemic Transformer’ in Leaders of Transition, Martin Westlake ed. (2000), New York: St. Martin’s Press
· Capoccia, Giovanni (2001), ‘Defending Democracy: Reactions to Political Extremism in Inter-war Europe’, EJPR, 39.
· George, Alexander L., ‘The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2. (Jun., 1969), pp. 190-222.
· Hargrove, Edwin (2004), ‘History, Political Science and the Study of Leadership’ Polity July 36 (4)
· MacGregor Burns, James, Leadership
· Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Prince, chapters XII - XIX
· McLean, Iain, Rational Choice and British Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric and Manipulation from Peel to Blair
· McLean, Iain (2002), ‘Review Article: William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetic (s)’. British Journal of Political Science 32, 535-558.
· Marable, Manning, Black Leadership
· Nagel, Jack H., ‘Populism, Heresthetics and Political Stability: Richard Seddon and the Art of Majority Rule’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 2. (Apr., 1993), pp. 139-174.
· Post, Jerrold, Leaders and their Followers in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political Behavior, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2004, Chapt 2
· Weber, Max (1946), ‘Structures of Power’, in H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press.
· Weber, Max (1988), ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, London.
· Yukl, Gary (2001), Leadership in Organizations, Prentice-Hall. (more)
Saturday 24 October 2009
Bunce (2003) Rethinking recent democratization
Bunce, Valerie 2003 “Rethinking recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommuist
Experience”.WP . Vol. 55, Iss. 2; pg. 167-195.
Reading list MT09 Week 3
Hard Copy? yes
Link to pdf.
Notes. (more)
Experience”.WP . Vol. 55, Iss. 2; pg. 167-195.
Reading list MT09 Week 3
Hard Copy? yes
Link to pdf.
Notes. (more)
Lipset (1959) Some Social Requisites of Democracy
Seymour Martin Lipset. (1959)“Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy” APSR, Vol. 53, No. 1.(Mar., 1959), pp. 69-105
Reading list MT09 Week 3
Hard Copy: yes
Link to pdf.
Notes. (more)
Reading list MT09 Week 3
Hard Copy: yes
Link to pdf.
Notes. (more)
Boix, Carles, and Susan Stokes. (2003) “Endogenous Democratization"
Boix, Carles, and Susan Stokes. (2003) “Endogenous Democratization,” WP, Volume 55, Number 4, July.
Link to article (pdf).
Reading list MT09 Week 3
Hard copy: yes
Notes. (more)
Link to article (pdf).
Reading list MT09 Week 3
Hard copy: yes
Notes. (more)
Friday 23 October 2009
Thursday 22 October 2009
MT09 - Introduction to Comparative Government - Paul Chaisty
Weeks 6 and 8
Location: Room 1, 2 Church Walk (near St. Antony's)
Assignments: 2 substantial essays
Tutorial 1:
Week 6: “Whilst we now have good explanations to why democracies consolidate, it remains difficult to explain systematically why they become democracies in the first place.” Discuss. Tuturial 2:
Week 8: Do comparative theories of state capacity provide a sound basis for distinguishing between strong and weak states? (more)
Location: Room 1, 2 Church Walk (near St. Antony's)
Assignments: 2 substantial essays
Tutorial 1:
Week 6: “Whilst we now have good explanations to why democracies consolidate, it remains difficult to explain systematically why they become democracies in the first place.” Discuss. Tuturial 2:
Week 8: Do comparative theories of state capacity provide a sound basis for distinguishing between strong and weak states? (more)
Political Institutions Programme
Classes: MT09 Wednesdays, 9am SSL
Presentations - weeks 1 and 7.
Assignments: None
Reading lists:
MT09
Week 1
Week 2
Week 3
Week 4
Week 5
Week 6
Week 7
Week 8
(more)
Presentations - weeks 1 and 7.
Assignments: None
Reading lists:
MT09
Week 1
Week 2
Week 3
Week 4
Week 5
Week 6
Week 7
Week 8
(more)
Introduction to the Advanced Study of Politics and International Relations
MT09 - Thursdays 14:00 - 15:30.
Not in 6th week
Convenors: Liz Frazer and Eddie Keene
Assignment - 1000 word summary due end of MT09
Line-up.
Week 1: Eddie Keene
Week 2: Jennifer Walsh
Week 3
(more)
Not in 6th week
Convenors: Liz Frazer and Eddie Keene
Assignment - 1000 word summary due end of MT09
Line-up.
Week 1: Eddie Keene
Week 2: Jennifer Walsh
Week 3
(more)
Introduction to Advanced Study of Politics and IR - Lecture 2
The State of the IR debate.
Prof Jenny Walsh, Somerville
Lecture handout available: hard copy
Notes:
Jennifer Walsh specialised in Edmund Burke, Sovereignty and International Intervention
CONTEXT:
Critically analyse theory in terms of who is making the theory, what are their personal biases; under which rules are they operating?
Neo-Realism
Kenneth Waltz was the father, with his "Theory of International Politics"
Views the causes of conflicts in the international community due to Structural Factors
The differences with classical realism, see Morgenthau, human nature is not a primary explanatory variable
A. 1. A call to abandon the Inductivist Illusion
Classical realist scholars hope to find patterns/connections between real life cases
Instead, NR attempts to describe a priori using theories
Maybe he has a case of "economics envy"
Uses individualistic models of behaviour that are rolled into systems
2. Treatment of Power
Combined capabilities of a state (so balance of capabilities leads to balance of power)
with Motivations: minimum being survival and maximum being domination
3. Logic of Anarchy
Anarchy is not just a residual condition, it defines the system and places similar constraints on all states
B - 1. The Ordering principle
Domestic politics is characterised by heirarchy
International politics is characterised by anarchy
Conflictual behaviour is the natural result of anarchy
2. The balance of power
There is one unit level factor (state capabilities) but apart from this analysis is structural
Why shouldn't we examine other unit-level factors
Criticisms: the theory is not comprehensive (e.g. cannot explain WW1), but its point is parsimony not perfection
Neo-Liberalism response
More concerned with integration than conflict (e.g. Ernst Hoss)
Post 1945, realist school didn't have all of the answers
e.g. within context of EEC states sought to gain prosperity through collaboration
Power and interdependence
Pluralism: relax assumption that states are the only main players in international relations, e.g. multinationals, NGOs etc.
Alternative dynamics: e.g. interdependence and cooperation
Distinction between high politics and low politics (security / economic cooperation)
...but, in the 1970s the oil crisis affected state security in a number of ways
Similarities:
It was a response to Waltz but did assign rationalist language
e.g. The Keohane article admits it does share some factors
Its agenda is to explain cooperation under systems of anarchy
B. Keohane's definition of cooperation: states bringing policy preferences into conformity
Shares:
States as primary actors
Atomistic/utility maximising
Respond to material incentives
Under conditions of anarchy
--> but cooperation can result, due to mutual interests and material benefits of doing so
Theory focusses on minimising the costs - e.g. prisoners' dilemma, optimal behaviour is precluded by rational behaviour
NLI moves away from this outcome through the use of institutions and repeated interactions
The "Liberal" ideological foundation - there is a more optimistic view of the world
Assumption that the security dilemma is not the natural conclusion of intl. anarchy
Self interests can be changed (e.g. Roussea, real vs apparent interests)
The institutions envince the assumption that politics can help.
Keohane e.g. has become more explicitly normative over time
see the Baldwin reading for more on the debate at work
Absolute vs. Relative gains (another distinction)
NLI sees absolute gains
NR believes states are more concerned with relative gains
Waltz believes the ratio of the gain is important
But how do we know whether states are pursuing absolute or relative gains?
Are the two theories the same?
Ruggi believes the two are essentiall "neo-utilitarian", with a similar rationalist epistemology
Both ignore identity, rationality, culture etc.
both are conservative and don't tackle injustice or seek to change the status quo
Neither theory had much to say about the fall of the Berlin Wall
Both have a universe of self interested utility maximisers
The approaches under-specified many aspects of international relations
Ruggi's main observation: states have a sense of appropriate behaviour
(Social theory related)
Social constructivism has a different agenda
Where do the players come from, why do they have those preferences etc.? What are their identities and do these identities change over the course of the interaction?
To account for the interests of actors rather than just taking them as given - think about collective intention/agency
Agency is reflective, actors give post hoc meaning to their actions
How do we actually study ideas?
NLI and NR don't really study ideas, they focus on materialism
They may be included as focal points in games with multiple equilibria
Constructionists - have a more systematic treatment of ideas, are interested in shaping the game to affect outcomes
How are ideas transmitted?
Notion of intersubjectivity
e.g. sovereignty requires mutual recognition
This assumes that international relations can be conceived in societal terms
A form of knowledge different from positivism
Keohane's challenge to constructivists (reflectivism)
Weakness is in the lack of clear reglective research programmes that can be employed - says scholars will remain on the margins of the field unless they embrace empiricism.
Constructivists have responded with lots of empirical work over the past 20 years
Trying to bridge the divide between idiographic and nomothetic
(more)
Prof Jenny Walsh, Somerville
Lecture handout available: hard copy
Notes:
Jennifer Walsh specialised in Edmund Burke, Sovereignty and International Intervention
CONTEXT:
Critically analyse theory in terms of who is making the theory, what are their personal biases; under which rules are they operating?
Neo-Realism
Kenneth Waltz was the father, with his "Theory of International Politics"
Views the causes of conflicts in the international community due to Structural Factors
The differences with classical realism, see Morgenthau, human nature is not a primary explanatory variable
A. 1. A call to abandon the Inductivist Illusion
Classical realist scholars hope to find patterns/connections between real life cases
Instead, NR attempts to describe a priori using theories
Maybe he has a case of "economics envy"
Uses individualistic models of behaviour that are rolled into systems
2. Treatment of Power
Combined capabilities of a state (so balance of capabilities leads to balance of power)
with Motivations: minimum being survival and maximum being domination
3. Logic of Anarchy
Anarchy is not just a residual condition, it defines the system and places similar constraints on all states
B - 1. The Ordering principle
Domestic politics is characterised by heirarchy
International politics is characterised by anarchy
Conflictual behaviour is the natural result of anarchy
2. The balance of power
There is one unit level factor (state capabilities) but apart from this analysis is structural
Why shouldn't we examine other unit-level factors
Criticisms: the theory is not comprehensive (e.g. cannot explain WW1), but its point is parsimony not perfection
Neo-Liberalism response
More concerned with integration than conflict (e.g. Ernst Hoss)
Post 1945, realist school didn't have all of the answers
e.g. within context of EEC states sought to gain prosperity through collaboration
Power and interdependence
Pluralism: relax assumption that states are the only main players in international relations, e.g. multinationals, NGOs etc.
