Bowen (2009) Can Islam be French?

Available SSL - DC34.5.M87.BOW 2010 . And here is the rest of it. (more)

Kuhn (1996) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Available New College - N 3 KUH. And here is the rest of it. (more)

Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) ‘Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral Accountability and the Size of the Government Sector’

Bawn, Kathleen, and Frances Rosenbluth (2006), ‘Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral
Accountability and the Size of the Government Sector’. American Journal of Political Science 50:251–65.
Available: Soft Copy

Notes (more)

Przeworksi, Stokes and Manin (1999) Democracy, Accountability and Representation

Przeworkski, Adam, Susan Carol Stokes and Bernard Manin (1999), Democracy, Accountability and Representation
Available SSL - JC423.DEM

Notes. (more)

The Self-restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies

Available SSL - JF229.SEL

Notes. (more)

Thesis ideas #1

Write up of first talk with David Robertson.

Notion of government accountability - how to define it and how to measure it.

How good is the political system - is democracy rule by the people or rule for the people? What is the difference?

Efficiency of parliamentary democracy - can we have sustained policy outcomes that are unpopular
inefficient market for policies / market for competence

Breaking manifesto pledges - is it undemocratic to do so?

How do features of the political system influence government accountability?
- voter turnout

Does it make much difference which party is in power, for example w.r.t long term projects, e.g. defence expenditure
Capital expenditure can be an indicator

Constitutional reforms - evolves through non-democratic methods (judicial decisions)
Conditional outcomes - means versus ends
Written versus unwritten conventions can dissipate

Party policies may be determined by party interests at the time, e.g. 1979 election focus on nuclear missiles.
Do parties set the agenda or do people?
Free party political broadcasts?
Entry costs of politics

Direct democracy: e.g. California panders to populist policies
Should election laws be in the constitution - French system parties can change the electoral laws without changing the constitution

Constitutional engineering to increase accountability

Sociological change - elected politicians are professional politicians.

Question I want to answer
Can we measure the efficiency of democratic systems?
Index of efficiency - cost of setting up a new party (based on the number of new parties registered?)
Literature on democratic accountability - accountability measured by? average number of portfolios over a certain time period
Percentage of "wasted votes"?

Literature search - government accountability,
Downs 1957 An economic theory of democracy
Schumpeter
Look again at the voting and elections literature

Constitutionalism - can constitutions make democracies more accountable

What institutional features affect the accountability of democratic governments
Efficiency and accountability: are efficient political systems more accountable to their electorates?

Idea about Accountability - from Downs an Economic Theory of Democracy - to what extent is each vote equal. His theory that uncertainty requires representatives which causes some voters to be worth more than others. Structure of the voting system etc. e.g. FPTP vs PR
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MT09 - Week 8 Reading List - The Politics of Development

This session aims to identify what different political thinkers and governments have
meant by ‘development’ (industrialization, public services, state capacity, economic
growth, freedom). It also explores the question of why ‘third-world’ countries have
found development to be such an elusive goal (historical legacies, political
structures, global inequality, corrupt governments, misguided international
institutions, natural resources).

Discussion topics:
(a) Why has ‘development discourse’ proved such an attractive language for governments, political thinkers, and international institutions? Is it possible to identify in the literature a common understanding of what development is and how it can be achieved? What are the main factors preventing the ‘development’ of the ‘third-world’?
(b) Does successful ‘development’ require a certain type of state (democratic vs. developmental vs. authoritarian vs. neo-patrimonial)? Is there an inherent contradiction between the policies required to successfully promote economic growth and the priorities of political actors in underdeveloped countries?

Readings:
(a) Development and its discontents
· Allen, T and A Thomas (2000), Poverty and Development into the Twenty First Century, esp Chs 1, 2, 17
· Bates, R (2001), Prosperity and Violence: the political economy of development (a useful overview and critique of the development of the discipline)
· *Cardoso, Fernando, and F Enzo (1979), Development and Dependency in Latin America
· Collier, Paul (2007), The Bottom Billion, esp Parts 2 & 4
· Cowen, M. & R.W. Shenton (1996), Doctrines of development
· Escobar, Arturo (1995), Encountering Development: the making and unmaking of the Third World
· Ferguson, James (1994), The Anti-politics Machine
· Gwynne, Robert and Cristobal Kay (2004), Latin America Transformed: Globalization and Modernity
· *Leys, C (1996), The Rise and Fall of Development Theory
· *Sen, Amartya (1999), Development As Freedom
· Stiglitz, Joseph (2002), Globalization and its Discontents

(b) The economic consequences of political structures
· Bates, R (2005), Markets and States in Tropical Africa
· *Chabal, P. and J-P Daloz (1999), Africa works: disorder as political instrument, Chs 1, 8 & 9
· Evans, Peter (1992), ‘The State as Problem and Solution’, in Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman eds The Politics of Economic Adjustment
· Governance 7, no. 4 (1994), special issue on the Developmental State in Asia
· Kline, Harvey and Wiarda, Howard (2006), Latin American Politics and Development, Ch 1
· Leftwich, A. (1993), Governance, democracy and development in the Third World. Third World
Quarterly 14 (3)
· Mamdani, Mahmood. (1990), Uganda - contradictions of the IMF programme and perspective.
Development and Change 21
· Onis, Ziya (1991), ‘The Logic of the Developmental State’, Comparative Politics, 24 (1), (this is a very helpful review article – the four sources discussed are all worthy of consultation)
· *Polanyi, Karl (1944), The Great Transformation
· *Rueschemeyer, D et al (1992), Capitalist Development and Democracy, esp pp. 63-75.
· Scott, James (1998), Seeing Like a State
(more)

Migdal (1988) Strong societies and weak states

Migdal, Joel (1988), Strong Societies and Weak States,
Available: Hard copy
Reading list MT09 Week 5, Ch 1.