Alternative dynamics: e.g. interdependence and cooperation
Distinction between high politics and low politics (security / economic cooperation)
...but, in the 1970s the oil crisis affected state security in a number of ways
Similarities:
It was a response to Waltz but did assign rationalist language
e.g. The Keohane article admits it does share some factors
Its agenda is to explain cooperation under systems of anarchy
B. Keohane's definition of cooperation: states bringing policy preferences into conformity
Shares:
States as primary actors
Atomistic/utility maximising
Respond to material incentives
Under conditions of anarchy
--> but cooperation can result, due to mutual interests and material benefits of doing so
Theory focusses on minimising the costs - e.g. prisoners' dilemma, optimal behaviour is precluded by rational behaviour
NLI moves away from this outcome through the use of institutions and repeated interactions
The "Liberal" ideological foundation - there is a more optimistic view of the world
Assumption that the security dilemma is not the natural conclusion of intl. anarchy
Self interests can be changed (e.g. Roussea, real vs apparent interests)
The institutions envince the assumption that politics can help.
Keohane e.g. has become more explicitly normative over time
see the Baldwin reading for more on the debate at work
Absolute vs. Relative gains (another distinction)
NLI sees absolute gains
NR believes states are more concerned with relative gains
Waltz believes the ratio of the gain is important
But how do we know whether states are pursuing absolute or relative gains?
Are the two theories the same?
Ruggi believes the two are essentiall "neo-utilitarian", with a similar rationalist epistemology
Both ignore identity, rationality, culture etc.
both are conservative and don't tackle injustice or seek to change the status quo
Neither theory had much to say about the fall of the Berlin Wall
Both have a universe of self interested utility maximisers
The approaches under-specified many aspects of international relations
Ruggi's main observation: states have a sense of appropriate behaviour
(Social theory related)
Social constructivism has a different agenda
Where do the players come from, why do they have those preferences etc.? What are their identities and do these identities change over the course of the interaction?
To account for the interests of actors rather than just taking them as given - think about collective intention/agency
Agency is reflective, actors give post hoc meaning to their actions
How do we actually study ideas?
NLI and NR don't really study ideas, they focus on materialism
They may be included as focal points in games with multiple equilibria
Constructionists - have a more systematic treatment of ideas, are interested in shaping the game to affect outcomes
How are ideas transmitted?
Notion of intersubjectivity
e.g. sovereignty requires mutual recognition
This assumes that international relations can be conceived in societal terms
A form of knowledge different from positivism
Keohane's challenge to constructivists (reflectivism)
Weakness is in the lack of clear reglective research programmes that can be employed - says scholars will remain on the margins of the field unless they embrace empiricism.
Constructivists have responded with lots of empirical work over the past 20 years
Trying to bridge the divide between idiographic and nomothetic
(more)
Tuesday 20 October 2009
Boix (2003) Democracy and Redistribution
Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Week 3 reading: Pp. 1-109.
Available: SSL - JC423.BOI .
Notes. (more)
Week 3 reading: Pp. 1-109.
Available: SSL - JC423.BOI .
Notes. (more)
Monday 19 October 2009
Skocpol (1973) A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's...
Skocpol, Theda.1973 “A Critical Review of Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy” Politics and Society, Fall
Available (pdf link).
The mandate of the classical theory of sociology is to assess the prospects for freedom, rationality and democracy in a modernising world.
Moore's "Social Origins" was a product of the Marxist scholarly perspective.
Relies on the central conceptions of Marxist political sociology "the conception of social class as arising out of an historically specific set of economic relationships and of the class struggle as the basic stuff of politics". He chose to emphasise economic factors rather than culture or ideas.
I. An analytic summary
A. The Moral of the Story
Not written in the style of a scientist trying to create a falsifiable theory on comparative modernisation.
Moore believed that Marx would be "the last one to deduce social institutions from values" (1958)
Message: the costs from modernisation have been at least as bad as the costs from revolution, perhaps worse.
E.g. the enclosure movement in Britain, Indian democratic stagnation.
The structure of the book is more to work towards a moral conclusion than to test rigorously the Marxist hypothesis.
B. The theoretical argument
The class structures of agrarian states are undergoing the intial stages of economic modernisation are linked to alternate political outcomes via critical political events analysed as class struggles.
Variable 1: Commercial impulse (growth of urban based commodity markets)
Moore must provide variables which explain agrarian strata's a) political propensities, and b) opportunities for extra agrarian class alliances
Variable 2: The alliance between urgan and rural upper classes is important.
1) The form of commercial agriculture - labour repressive versus market
2) Peasant revolutionary potential
Most Marxist writers contrasted exploitative capital-proletariat relationship with some generic feudal lord-peasant exploitative relationship. This task Moore tackles by drawing his above 1 2 distinction.
Some forms of commercial agriculture are more conducive to democracy than others. It is the "use of political mechanisms" to repress the peasants that is a defining characteristic.
Skocpol later takes issue with this - is it a fair criticism or is it just a badly worded point?
Variable 3: Peasant revolutionary potential
Condition is that commercialisation must leave the peasantry at a moderate or low strength as to leave peasant society intact but "impaired".
There are a number of factors that determine whether peasants have a strong or weak revolutionary potential. Ties to landed upper class and degree of radical peasant solidarity.
Type of explanation that Moore is attempting is "sequence analysis" (Somers 1971). Sequence of events that are assumed to have a causal connection.
Certain events make certain other events more likely. Weberian notion of path dependence.
Moore does not obtain complete explanation or anything approaching it.
Assumes commericalisation flowing into industrialisation rather than explaining the process of development.
II. Social origins some fundamental problems
Self styled Weberians or neo-Weberians have criticised the book for either generalising too much or neglecting the causal role of ideas, or both.
A) problems with the operationalisation of the variable strength of the bourgeois impulse
B) difficulties with the distinction between market and labour-repressive forms of commercial agriculture
C) inadequacies of class struggle and class-coalition explanations of political conflicts and societal transformations
D) shortcomings inherent in a theoretical focus on exclusively intrasocietal change-producing processes
A. Bourgeois impulse - the phantom
Nothing said about determining the strength independently of the ppolitical outcomes
It has indirect effects, i.e. offers opportunities to classes
Deemphasis of direct bourgeois political activity
In a systematic assessment of its strength, consider the numbers dispersion and density of upper class urbanites, concentrating on town dwellers engaged in commerce and industry.
Is it really the bourgeois impulse that was important, or the effect it had on upper/lower class relations, and the widening of a semi-powerful society/dispersion of power
B. Market vs labour repressive commercial agriculture
E.g. the English landlords (who Moore identifies as market-commercial) employed Parliamentary decrees to enclose lands, used control of parish political offices to regulate the movement of labourers via administration of justice and the Poor Laws. How were they less dependent on "political mechanisms" for extracting a surplus?
No empirical grounds for market vs labour repressive distinction
I don't think it is as simple as finding the variable. The outcome is more important than operationalising a particular "cause". Think about the balances of power in partial states lit, Linz and Stepan 1996.
Moore labels the German state labour-repressive which Skocpol rejects on the basis that workers were hired not serfs. One of the key things about the German situation was that there were no local markets for produce - probably low commercialisation impulse amongst the peasants. So maybe Skocpol missed the point here.
In Japan for example which Moore claims is labour-repressive due to the very high surplus extracted from the lands, the conditions were actually in place where a market system could generate such high profits.
C. The inadequacy of Marxist political sociology
It has been assumed that pre-capitalist modes of production political and class domination were undifferentiated. Even if the political interests of the dominant class are compromised, in the long run the state is still run in the interests of the economically dominant class.
A focus on the ways in which seemingly autonomous political structures and processes are invariable constrained to function to create or preserve the capitalist mode of production. Due to... hegemonic ideology, or, control of bourgeois personnel of strategic parts of state systems, the conditioning effects of economic structures and class struggles. Could serve the interests of capitalism the best when the ruling class is not the politically governing class (Poulantzas 1968)
Nowhere is it admitted that the state might act against the long run economic interests of the dominant class or act to produce a new mode of production. Remained frozen within the assumptions that political structures are determined by the economic.
Moore breaks with the Marxist tradition by analysing pre-capitalist agrarian states.
(more)
Democracy” Politics and Society, Fall
Available (pdf link).
The mandate of the classical theory of sociology is to assess the prospects for freedom, rationality and democracy in a modernising world.
Moore's "Social Origins" was a product of the Marxist scholarly perspective.
Relies on the central conceptions of Marxist political sociology "the conception of social class as arising out of an historically specific set of economic relationships and of the class struggle as the basic stuff of politics". He chose to emphasise economic factors rather than culture or ideas.
I. An analytic summary
A. The Moral of the Story
Not written in the style of a scientist trying to create a falsifiable theory on comparative modernisation.
Moore believed that Marx would be "the last one to deduce social institutions from values" (1958)
Message: the costs from modernisation have been at least as bad as the costs from revolution, perhaps worse.
E.g. the enclosure movement in Britain, Indian democratic stagnation.
The structure of the book is more to work towards a moral conclusion than to test rigorously the Marxist hypothesis.
B. The theoretical argument
The class structures of agrarian states are undergoing the intial stages of economic modernisation are linked to alternate political outcomes via critical political events analysed as class struggles.
Variable 1: Commercial impulse (growth of urban based commodity markets)
Moore must provide variables which explain agrarian strata's a) political propensities, and b) opportunities for extra agrarian class alliances
Variable 2: The alliance between urgan and rural upper classes is important.
1) The form of commercial agriculture - labour repressive versus market
2) Peasant revolutionary potential
Most Marxist writers contrasted exploitative capital-proletariat relationship with some generic feudal lord-peasant exploitative relationship. This task Moore tackles by drawing his above 1 2 distinction.
Some forms of commercial agriculture are more conducive to democracy than others. It is the "use of political mechanisms" to repress the peasants that is a defining characteristic.
Skocpol later takes issue with this - is it a fair criticism or is it just a badly worded point?
Variable 3: Peasant revolutionary potential
Condition is that commercialisation must leave the peasantry at a moderate or low strength as to leave peasant society intact but "impaired".
There are a number of factors that determine whether peasants have a strong or weak revolutionary potential. Ties to landed upper class and degree of radical peasant solidarity.
Type of explanation that Moore is attempting is "sequence analysis" (Somers 1971). Sequence of events that are assumed to have a causal connection.
Certain events make certain other events more likely. Weberian notion of path dependence.
Moore does not obtain complete explanation or anything approaching it.
Assumes commericalisation flowing into industrialisation rather than explaining the process of development.
II. Social origins some fundamental problems
Self styled Weberians or neo-Weberians have criticised the book for either generalising too much or neglecting the causal role of ideas, or both.
A) problems with the operationalisation of the variable strength of the bourgeois impulse
B) difficulties with the distinction between market and labour-repressive forms of commercial agriculture
C) inadequacies of class struggle and class-coalition explanations of political conflicts and societal transformations
D) shortcomings inherent in a theoretical focus on exclusively intrasocietal change-producing processes
A. Bourgeois impulse - the phantom
Nothing said about determining the strength independently of the ppolitical outcomes
It has indirect effects, i.e. offers opportunities to classes
Deemphasis of direct bourgeois political activity
In a systematic assessment of its strength, consider the numbers dispersion and density of upper class urbanites, concentrating on town dwellers engaged in commerce and industry.
Is it really the bourgeois impulse that was important, or the effect it had on upper/lower class relations, and the widening of a semi-powerful society/dispersion of power
B. Market vs labour repressive commercial agriculture
E.g. the English landlords (who Moore identifies as market-commercial) employed Parliamentary decrees to enclose lands, used control of parish political offices to regulate the movement of labourers via administration of justice and the Poor Laws. How were they less dependent on "political mechanisms" for extracting a surplus?
No empirical grounds for market vs labour repressive distinction
I don't think it is as simple as finding the variable. The outcome is more important than operationalising a particular "cause". Think about the balances of power in partial states lit, Linz and Stepan 1996.
Moore labels the German state labour-repressive which Skocpol rejects on the basis that workers were hired not serfs. One of the key things about the German situation was that there were no local markets for produce - probably low commercialisation impulse amongst the peasants. So maybe Skocpol missed the point here.
In Japan for example which Moore claims is labour-repressive due to the very high surplus extracted from the lands, the conditions were actually in place where a market system could generate such high profits.
C. The inadequacy of Marxist political sociology
It has been assumed that pre-capitalist modes of production political and class domination were undifferentiated. Even if the political interests of the dominant class are compromised, in the long run the state is still run in the interests of the economically dominant class.
A focus on the ways in which seemingly autonomous political structures and processes are invariable constrained to function to create or preserve the capitalist mode of production. Due to... hegemonic ideology, or, control of bourgeois personnel of strategic parts of state systems, the conditioning effects of economic structures and class struggles. Could serve the interests of capitalism the best when the ruling class is not the politically governing class (Poulantzas 1968)
Nowhere is it admitted that the state might act against the long run economic interests of the dominant class or act to produce a new mode of production. Remained frozen within the assumptions that political structures are determined by the economic.
Moore breaks with the Marxist tradition by analysing pre-capitalist agrarian states.
(more)
Moore (1966) Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship
Moore, Barrington.1968 Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.
Reading Week 3: Part 3 Chpt 7 pp413-432.
Available - SSL - HN15.MOO .
Notes
Chapter VII is called "The Democratic Route to Modern Society".
(413)
The combining of capitalism and parliamentary democracy after a series of revolutions - this is the route of "bourgeois revolution". Occurred in England, France and US but the societies came from different starting points.
Capitalism that passed through reactionary political forms became fascism.
Peasant revolutions became communist societies in Russia and China.
(414)
These three forms are historical stages and they "display a limited determinate relation to each another".
However, the democratic revolution in England did affect what happened subsequently in Japan and Germany (particularly the availability of the "reactionary methods" which otherwise would not have been possible).
"The historical preconditions of each major political species differs sharply from the others"
Method of analysis - looking at "agrarian social features"
Definition of democracy - purpose of it - a long and incompete struggle to...
1. check arbitrary rulers
2. replace abitrary rules with just and rational ones
3. obtain a share for the underlying population in the making of rules
Bear in mind this definition of Moore's when considering his work and when considering other defnitions of democracy. He does not require universal suffrage to consider a state democratic. The clauses are slightly vague - we can think of degrees of democracy and democratisation as a gradual process rather than flicking a switch.
(415)
Question: are there structural differences in agrarian societies that might in some cases favour certain development paths?
Starting points are not decisive in themselves but can influence.
Believes there is a convincing case to be made that Western Feudalism contained institutional features that predisposed it towards democracy including growth in the notion of immunity of certain groups and persons from the power of the ruler [and] the conception of the right to resistance of unjust authority [plus] conception of a contract as a mutual engagement freely undertaken by free persons (feudal notion of vassalage)
This complex arose only in Western Europe.
(416)
In Russia there did develop a system of estates the soslovii but Ivan the Terrible "broke the back of the nobility".
Bureacratic China developed the concept of the Mandate of Heaven that ligitimised some resistance to unjust oppression, but w/o a strong notion of corporate immunity
Feudalism arose in Japan but with heavy stress on loyalty to superiors and divine leader
Lacked conception of engagement among theoretical equals (e.g. vassalage)
Traditional despotisms may arise where a central authority is able to perform a variety of tasks or supervise activities essential to the working of the whole society (e.g. controlling Water supply, see Wittfogel, but probably too narrow a notion).
(417)
The persistence of royal absolutism or preindustrial bureacratic rule has created conditions unfavourable to Western democracy.
Even though these royal absolutisms or agrarian bureacracies did exist in the countries that subsequently did democratise.
Strong monarchical institutions checked the turbulence of the nobility. Strong state that gradually democratised.
Another precondition: balance of power between the crown and the nobility. Agrees with the "pluralist notion" that an independent nobility is important.
(418)
Achievement of this balance is usually the result or aftermath of a large amount of violence.
If nobility seeks freedom in the absence of a bourgois revolution - highly unfavourable to development of democracy.
Agreement with the Marxist thesis that a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers an "indispensable element".
(419)
Decisive determinant (key variable) has the landed aristocracy acquired commercial traits?
Feudal system: landowner, serfs work his land and keep some of the produce, with some common land
Advance of commerce in towns and demands of absolutist rulers for taxes meant landed required more cash. Three main responses to this problem
(420)
English turned to a form of commercial farming allowing the peasants more autonomy.
French left the peasants in de facto possession of the soil, then took a percentage and marketed it.
Manorial reaction in E.Europe. E.German Junkers reduced peasants to serfdom in order to grow and export grain. Similar process in Russia due to political causes.
In England this turn to commercial farming led to less reliance on the crown, reaction against fumbling Stuart attempts at absolutism. It also created a strong link to the towns.
Where there's a weak commercial impulse among the landed upper classes, there remains a huge peasant mass which creates problems for democracy creation.
So commercialisation was important - but for the peasants as well as the landed. Where they got more opportunity to generate their own wealth this may have been an important factor.
(421)
Maintenance of plantation slavery in the US was an obstacle
Landed upper class requires a state with a strong apparatus of repression, imposes climate of political opinion opposed to human freedom.
Encourages the preponderance of the countryside over the towns which remain shipment centres to overseas territories.
Brutalising consequences of the elites relationship with its workforce.
Question: Why/how did this transition to commercial agriculture take place?
(422)
There were differences in opportunities to develop commercial agriculture, e.g. existence of a market in nearby towns and adequate transportation. Role of population density and geography?
Transformation of peasants into some other form of social grouping augurs best for democracy.
(423)
For peasants living at the margin of physical existence, modernisation might be too risky, particularly if the profit is likely to go to someone else. (The peasants had to take some risk).
Two variables so far: relationship of landed aristocracy to the monarchy and the commericial impulses (requirement of production for the market) [plus third variable] relationship of landed upper classes with town dwellers (upper stratum: bourgeoisie).
The coalitions and countercoalitions among these latter groups created the framework and environment of political action. What situations contributed to the development of a free society?
Natural lines of cleavage - requirement of cheap food / cheap goods. Class differences can cut across rural-urban cleavage (Marxist)
(424)
Convergent interests between upper ranks of town dwellers and landed upper classes occurred in Tudor and Stuart England. The convergence led both groups to oppose the royal authority. English bougeoisie was trading with foreign markets whereas the French were reliant more on arms trade with the king, meaning they were more dependent on the crown.
Height of English bourgeoisie power was between the 17th and 19th century - foreign and domestic rivals not yet brought to their full powers.
(425)
Also important for the commercial and industrial leaders to become a dominant element in society. Allows landed upper class to take on a "bourgeois hue"
England's "final solution" to the peasant question - the sheep enclosures. No massive reservoir of peasants to serve the reactionary ends of the landed upper classes. Instability of French democracy in the 19th and 20th centuries partly because it didn't escape the peasant problem.
The brutality of the enclosures reminds the limits to peaceful transitions to democracy. Moore is saying the enclosures were a necessary step towards democracy. They reduced subsistence farming and increased the number of labourers available to industry, and increased the commercialisation impulse of the landed upper classes.
The Civil War checked royal absolutism and gave the aristocracy more power to destroy peasant society.
(428)
Conception of a "bourgeois revolution". No seizing of the reins of power. The aristocracy in Britain retained control of the political machinery through the 19th century due to the importance of capitalism in the countryside.
(429)
The key elements to a bourgeois society are the right to vote, representation in a legislature that is not just a rubber stamp, an objective system of law without privileges by birth, property rights, free speech, freedom of assembly.
(430)
Argument: landed upper classes either helped to make the bourgeois revolution or were destroyed by it. Resisting capitalism meant they were swept aside by its convulsions. The capitalist and democratic tide is one and the same.
(more)
Reading Week 3: Part 3 Chpt 7 pp413-432.
Available - SSL - HN15.MOO .
Notes
Chapter VII is called "The Democratic Route to Modern Society".
(413)
The combining of capitalism and parliamentary democracy after a series of revolutions - this is the route of "bourgeois revolution". Occurred in England, France and US but the societies came from different starting points.
Capitalism that passed through reactionary political forms became fascism.
Peasant revolutions became communist societies in Russia and China.
(414)
These three forms are historical stages and they "display a limited determinate relation to each another".
However, the democratic revolution in England did affect what happened subsequently in Japan and Germany (particularly the availability of the "reactionary methods" which otherwise would not have been possible).
"The historical preconditions of each major political species differs sharply from the others"
Method of analysis - looking at "agrarian social features"
Definition of democracy - purpose of it - a long and incompete struggle to...
1. check arbitrary rulers
2. replace abitrary rules with just and rational ones
3. obtain a share for the underlying population in the making of rules
Bear in mind this definition of Moore's when considering his work and when considering other defnitions of democracy. He does not require universal suffrage to consider a state democratic. The clauses are slightly vague - we can think of degrees of democracy and democratisation as a gradual process rather than flicking a switch.
(415)
Question: are there structural differences in agrarian societies that might in some cases favour certain development paths?
Starting points are not decisive in themselves but can influence.
Believes there is a convincing case to be made that Western Feudalism contained institutional features that predisposed it towards democracy including growth in the notion of immunity of certain groups and persons from the power of the ruler [and] the conception of the right to resistance of unjust authority [plus] conception of a contract as a mutual engagement freely undertaken by free persons (feudal notion of vassalage)
This complex arose only in Western Europe.
(416)
In Russia there did develop a system of estates the soslovii but Ivan the Terrible "broke the back of the nobility".
Bureacratic China developed the concept of the Mandate of Heaven that ligitimised some resistance to unjust oppression, but w/o a strong notion of corporate immunity
Feudalism arose in Japan but with heavy stress on loyalty to superiors and divine leader
Lacked conception of engagement among theoretical equals (e.g. vassalage)
Traditional despotisms may arise where a central authority is able to perform a variety of tasks or supervise activities essential to the working of the whole society (e.g. controlling Water supply, see Wittfogel, but probably too narrow a notion).
(417)
The persistence of royal absolutism or preindustrial bureacratic rule has created conditions unfavourable to Western democracy.
Even though these royal absolutisms or agrarian bureacracies did exist in the countries that subsequently did democratise.
Strong monarchical institutions checked the turbulence of the nobility. Strong state that gradually democratised.
Another precondition: balance of power between the crown and the nobility. Agrees with the "pluralist notion" that an independent nobility is important.
(418)
Achievement of this balance is usually the result or aftermath of a large amount of violence.
If nobility seeks freedom in the absence of a bourgois revolution - highly unfavourable to development of democracy.
Agreement with the Marxist thesis that a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers an "indispensable element".
(419)
Decisive determinant (key variable) has the landed aristocracy acquired commercial traits?
Feudal system: landowner, serfs work his land and keep some of the produce, with some common land
Advance of commerce in towns and demands of absolutist rulers for taxes meant landed required more cash. Three main responses to this problem
(420)
English turned to a form of commercial farming allowing the peasants more autonomy.
French left the peasants in de facto possession of the soil, then took a percentage and marketed it.
Manorial reaction in E.Europe. E.German Junkers reduced peasants to serfdom in order to grow and export grain. Similar process in Russia due to political causes.
In England this turn to commercial farming led to less reliance on the crown, reaction against fumbling Stuart attempts at absolutism. It also created a strong link to the towns.
Where there's a weak commercial impulse among the landed upper classes, there remains a huge peasant mass which creates problems for democracy creation.
So commercialisation was important - but for the peasants as well as the landed. Where they got more opportunity to generate their own wealth this may have been an important factor.
(421)
Maintenance of plantation slavery in the US was an obstacle
Landed upper class requires a state with a strong apparatus of repression, imposes climate of political opinion opposed to human freedom.
Encourages the preponderance of the countryside over the towns which remain shipment centres to overseas territories.
Brutalising consequences of the elites relationship with its workforce.
Question: Why/how did this transition to commercial agriculture take place?
(422)
There were differences in opportunities to develop commercial agriculture, e.g. existence of a market in nearby towns and adequate transportation. Role of population density and geography?
Transformation of peasants into some other form of social grouping augurs best for democracy.
(423)
For peasants living at the margin of physical existence, modernisation might be too risky, particularly if the profit is likely to go to someone else. (The peasants had to take some risk).
Two variables so far: relationship of landed aristocracy to the monarchy and the commericial impulses (requirement of production for the market) [plus third variable] relationship of landed upper classes with town dwellers (upper stratum: bourgeoisie).
The coalitions and countercoalitions among these latter groups created the framework and environment of political action. What situations contributed to the development of a free society?
Natural lines of cleavage - requirement of cheap food / cheap goods. Class differences can cut across rural-urban cleavage (Marxist)
(424)
Convergent interests between upper ranks of town dwellers and landed upper classes occurred in Tudor and Stuart England. The convergence led both groups to oppose the royal authority. English bougeoisie was trading with foreign markets whereas the French were reliant more on arms trade with the king, meaning they were more dependent on the crown.
Height of English bourgeoisie power was between the 17th and 19th century - foreign and domestic rivals not yet brought to their full powers.
(425)
Also important for the commercial and industrial leaders to become a dominant element in society. Allows landed upper class to take on a "bourgeois hue"
England's "final solution" to the peasant question - the sheep enclosures. No massive reservoir of peasants to serve the reactionary ends of the landed upper classes. Instability of French democracy in the 19th and 20th centuries partly because it didn't escape the peasant problem.
The brutality of the enclosures reminds the limits to peaceful transitions to democracy. Moore is saying the enclosures were a necessary step towards democracy. They reduced subsistence farming and increased the number of labourers available to industry, and increased the commercialisation impulse of the landed upper classes.
The Civil War checked royal absolutism and gave the aristocracy more power to destroy peasant society.
(428)
Conception of a "bourgeois revolution". No seizing of the reins of power. The aristocracy in Britain retained control of the political machinery through the 19th century due to the importance of capitalism in the countryside.
(429)
The key elements to a bourgeois society are the right to vote, representation in a legislature that is not just a rubber stamp, an objective system of law without privileges by birth, property rights, free speech, freedom of assembly.
(430)
Argument: landed upper classes either helped to make the bourgeois revolution or were destroyed by it. Resisting capitalism meant they were swept aside by its convulsions. The capitalist and democratic tide is one and the same.
(more)
Schmitter and Karl (1991) What democracy is... and is not
Schmitter, Philippe and Terry Lynn Karl. “What Democracy is …and is Not” in Larry
Diamond and Marc Plattner eds. The Global Resurgence of Democracy pp.39-52 original in
Journal of Democracy
Issue 2, Volume 3 in Journal of Democracy
Available (pdf link) or saved on computer.
Notes. (more)
Diamond and Marc Plattner eds. The Global Resurgence of Democracy pp.39-52 original in
Journal of Democracy
Issue 2, Volume 3 in Journal of Democracy
Available (pdf link) or saved on computer.
Notes. (more)
Schumpeter (1947) Capitalism Socialism and Democracy
Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism, & Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers,
1947
Week 3 Reading list - Chpt XXII Sec I pp.269-273
Available SSL - HX40.SCH
Available New College - P 2.2 SCH .
Notes. (more)
1947
Week 3 Reading list - Chpt XXII Sec I pp.269-273
Available SSL - HX40.SCH
Available New College - P 2.2 SCH .
Notes. (more)
Sunday 18 October 2009
UK Constitutional Reform
Summarising the debate on the UK constitution (see post on parliamentary and electoral reform for that).
Notes. (more)
Notes. (more)
Friday 16 October 2009
Sartori (2004) Comparative Constitutional Engineering
On the reading list for Week 2 - Constitutionalism.
Notes.
I get the feeling some chapters have been surpassed by Lijphart.
(more)
Notes.
I get the feeling some chapters have been surpassed by Lijphart.
(more)
Hamilton, Madison and Jay - The Federalist Papers
Week 2 reading - 23-8; 41-4; 47ff.
Full online text: http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fedindex.htm
Notes. (more)
Full online text: http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fedindex.htm
Notes. (more)
MT09 - Week 3 reading list - Democracy
Aim of the session: To develop insights into what distinguishes democracy from other regime types.
Discussion topics:
(a) How should scholars define democracy? How can democracies be identified in the real world?
(b) How do democracies emerge?.
Readings:
(a) The Concept of Democracy
· Dahl, Robert. P Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1971, chapt. 1.
· Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism, & Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers,
1947 Chpt XXII Sec I pp.269-273
· Schmitter, Philippe and Terry Lynn Karl. “What Democracy is …and is Not” in Larry
Diamond and Marc Plattner eds. The Global Resurgence of Democracy pp.39-52 original in
Journal of Democracy
(b) Explanations for Democracy’s Emergence
· Rustow, Dankwart. “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model” in Comparative
Politics vol 2 no. 2 April 1970 pp337-63.
· Moore, Barrington.1968 Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Part 3 Chpt 7 pp413-432.
· Skocpol, Theda.1973 “A Critical Review of Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy” Politics and Society, Fall.
· Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2006 Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . Chapt 1 skim Chapts 2-3/
· Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 1-109.
· Seymour Martin Lipset. (1959)“Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy” APSR, Vol. 53, No. 1.(Mar., 1959), pp. 69-105.
· Boix, Carles, and Susan Stokes. (2003) “Endogenous Democratization,” WP, Volume 55, Number 4, July.
· Rueschemeyer, Dietrich Eve lyne Huber Stephens, and John Stephens. Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, chapters 1, 2, and 3.
· Przeworski, Adam “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,” pp. 59-80 from Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
· O’Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Negotiating (and Renegotiating) Pacts,”
from Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies.
· Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp. xiii-xv, chapters 1~4.*
· Bunce, Valerie 2003 “Rethinking recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommuist
Experience”.WP . Vol. 55, Iss. 2; pg. 167-195.
· Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996 Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation 3-83.
· Whitehead, Laurence.2001 The International Dimensions of Democratization Chapter 1 and
Postcript 3-25 and 443-454 by Whitehead and Chapt 2 by Schmitter 26-49. (more)
Discussion topics:
(a) How should scholars define democracy? How can democracies be identified in the real world?
(b) How do democracies emerge?.
Readings:
(a) The Concept of Democracy
· Dahl, Robert. P Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1971, chapt. 1.
· Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism, & Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers,
1947 Chpt XXII Sec I pp.269-273
· Schmitter, Philippe and Terry Lynn Karl. “What Democracy is …and is Not” in Larry
Diamond and Marc Plattner eds. The Global Resurgence of Democracy pp.39-52 original in
Journal of Democracy
(b) Explanations for Democracy’s Emergence
· Rustow, Dankwart. “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model” in Comparative
Politics vol 2 no. 2 April 1970 pp337-63.
· Moore, Barrington.1968 Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Part 3 Chpt 7 pp413-432.
· Skocpol, Theda.1973 “A Critical Review of Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy” Politics and Society, Fall.
· Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2006 Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . Chapt 1 skim Chapts 2-3/
· Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 1-109.
· Seymour Martin Lipset. (1959)“Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy” APSR, Vol. 53, No. 1.(Mar., 1959), pp. 69-105.
· Boix, Carles, and Susan Stokes. (2003) “Endogenous Democratization,” WP, Volume 55, Number 4, July.
· Rueschemeyer, Dietrich Eve lyne Huber Stephens, and John Stephens. Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, chapters 1, 2, and 3.
· Przeworski, Adam “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,” pp. 59-80 from Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
· O’Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Negotiating (and Renegotiating) Pacts,”
from Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies.
· Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp. xiii-xv, chapters 1~4.*
· Bunce, Valerie 2003 “Rethinking recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommuist
Experience”.WP . Vol. 55, Iss. 2; pg. 167-195.
· Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996 Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation 3-83.
· Whitehead, Laurence.2001 The International Dimensions of Democratization Chapter 1 and
Postcript 3-25 and 443-454 by Whitehead and Chapt 2 by Schmitter 26-49. (more)
Thursday 15 October 2009
Vile (1988) Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers
Vile, Maurice (2nd ed 1998), Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers
Ch. 1 available as PDF on computer or google docs
.
Notes. (more)
Ch. 1 available as PDF on computer or google docs
.
Notes. (more)
Ridley (1988) There is no British Constitution
Ridley, F. F. (1988), ‘There is no British Constitution: a Dangerous Case of the Emperor’s New
Clothes’, Parliamentary Affairs 41:3.
Available: Soft copy on computer or google docs
Notes. (more)
Clothes’, Parliamentary Affairs 41:3.
Available: Soft copy on computer or google docs
Notes. (more)
Perry (1998) Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations
Michael J. Perry, “What is ‘the Constitution’? (and other Fundamental Questions),” in Larry Alexander, ed., Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), esp pp. 99-151
Available: Nuffield - K 3165.A
SSL - K3165.CON 2001
Pages 99-151 available soft copy on computer, or google docs
Notes. (more)
Available: Nuffield - K 3165.A
SSL - K3165.CON 2001
Pages 99-151 available soft copy on computer, or google docs
Notes. (more)
Pennock, J R and Chapman, John W (1979), ‘Constitutionalism’ Nomos
Soft copy - Preface - on computer.
Available SSL - K3165.CON or
bod bookstack M05.F08129
Notes. (more)
Available SSL - K3165.CON or
bod bookstack M05.F08129
Notes. (more)
McIlwain (1947) Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern
Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Ithaca: Cornell University 1947 [1940), esp pp. 1-66
Available - SSL JF51.MCI 2007 (confined)
Notes. (more)
Available - SSL JF51.MCI 2007 (confined)
Notes. (more)
Krotosynski (2006) The first amendment in cross-cultural perspective
Krotoszynski, Ronald (2006), The First Amendment in Cross-Cultural Perspective: A Comparative Legal Analysis of the Freedom of Speech.
Available SSL - K3254.KRO
Notes. (more)
Available SSL - K3254.KRO
Notes. (more)
Graber (2006) The Problem of Constitutional Evil
Graber, Mark (2006), Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil – especially Introduction
Soft copy: Link to google books or on NetLibrary
Notes. (more)
Soft copy: Link to google books or on NetLibrary
Notes. (more)
Finer, Bogdanor and Rudden (1995) Comparing Constitutions
Finer, Samuel, Bogdanor, Vernon and Rudden, Bernard (1995), Comparing Constitutions.
Soft copy:
Up to page 39 only: on computer or google documents
Notes. (more)
Soft copy:
Up to page 39 only: on computer or google documents
Notes. (more)
Baines and Rubio-Marin (2004) The gender of constitutional jurisprudence
Baines, Beverley, and Rubio-Marin, Ruth, eds. (2004), The Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence
Soft copy:
Introduction only Link to google docs or available on hard drive
Suitable for printing only (sideways text)
Notes:
(more)
Soft copy:
Introduction only Link to google docs or available on hard drive
Suitable for printing only (sideways text)
Notes:
(more)
Wednesday 14 October 2009
MT09 - Week 2 reading list - Constitutionalism
Available on DPIR website (link).
(No bold sources as of yet)
Discussion topics:
(a) What is characteristic about ‘constitutional’ polities?
(b) Can a new set of constitutional rules change the historical trajectory of a country? Or are rules always dictated by, and dependent upon, historical trajectories?
(Class handouts available in File 5)
Readings:
(a) Constitutionalism
· Baines, Beverley, and Rubio-Marin, Ruth, eds. (2004), The Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence
· Finer, Samuel, Bogdanor, Vernon and Rudden, Bernard (1995), Comparing Constitutions
· Graber, Mark (2006), Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil – especially Introduction
· Krotoszynski, Ronald (2006), The First Amendment in Cross-Cultural Perspective: A Comparative Legal Analysis of the Freedom of Speech
· Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Ithaca: Cornell University
1947 [1940), esp pp. 1-66
· Pennock, J R and Chapman, John W (1979), ‘Constitutionalism’ Nomos
· Michael J. Perry, “What is ‘the Constitution’? (and other Fundamental Questions),” in Larry Alexander, ed., Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), esp pp. 99-151
· Ridley, F. F. (1988), ‘There is no British Constitution: a Dangerous Case of the Emperor’s New
Clothes’, Parliamentary Affairs 41:3
· Vile, Maurice (2nd ed 1998), Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, Ch 1
(b) The Politics of Constitutional Design
· Elster and Slagsted (eds) (1988), Constitutionalism and Democracy
· Elster, Jon (2003), Authors and Actors: Executive-legislative Relations in Four French
Constitution Making Moments, mimeo, presented at Crafting and Operating Institutions conference at Yale University, April 11-13, http://www.yale.edu/coic/elster.doc (evaluating the rational choice framework of analyzing constitution making)
· Ferejohn, John, et al. (2001), Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule
· Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James and Jay, John (new edn 1987), The Federalist Papers: 23-8; 41-4; 47ff.
· Sartori, Giovanni (1994), Comparative Constitutional Engineering
· Sunstein, Cass (2002), Designing Democracy. (more)
(No bold sources as of yet)
Discussion topics:
(a) What is characteristic about ‘constitutional’ polities?
(b) Can a new set of constitutional rules change the historical trajectory of a country? Or are rules always dictated by, and dependent upon, historical trajectories?
(Class handouts available in File 5)
Readings:
(a) Constitutionalism
· Baines, Beverley, and Rubio-Marin, Ruth, eds. (2004), The Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence
· Finer, Samuel, Bogdanor, Vernon and Rudden, Bernard (1995), Comparing Constitutions
· Graber, Mark (2006), Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil – especially Introduction
· Krotoszynski, Ronald (2006), The First Amendment in Cross-Cultural Perspective: A Comparative Legal Analysis of the Freedom of Speech
· Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Ithaca: Cornell University
1947 [1940), esp pp. 1-66
· Pennock, J R and Chapman, John W (1979), ‘Constitutionalism’ Nomos
· Michael J. Perry, “What is ‘the Constitution’? (and other Fundamental Questions),” in Larry Alexander, ed., Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), esp pp. 99-151
· Ridley, F. F. (1988), ‘There is no British Constitution: a Dangerous Case of the Emperor’s New
Clothes’, Parliamentary Affairs 41:3
· Vile, Maurice (2nd ed 1998), Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, Ch 1
(b) The Politics of Constitutional Design
· Elster and Slagsted (eds) (1988), Constitutionalism and Democracy
· Elster, Jon (2003), Authors and Actors: Executive-legislative Relations in Four French
Constitution Making Moments, mimeo, presented at Crafting and Operating Institutions conference at Yale University, April 11-13, http://www.yale.edu/coic/elster.doc (evaluating the rational choice framework of analyzing constitution making)
· Ferejohn, John, et al. (2001), Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule
· Hamilton, Alexander, Madison, James and Jay, John (new edn 1987), The Federalist Papers: 23-8; 41-4; 47ff.
· Sartori, Giovanni (1994), Comparative Constitutional Engineering
· Sunstein, Cass (2002), Designing Democracy. (more)
Monday 12 October 2009
Dahl (2007) quote on data collection
"I don’t want to exaggerate and say we are anywhere near achieving a final, conclusive body of
knowledge; we never will be. "
In Munck and Snyder article "What has comparative politics accomplished?" in APSA. (more)
knowledge; we never will be. "
In Munck and Snyder article "What has comparative politics accomplished?" in APSA. (more)
Eckstein (1963) A Perspective on comparative politics, past and present
In "Comparative Politics", Ed. Eckstein and Apter
Notes: (more)
Notes: (more)
The Chicago School in Comparative Politics
Looking at the formation and influence of the Chicago school, prominent in the 1920s and 1930s.
Footnote in Munck and Snyder (1997, p. 41). Key members of the school were Merriam, Harold Gosnell, Lasswell, White, Wright - extended to graduate students trained at Chicago, e.g.
Gabriel Almond, V.O Key Jr. David Truman, Herbert Simon (the only political scientist ever awarded a Nobel prize, in economics).
On the Chicago school and its members see Almond (1990, 309-28)
(more)
Footnote in Munck and Snyder (1997, p. 41). Key members of the school were Merriam, Harold Gosnell, Lasswell, White, Wright - extended to graduate students trained at Chicago, e.g.
Gabriel Almond, V.O Key Jr. David Truman, Herbert Simon (the only political scientist ever awarded a Nobel prize, in economics).
On the Chicago school and its members see Almond (1990, 309-28)
(more)
Merriam (1921) The present state of political science
In American Political Science Research now titled American Political Science review
Volume 15 no.2.
Link to PDF
Notes
Merriam's manifesto proposed a model of political science that distinguished it from history.
Cited by Munck (2007) as the birth of the Behavioural Revolution in comparative politics.
Calls for increase availability and collection of empirical data relevant to political science.
Calls for a broad based professional body - encompassing institutions from many countries, classes, races etc. - to transcend the biases of country, class race.
Wants to avoid political science falling into a category that is neither scientific science or practical politics.
Notes the benefits of the use of statistics within reason - suggests its use is increased.
"Modern psychology also offers material and methods of great value to politics, and possibilities of still greater things"
"undertakings in charge often of isolated observers and workers. The political research of our nation and of others is ill-organized, especially for a branch of knowledge that deals with organisation and administration as its central topics "
(more)
Volume 15 no.2.
Link to PDF
Notes
Merriam's manifesto proposed a model of political science that distinguished it from history.
Cited by Munck (2007) as the birth of the Behavioural Revolution in comparative politics.
Calls for increase availability and collection of empirical data relevant to political science.
Calls for a broad based professional body - encompassing institutions from many countries, classes, races etc. - to transcend the biases of country, class race.
Wants to avoid political science falling into a category that is neither scientific science or practical politics.
Notes the benefits of the use of statistics within reason - suggests its use is increased.
"Modern psychology also offers material and methods of great value to politics, and possibilities of still greater things"
"undertakings in charge often of isolated observers and workers. The political research of our nation and of others is ill-organized, especially for a branch of knowledge that deals with organisation and administration as its central topics "
(more)
MT09 - Comparative Government Introduction - Lecture 1
Mondays at 12, Exam Schools.
Lecture delivered by Eddie Keene. His work is mainly on the History of Ideas, Historical Sociology in the 16th - 19th Century.
Understanding the modern world involves understanding the early, or pre-modern world. The idea of The State is at the heart of the study of politics. Politics happens within states; IR happens between states. States help us to define what demarcates politics and IR.
Methodology:
Very few methods are unique to the study of politics. The field is interested in a cluster of questions - and borrows methods from other disciplines.
1. The world is divided into states (how?)
2. Words are very important in the study of politics. How ambiguous are "words"? The way we use words may in itself be a form of political action, with political consequences.
Skinner: words are important and form of political action. A skilful player of the language game can change the rules through the use of words. Important writers in the discourse of politics, e.g. Machiavelli and Hobbes, can transform the meaning of words.
The word "State" has a number of connected words, e.g. estate (territorial concept/segment of society or a class), Status (standing, position in heirarchy, the state we're in), state craft (art of state/art of war). Reason of state, statistics (originally political arithmetic, science of measuring the states).
Visions of politics volume 2 (Skinner) - in its final Hobbesian moment the word State acquires its modern form. The "State" of the ruler usually referred to the standing of the leader. Renaissance writers add the concept of the estate (territories).
AND the group of men working for the prince carrying out his orders (regime).
Doesn't yet include the notion of sovereignty.
The next moment is the republican conception which involves "the people".
People are a community living in original state of natural liberty, trading some of these liberties for stability.
But once the people give powers to the sovereign they've lost them forever.
The State is now an artificial being in charge of these things (Hobbes). People cannot have a form of community until/unless they have an artificial person representing them (i.e. the state). This was the first time the word State was used in this context.
Skinner ends the story with Hobbes. Through the 18th Century treaties were made by Monarchs/Princes. This is still 100 years after Hobbes. How does the artificial personality of the state become capable of "signing" treaties. Alexander West says that states are people too. He has a disagreement with Skinner because many of the leading powers call themselves Empires. A Union is another idea out with a state. Most powerful states were usually unions, e.g. Dutch, UK, USA, Soviet Union. Unions of states.
Historical sociology looks at the practical process of state formation. Linkages between the subjects. The inside out story looks at domestic consolidation within states. Feudalism to absolutism nationalist biases of 19th Century historiography. Concerned with the internal processes e.g. in Germany they were attempting to assert the pedigree of their newly formed and weakly connected states.
A different approach arose in the 20th Century - an Outside in story in which war makes the state and vice versa. States are protection rackets and war machines.
(more)
Lecture delivered by Eddie Keene. His work is mainly on the History of Ideas, Historical Sociology in the 16th - 19th Century.
Understanding the modern world involves understanding the early, or pre-modern world. The idea of The State is at the heart of the study of politics. Politics happens within states; IR happens between states. States help us to define what demarcates politics and IR.
Methodology:
Very few methods are unique to the study of politics. The field is interested in a cluster of questions - and borrows methods from other disciplines.
1. The world is divided into states (how?)
2. Words are very important in the study of politics. How ambiguous are "words"? The way we use words may in itself be a form of political action, with political consequences.
Skinner: words are important and form of political action. A skilful player of the language game can change the rules through the use of words. Important writers in the discourse of politics, e.g. Machiavelli and Hobbes, can transform the meaning of words.
The word "State" has a number of connected words, e.g. estate (territorial concept/segment of society or a class), Status (standing, position in heirarchy, the state we're in), state craft (art of state/art of war). Reason of state, statistics (originally political arithmetic, science of measuring the states).
Visions of politics volume 2 (Skinner) - in its final Hobbesian moment the word State acquires its modern form. The "State" of the ruler usually referred to the standing of the leader. Renaissance writers add the concept of the estate (territories).
AND the group of men working for the prince carrying out his orders (regime).
Doesn't yet include the notion of sovereignty.
The next moment is the republican conception which involves "the people".
People are a community living in original state of natural liberty, trading some of these liberties for stability.
But once the people give powers to the sovereign they've lost them forever.
The State is now an artificial being in charge of these things (Hobbes). People cannot have a form of community until/unless they have an artificial person representing them (i.e. the state). This was the first time the word State was used in this context.
Skinner ends the story with Hobbes. Through the 18th Century treaties were made by Monarchs/Princes. This is still 100 years after Hobbes. How does the artificial personality of the state become capable of "signing" treaties. Alexander West says that states are people too. He has a disagreement with Skinner because many of the leading powers call themselves Empires. A Union is another idea out with a state. Most powerful states were usually unions, e.g. Dutch, UK, USA, Soviet Union. Unions of states.
Historical sociology looks at the practical process of state formation. Linkages between the subjects. The inside out story looks at domestic consolidation within states. Feudalism to absolutism nationalist biases of 19th Century historiography. Concerned with the internal processes e.g. in Germany they were attempting to assert the pedigree of their newly formed and weakly connected states.
A different approach arose in the 20th Century - an Outside in story in which war makes the state and vice versa. States are protection rackets and war machines.
(more)
Sunday 11 October 2009
Hardin - sociology dept quote
"Talcott Parsons notoriously tried to get the Harvard sociology department to promulgate astatement of its general position on sociology. That effort foundered on the disbelief of such colleagues as Samuel Stouffer and George Homans that the members of the department shared any general position (Homans 1984, 301–3)."
From Hardin (2002) Whither Political Science
(more)
From Hardin (2002) Whither Political Science
(more)
King (1991) On political methodology
Gary King. 1991. ‘On political methodology’, Political Analysis 2: 1-30 [READ PAGES 1-9].
Link to PDF
Study of methodology in political science. (more)
Link to PDF
Study of methodology in political science. (more)
Caporaso (2000) Comparative Politics - Diversity and Coherence
Comparative Politics: Diversity and Coherence.
James A. Caporaso
Comparative Political Studies 2000; 33; 699
DOI: 10.1177/001041400003300601
Link to PDF
Explores to what extent comparative politics is becoming a discipline, and also contrasts comp pol with IR.
(more)
James A. Caporaso
Comparative Political Studies 2000; 33; 699
DOI: 10.1177/001041400003300601
Link to PDF
Explores to what extent comparative politics is becoming a discipline, and also contrasts comp pol with IR.
(more)
Saturday 10 October 2009
Statistical data in Comparative Politics
A look at how the use of statistical data in comparative politics has evolved.
Early cross-national survey data contributions made by Inglehart (1977) and Verba, Nie and Kim (1978). (more)
Early cross-national survey data contributions made by Inglehart (1977) and Verba, Nie and Kim (1978). (more)
The Rational Choice school in Comparative Politics
Discussion of the rational choice school; origins, key authors, strengths, weaknesses etc.
Discussion in Munck (2007, Ch 2, p. 53) .
William Riker of Rochester University helped popularise rational choice. (e.g. Riker 1977, Riker 1990)
Rational choice institutionalism owed much to North's (1990) widely read book.
On the key role played by the RAND corporation (Amadae, 2003)
On whether rational choice might be considered a general theory (Munck, 2001)
(more)
Discussion in Munck (2007, Ch 2, p. 53) .
William Riker of Rochester University helped popularise rational choice. (e.g. Riker 1977, Riker 1990)
Rational choice institutionalism owed much to North's (1990) widely read book.
On the key role played by the RAND corporation (Amadae, 2003)
On whether rational choice might be considered a general theory (Munck, 2001)
(more)
Friday 9 October 2009
Collier (1991) Comparative politics: two decades of change
In Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives. P. 7-31
Available SSL JF51.COM
Notes. (more)
Available SSL JF51.COM
Notes. (more)
Jackman (1985) Cross national statistical research
Jackman (1985) Cross national statistical research and the study of comparative politics.
In American Journal of Political Science Vol. 29, No. 1
PDF Link
Notes. (more)
In American Journal of Political Science Vol. 29, No. 1
PDF Link
Notes. (more)
Lipset (1959) Some social requisites of democracy
Lipset (1959) Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy.
PDF (link)
Notes. (more)
PDF (link)
Notes. (more)
Holt and Richardson (1970) Competing paradigms in comparative politics
Chapter (pp. 29-45) from The methodology of comparative research; a symposium from the Center for Comparative Studies in Technological Development and Social Change and the Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota. / Edited by Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner -
available Bod 3972 d.52 and Ox Iinternet Institute JA71.MET .
Notes (more)
available Bod 3972 d.52 and Ox Iinternet Institute JA71.MET .
Notes (more)
Adcock, Robert. 2003. "The emergence of political science as a discipline"
Adcock, Robert. 2003. "The emergence of political science as a discipline: History and the study of politics in America: 1975 - 1919".
In History of Political Thought 24, No. 3 - saved to computer
Notes. (more)
In History of Political Thought 24, No. 3 - saved to computer
Notes. (more)
Thursday 8 October 2009
PS Political Science and Politics
Academic Journal founded 1988
Links to issues
Volume 35 Issue 2 http://www.jstor.org/stable/i269770 (more)
Links to issues
Volume 35 Issue 2 http://www.jstor.org/stable/i269770 (more)
Cultural Theories
Developing a theory of "irrational" actions based on cultural specificities.
Individuals may act "irrationally" in a frequent and systematic manner. Irrationality means that the action on its own is costly or harmful to the agent.
This behaviour is culturally driven. Actors will comply with culurally based irrational actions in order to fit in with a particular culture. Undertaking irrational acts is a signalling mechanism evincing loyalty to the community.
Different cultures will be able to sustain different levels of costly action. The variables that determine how costly an action the culture can sustain are:
- the benefits afforded by belonging to the community
- the cost to the community of an individual leaving or "defecting"
Testable hypothesese:
Communities that afford large benefits on their members will elicit more irrational behaviour.
Communities that are costly to leave
A community that suffers from the loss of a member may either:
- have low levels of irrational rituals in order to keep its members loyal
- or have high levels of irrational rituals in order to self-select loyal members
(more)
Individuals may act "irrationally" in a frequent and systematic manner. Irrationality means that the action on its own is costly or harmful to the agent.
This behaviour is culturally driven. Actors will comply with culurally based irrational actions in order to fit in with a particular culture. Undertaking irrational acts is a signalling mechanism evincing loyalty to the community.
Different cultures will be able to sustain different levels of costly action. The variables that determine how costly an action the culture can sustain are:
- the benefits afforded by belonging to the community
- the cost to the community of an individual leaving or "defecting"
Testable hypothesese:
Communities that afford large benefits on their members will elicit more irrational behaviour.
Communities that are costly to leave
A community that suffers from the loss of a member may either:
- have low levels of irrational rituals in order to keep its members loyal
- or have high levels of irrational rituals in order to self-select loyal members
(more)
Monday 5 October 2009
Sartori (1970) Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics
Sartori, Giovanni “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” APSR, 64:4:1033-53.
Link to PDF
Reading list MT09 Week 1
And here is the rest of it. (more)
Link to PDF
Reading list MT09 Week 1
And here is the rest of it. (more)
King (1998) The politics of social research: insitutionalising funding regimes in the UK and US
King, Desmond (1998) “The Politics of Social Research: Institutionalizing Public Funding Regimes in the US and Britain,” BJPS 28: 415-444.
Link to PDF
Printed in British Journal of Political Science
On reading list MT09 week 1
Hard copy? No (more)
Link to PDF
Printed in British Journal of Political Science
On reading list MT09 week 1
Hard copy? No (more)
Hardin (2002) Wither Political Science
Russell Hardin (2002). Whither Political Science?. PS: Political Science & Politics, 35 , pp 183-186
doi:10.1017/S1049096502000458
Link to journal article
Begins with a short discussion of the methodological disputes within the field. Acknowledges that comparative politics is a fragmented field with long running disagreements.
What has comparative politics accomplished that is useful?
Downsian theory of democracy put an end to the (hortatory) APSA sponsored debates "towards responsible two party govenment"
"we do not these days pretend to speak with one professional voice"
(more)
doi:10.1017/S1049096502000458
Link to journal article
Begins with a short discussion of the methodological disputes within the field. Acknowledges that comparative politics is a fragmented field with long running disagreements.
What has comparative politics accomplished that is useful?
Downsian theory of democracy put an end to the (hortatory) APSA sponsored debates "towards responsible two party govenment"
"we do not these days pretend to speak with one professional voice"
(more)
Monroe (2002) Shaking things up? Thoughts on the future of p.s.
Monroe, Kristen Renwick (2002), ‘Shaking Things Up? Thoughts about the future of political science’, PS Political Science and Politics 35 (2)
Link to journal article (more)
Link to journal article (more)
Munck and Snyder (2007) Passion, Craft and Method in Comparative Politics
Munck, Gerardo and Richard Snyder. Passion Craft and Method in Comparative Politics 2007
Reading List MT09 week 1 - pp.32-59
Hard copy? No - SSL JF130.MUN
Notes:
Refers to comparative politics throughout as a sub-field of political science
Further reading/references:
Ross (1991, 64-77 and Ch. 8) - on the relationship between political science and history in the period in the early years of the discipline (1903 founding of APSA)
Adcock (2003) - on the same topic
Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 23-27 and 63-69) - only available at Magdalen 320.09 SOM
Almond (1996, 65-68) On the Chicago school and some of its key members (from the New Handbook of political science, Chapter 2
Parsons (1951) - Weberian-Parsonian concepts played a central role in structural-functionalism
Holt and Richardson (1970, 29-45) Account of other metatheories around during the behavioural revolution when structural-functionalism was at its height
Lipset (1959) widely read article on the link between economic development and democracy
Sartori (1969, 87-94) suggests that Lipset and Rokkan's (1967b) work on party formation was a landmark study that departed in key ways from the previous literature
The next generation began to reshape the field:
Lijphart (1968a) on consociationalism,
Schmitter (1971) on corporatism
Stepan (1971) on the military
O'Donnell (1973) on authoritarianism
Scott (1976) and Skocpol (1979) on revolution
See footnote on p. 50 for contributions to cross-country survey data
Fundamental differences in perspective between Sartori (1970 - concept misformation...) and Jackman (1985), who advocated quantitative research (debates in comp gov)
Collier (1991) critical assessment of the state of the literature on methodology
Notes
Chapter 2
(32)
Comp Pol emerged as a FIELD of political science in late 19th century in the US.
Influence of US academia declined in 2 decades post WW2
Research standards set in the US
(33)
Two main "revolutions" - behavioural revolution, drawing from sociology, and post cold war "Second scientific revolution" drawing from economics and focussing on methodology.
** "Fallen short of fulfilling the field's mission of producing a global science of politics - the lack of a general or unified theory of politics, and the failure to produce robust, broad empirical generalisations about world politics."
Constitution of political science as a discipline, 1880 - 1920. Traces its birth to the greek philosophers of antiquity, e.g. Plato (The Republic 360bc) and Aristotle politics (340bc).
(35)
Various institutional developments took place in the states that gave an organisational basis to the autnomisation of political science. The first graduate programme was Columbia University's school of political science founded by John Burgess in 1880 -> led to the expansion of PhDs trained as political scientists in the US. The discipline's professional association - APSA - founded in 1903.
This involved a differentiation between PS and history. APSA was a splinter group from the American Historical Association (founded 1884). Political Scientists defined their subject matter in a way to create a separate identity from history.
Many of the founders had been trained in Germany in Staatswissenschaft (political science) and historically orientated Geisteswissenschaft (social sciences) - may explain why the "state" was central to early PS.
(Differences with history)
P.Scientists left the past as the preserve of historians and focus on the contemporary.
Eschew history's aspiration to address all potential factors that affect politics and instead focus on more delimited question of government and its formal instutions. - but also theory building, law-like generalisations etc.
(36)
(Differences with sociology)
Sociologists established a discipline that was a continuation of classical social theory of Comte, Toqueville, Spencer, Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Pareto, Mosca and Michels, and defined sociology as the mother discipline, the synthetic social science.
Economics and sociology defined themselves through theory driven choices - economics a reorientation of classical theory - sociology an extension of classical theory. PS differentiated itself through an empirically distinct subject matter and involved a rejection of European grand theorising and philosophies of history. Born out of history and a desire to distinguish itself; break from classical tradition.
(37)
The early discipline was bereft of theory. The formal-legal approach that was common was largely atheoretical - did not propose general and testable hypotheses. Narrow research agenda forcussing on formal institutions.
A US reaction to abstract or even metaphysical aspects of European philosophies of history - and had the positive effect of grounding the discussion in observables, empirical facts. Mainly based on case-studies and data was not subjected to rigorous testing. ("Descriptive" phase)
(41)
The behavioural revolution 1921-1966
Merriam's (1921) Manifesto for a new science of politics, a departure from the historical approach.
Series of national conferences on the science of politics - 1923, 1924 and 1925
The formation of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC)
Signalled the rise of the "Chicago school", an influential source of scholarship in the 1920s and 30s.
(42)
More be default than design, comparative politics was institutionally constituted as a field that covered what was not covered by American politics, i.e. the study of government and formal institutions outside the US.
The rise of the Nazis in Germany encouraged many scholars to emigrate, and they brought to the US a greater emphasis on normative political theory.
Eckstein (1963, 18-23) characterises the most influential books in CP over this period.
Behaviouralism didn't really spread to comparative politics until after WW2, due to the institutional insulation, Merriam's ideas didn't immediately reach comparative politics departments.
(43)
Behaviouralism stood for 2 distinct ideas.
1.Rejection of the restriction of scope to formal institutions
Included a range of informal procedures and behaviours
2.Sought to use a scientific approach to theory and methods
Systematic theory and empirical testing
Dahl (1961b, 766) - "a protest movement within political science"
Broadening the scope of enquiry beyond government instutitions led to the increased influence of sociology, and Parsonian (1951) theories of structural functionalism. Was influenced by anthopology and social psychology.
(44)
The state was, to some extent, ignored, hence behaviouralist research often let to reductionist accounts of politics in which the state was a black box with no autonomy/impact of its own.
Ingored the idea that the state can be an agent that influences the actors and institutions.
(45)
Limits of structural-functionalism
Still fell short of providing testable propositions and testing hypothesese
The literature did develop mid-range theories that were suited to empirical testing, e.g. Symour Lipset's (1960) Political Man. - included widely read APSR article on the link between economic development and democracy (Lipset 1959).
During the behavioural period, research spread outside the large European countries. Comparativists studied the US and thus broke down the arbitrary exclusion of US from CP.
Another methodological novelty was the inclusion of statistical research.
E.g. the pioneering survey-based study, The Civic Culture by Almond and Verba (1963)
(46)
The field had become more theoretically orientated and more methodologically sophisticated.
(47)
The Post-Behavioural Period, 1967-1988
Lipset and Rokkan's (1967b) "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, Voter Alignments" marked a new intellectual agenda
See above "the next generation began to reshape the field"
Authors diverse in national origin and values they held
Prolific scholars of the era: Europe born: Linz, Sartori, Lijphart, Przeworski); Latin America born: O'Donnel - though this group had mainly studied at US institutions.
(48)
The most widely shared critique focussed on the behaviouralist's reductionism, i.e. the idea that politics can be reduced to, and explained in terms of, more fundamental social or economic underpinnings.
The alternative consisted of the re-vindication of politics as an autonomous practice and an emphasis on the importance of political determinants.
(49)
The centrality given to distinctly political questions implied a redefinition of the subject matter of comparative politics
the study of political behaviour and interest groups was not ignored but tackled from the perspective of the state. As Skocpol (1985) put it, there was an attempt to "bring the state back in" - [as an autonomous actor]
The new literature also brought back the formal institutions that had been abandoned
Led to a refocussing on the state, state-society relations and political institutions
Theorising also changed - more focus on building mid-range theories
Continuing use of statistics, mainly small-N studies or case studies. A quantitative literature started to develop in areas such as electoral behaviour, public opinion and democracy.
(51)
Methadological schism started to take root.
the (relatively) low standing of quantitative research was due to deficiencies in the literature - comparativists often had reservations about the theoretical underpinnings of quantitative research (and) the quantitative literature did not speak to some of the most pressing or theoretically relevant issues of the time (e.g. see Johnson 2003 for a discussion).
(52)
The second scientific revolution, 1989-Present
Push to make the field more scientific, helped by the APSA section on comparative politics.
Response to the fragmentation of the field due to increased prominence of Area Studies
Proposed metatheories drew heavily on economics as opposed to sociology
Game theoretic rational choice theory, and rational choice institutionalism - a related but distinct metatheory that introduced (in a highly consequential move) institutions as constraints.
See cg approaches post on rational choice theory
Rational choice theory can be seen as a unifying theory, which can integrate theories about action in different domains, because it is not held to apply to any specific domain
Emphasis on logical rigour in theorising
After 1989 work gradually became more formalised
Political events such as the wave of democratisation made questions and methods standard in the field of American politics more global in application/more relevant to CP students
(55)
The infrastructure for quantitative research was strengthened, leading to an increase in the amount and standards of quantitative work. (Huge increase in the availability of survey data)
The post 1989 period has lacked anything so dominant as structural functionalism or modernism in the behaviouralist period - it is a time of pluralism.
Rational choice theorists began to include institutions in their analysis - as debate centred on rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism - it became hard to detect what was distinctive about these metatheories.
A common issue: institutions are both contraints and endogenous to the political process.
These metatheories don't separate a general theory of action from a general theory of politics.
(56)
David Collier reinvigorated the debate on methodology with his 1991 article. Revival of interest in qualitative methodology was associated with efforts to build bridges amond different methodologies.
(57)
The possibility of a unifying "tri-partite" methodology involving statistical analysis, formalisation and narrative, suggested by Laitin (2002).
Top of page 57, exposition of the new debates about methodologies. Can we move towards a discipline?
The new scientific revolution did not bring about a major shift in the focus of empirical research.
(58)
Unification? A focus on a distinctively political subject matter has become largely the norm, mid-range theorising on a range of important questions has grown steadily, and the methods used in the field have become increasingly sophisticated.
Comparativists have largely abandoned the aspiration of the system-builders who sought to elaborate an explicit metatheory of politics in the 1950s and 1960s
Key challenge is the development of a general/unified theory of politics, which itegrates both mid-range theories of various substantive issues, and theories of statics and dynamics.
There remain empirical shortcomings. Comparatives still lack good measures for many of the concepts used in their theories. Comparativists still rarely use methods that would subject their hypotheses to rigorous testing.
(more)
Reading List MT09 week 1 - pp.32-59
Hard copy? No - SSL JF130.MUN
Notes:
Refers to comparative politics throughout as a sub-field of political science
Further reading/references:
Ross (1991, 64-77 and Ch. 8) - on the relationship between political science and history in the period in the early years of the discipline (1903 founding of APSA)
Adcock (2003) - on the same topic
Somit and Tanenhaus (1967, 23-27 and 63-69) - only available at Magdalen 320.09 SOM
Almond (1996, 65-68) On the Chicago school and some of its key members (from the New Handbook of political science, Chapter 2
Parsons (1951) - Weberian-Parsonian concepts played a central role in structural-functionalism
Holt and Richardson (1970, 29-45) Account of other metatheories around during the behavioural revolution when structural-functionalism was at its height
Lipset (1959) widely read article on the link between economic development and democracy
Sartori (1969, 87-94) suggests that Lipset and Rokkan's (1967b) work on party formation was a landmark study that departed in key ways from the previous literature
The next generation began to reshape the field:
Lijphart (1968a) on consociationalism,
Schmitter (1971) on corporatism
Stepan (1971) on the military
O'Donnell (1973) on authoritarianism
Scott (1976) and Skocpol (1979) on revolution
See footnote on p. 50 for contributions to cross-country survey data
Fundamental differences in perspective between Sartori (1970 - concept misformation...) and Jackman (1985), who advocated quantitative research (debates in comp gov)
Collier (1991) critical assessment of the state of the literature on methodology
Notes
Chapter 2
(32)
Comp Pol emerged as a FIELD of political science in late 19th century in the US.
Influence of US academia declined in 2 decades post WW2
Research standards set in the US
(33)
Two main "revolutions" - behavioural revolution, drawing from sociology, and post cold war "Second scientific revolution" drawing from economics and focussing on methodology.
** "Fallen short of fulfilling the field's mission of producing a global science of politics - the lack of a general or unified theory of politics, and the failure to produce robust, broad empirical generalisations about world politics."
Constitution of political science as a discipline, 1880 - 1920. Traces its birth to the greek philosophers of antiquity, e.g. Plato (The Republic 360bc) and Aristotle politics (340bc).
(35)
Various institutional developments took place in the states that gave an organisational basis to the autnomisation of political science. The first graduate programme was Columbia University's school of political science founded by John Burgess in 1880 -> led to the expansion of PhDs trained as political scientists in the US. The discipline's professional association - APSA - founded in 1903.
This involved a differentiation between PS and history. APSA was a splinter group from the American Historical Association (founded 1884). Political Scientists defined their subject matter in a way to create a separate identity from history.
Many of the founders had been trained in Germany in Staatswissenschaft (political science) and historically orientated Geisteswissenschaft (social sciences) - may explain why the "state" was central to early PS.
(Differences with history)
P.Scientists left the past as the preserve of historians and focus on the contemporary.
Eschew history's aspiration to address all potential factors that affect politics and instead focus on more delimited question of government and its formal instutions. - but also theory building, law-like generalisations etc.
(36)
(Differences with sociology)
Sociologists established a discipline that was a continuation of classical social theory of Comte, Toqueville, Spencer, Durkheim, Marx, Weber, Pareto, Mosca and Michels, and defined sociology as the mother discipline, the synthetic social science.
Economics and sociology defined themselves through theory driven choices - economics a reorientation of classical theory - sociology an extension of classical theory. PS differentiated itself through an empirically distinct subject matter and involved a rejection of European grand theorising and philosophies of history. Born out of history and a desire to distinguish itself; break from classical tradition.
(37)
The early discipline was bereft of theory. The formal-legal approach that was common was largely atheoretical - did not propose general and testable hypotheses. Narrow research agenda forcussing on formal institutions.
A US reaction to abstract or even metaphysical aspects of European philosophies of history - and had the positive effect of grounding the discussion in observables, empirical facts. Mainly based on case-studies and data was not subjected to rigorous testing. ("Descriptive" phase)
(41)
The behavioural revolution 1921-1966
Merriam's (1921) Manifesto for a new science of politics, a departure from the historical approach.
Series of national conferences on the science of politics - 1923, 1924 and 1925
The formation of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC)
Signalled the rise of the "Chicago school", an influential source of scholarship in the 1920s and 30s.
(42)
More be default than design, comparative politics was institutionally constituted as a field that covered what was not covered by American politics, i.e. the study of government and formal institutions outside the US.
The rise of the Nazis in Germany encouraged many scholars to emigrate, and they brought to the US a greater emphasis on normative political theory.
Eckstein (1963, 18-23) characterises the most influential books in CP over this period.
Behaviouralism didn't really spread to comparative politics until after WW2, due to the institutional insulation, Merriam's ideas didn't immediately reach comparative politics departments.
(43)
Behaviouralism stood for 2 distinct ideas.
1.Rejection of the restriction of scope to formal institutions
Included a range of informal procedures and behaviours
2.Sought to use a scientific approach to theory and methods
Systematic theory and empirical testing
Dahl (1961b, 766) - "a protest movement within political science"
Broadening the scope of enquiry beyond government instutitions led to the increased influence of sociology, and Parsonian (1951) theories of structural functionalism. Was influenced by anthopology and social psychology.
(44)
The state was, to some extent, ignored, hence behaviouralist research often let to reductionist accounts of politics in which the state was a black box with no autonomy/impact of its own.
Ingored the idea that the state can be an agent that influences the actors and institutions.
(45)
Limits of structural-functionalism
Still fell short of providing testable propositions and testing hypothesese
The literature did develop mid-range theories that were suited to empirical testing, e.g. Symour Lipset's (1960) Political Man. - included widely read APSR article on the link between economic development and democracy (Lipset 1959).
During the behavioural period, research spread outside the large European countries. Comparativists studied the US and thus broke down the arbitrary exclusion of US from CP.
Another methodological novelty was the inclusion of statistical research.
E.g. the pioneering survey-based study, The Civic Culture by Almond and Verba (1963)
(46)
The field had become more theoretically orientated and more methodologically sophisticated.
(47)
The Post-Behavioural Period, 1967-1988
Lipset and Rokkan's (1967b) "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, Voter Alignments" marked a new intellectual agenda
See above "the next generation began to reshape the field"
Authors diverse in national origin and values they held
Prolific scholars of the era: Europe born: Linz, Sartori, Lijphart, Przeworski); Latin America born: O'Donnel - though this group had mainly studied at US institutions.
(48)
The most widely shared critique focussed on the behaviouralist's reductionism, i.e. the idea that politics can be reduced to, and explained in terms of, more fundamental social or economic underpinnings.
The alternative consisted of the re-vindication of politics as an autonomous practice and an emphasis on the importance of political determinants.
(49)
The centrality given to distinctly political questions implied a redefinition of the subject matter of comparative politics
the study of political behaviour and interest groups was not ignored but tackled from the perspective of the state. As Skocpol (1985) put it, there was an attempt to "bring the state back in" - [as an autonomous actor]
The new literature also brought back the formal institutions that had been abandoned
Led to a refocussing on the state, state-society relations and political institutions
Theorising also changed - more focus on building mid-range theories
Continuing use of statistics, mainly small-N studies or case studies. A quantitative literature started to develop in areas such as electoral behaviour, public opinion and democracy.
(51)
Methadological schism started to take root.
the (relatively) low standing of quantitative research was due to deficiencies in the literature - comparativists often had reservations about the theoretical underpinnings of quantitative research (and) the quantitative literature did not speak to some of the most pressing or theoretically relevant issues of the time (e.g. see Johnson 2003 for a discussion).
(52)
The second scientific revolution, 1989-Present
Push to make the field more scientific, helped by the APSA section on comparative politics.
Response to the fragmentation of the field due to increased prominence of Area Studies
Proposed metatheories drew heavily on economics as opposed to sociology
Game theoretic rational choice theory, and rational choice institutionalism - a related but distinct metatheory that introduced (in a highly consequential move) institutions as constraints.
See cg approaches post on rational choice theory
Rational choice theory can be seen as a unifying theory, which can integrate theories about action in different domains, because it is not held to apply to any specific domain
Emphasis on logical rigour in theorising
After 1989 work gradually became more formalised
Political events such as the wave of democratisation made questions and methods standard in the field of American politics more global in application/more relevant to CP students
(55)
The infrastructure for quantitative research was strengthened, leading to an increase in the amount and standards of quantitative work. (Huge increase in the availability of survey data)
The post 1989 period has lacked anything so dominant as structural functionalism or modernism in the behaviouralist period - it is a time of pluralism.
Rational choice theorists began to include institutions in their analysis - as debate centred on rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism - it became hard to detect what was distinctive about these metatheories.
A common issue: institutions are both contraints and endogenous to the political process.
These metatheories don't separate a general theory of action from a general theory of politics.
(56)
David Collier reinvigorated the debate on methodology with his 1991 article. Revival of interest in qualitative methodology was associated with efforts to build bridges amond different methodologies.
(57)
The possibility of a unifying "tri-partite" methodology involving statistical analysis, formalisation and narrative, suggested by Laitin (2002).
Top of page 57, exposition of the new debates about methodologies. Can we move towards a discipline?
The new scientific revolution did not bring about a major shift in the focus of empirical research.
(58)
Unification? A focus on a distinctively political subject matter has become largely the norm, mid-range theorising on a range of important questions has grown steadily, and the methods used in the field have become increasingly sophisticated.
Comparativists have largely abandoned the aspiration of the system-builders who sought to elaborate an explicit metatheory of politics in the 1950s and 1960s
Key challenge is the development of a general/unified theory of politics, which itegrates both mid-range theories of various substantive issues, and theories of statics and dynamics.
There remain empirical shortcomings. Comparatives still lack good measures for many of the concepts used in their theories. Comparativists still rarely use methods that would subject their hypotheses to rigorous testing.
(more)
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