(4)
Post war view of state building was that states had the potential to mould their societies through virtuous planning and meticulously laid out policies.
The state organisation became the focal point for hopes of achieving broad goals of human dignity, prosperity and equity.
Capabilities include the capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.
(5)
Strong states have "high capabilities" to complete these tasks, where weak states are on the low end of the spectrum of capability.
Migdal takes Norlinger's definition of autonomy: states that can act on their own preferences and are not beholden to the most dominant social group
Strong state lit versus weak state lit, states almost totally impotent in the swirl of dizzying social changes
Krasner (1985): most developing countries have very weak domestic political institutions.
Constitutions and legislation often appear strong on paper but in practice the control is not actually exercised (Hammergren 1977)
(8)
Kohli (1987) India's state performance can be characterised overall by a failure to pursue the regime's own professed goals.
[carrying out some different goals might imply a strong/effective state that has been captured by a particular social group. similarly carrying out own goals ineffectively may imply weak but autonomous state]

(more)

Constitutional Reform Event

This special issue will be launched at a free event to be held at Portcullis House, Westminster on 9 December 2009 from 6pm. All are welcome to join special issue editor Dr. David Erdos (Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford), Unlock Democracy, and Oxford Journals for an evening of lively discussion and debate on the past, present, and future of UK constitutional reform. The event will be chaired by Baroness Helena Kennedy QC and confirmed speakers include Peter Facey, Director of Unlock Democracy, and Dr. Tony Wright MP, Chairman of the Public Administration Select Committee. (Further speakers to be announced shortly.) The panel will address three overarching questions which are of as much interest now as twenty years ago when Charter 88 was first launched:


What have been the central strengths and achievements of the constitutional reform movement?
Where might it have taken a wrong turning, strategically and/or in terms of philosophy?
Where do we go from here in order to achieve democratic and constitutional renewal?
Those seeking further information are welcome to email David Erdos directly at david.erdos@csls.ox.ac.uk.

Parliamentary Affairs special Journal on constitutional reform (link)

(more)

Skocpol and Finegold (1982) State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal

Skocpol, Theda and Kenneth Finegold (1982) ‘State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal,’ Political Science Quarterly, 97 (2), 255-78
Available - PDF Link


(255)
The new deal was a major watershed in the development of an economically interventionist national state.
The NIRA and the Agricultural Adjustment Act were an extraordinary new departure for the US govt. due to the amount of economic intervention.
NIRA: pursuit of economic recovery through the united action of labour and management. Each code for each industry mandated minimum wages and maximum hours plus more union rights.
(256)
Agricultural Adj Act (AAA) aimed to raise prices for basic commodities.
These acts effectively mandated creation of the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA).
(257)
If both these acts had succeeded the US might have by the mid 30s emerged from recession as a centralised system of politically managed corporatist capitalism.
But... NRA became increasingly unwieldy, conflict ridden, uncertain about basic goals and preferred means for achieving them. AAA's programme was more successful.
(258)
Why was the new deal's initial effort to intervene in agriculture institutionalised so much more quickly than it's attempt to intervene in industry. Neither conventional pluralism nor conventional Marxism can answer it.
(259)
Both of these theoretical approaches attempt to explain political outcomes in socially determinist ways.
Pluralist theory: the best organised groups in society with the greatest political resources will use government to achieve their goals.
Marxist theory: capitalist class benefits most from politics in a capitalist society (regardless of whether capitalists control decision making).
Industrial capitalists were already highly organised by 1932 through trade associations.
(260)
Their strategy for recovery of American industry was based on the relaxation of antitrust laws, and government sponsorship for industry by industry cooperation to coordinate prices and regulate production levels and employment conditions. The industrialists got what they asked for in terms of the NIRA and even more so in the implementation than the legislation.
Farmers were not as highly organised as the industrialists in the early 30s. Competing farmers' associations were pressing for different responses to the depression.
Farmers still did well out of the AAA despite lack of unity over requests for assistance.
Argument: in neither case can the demands, the organisation, or the class economic power of social groups directly explain the results of the New Deal govt interventions affecting the interests of farmers or industrialists.
Explanatory approach focusses on issue of state capacity. Govts can not always successfully enact their own decisions.
(261)
Given the state capacities at hand, the NIRA promised the impossible whereas the AAA promised the attainable.

Weakness of the American state and the failure of the NRA
Schumpeter's 1939 book Business Cycles outlined a previously entrenched skilled civil service or experienced bureaucracy in America.
Skowronek (1982) during the nineteenth century the US national polity was "stateless" - a government of courts and parties, one that functioned remarkably well in a decentralised capitalist economy.
(263)
Herbert Hoover created the ideal of the "associative state" a form of "adhocracy" involving using government officials as facilitators between influential group, particularly business trade associations.
(264)
Roosevelt was mainly reliant on one man, General Hugh Johnson to put together the entire NRA apparatus necessary to implement Title I of the NIRA.
An entire NRA staff had to be instantly assembled. Blue Eagle campaign was launched to persuade employers to agree immediately to blanket wage and hours provisions - and Johnson prompted industries to draw up their own codes of fair competition.
Business leaders successfully formulated these codes so as to allow a number of loopholes in the prolabour provisions as well as production cutbacks and noncompetitive higher prices for most industries.
(266)
The lack of input from labour groups and consumer groups meant that the NIRA was a bargain between business leaders and business leaders in the guise of the government.
(267)
The virtual complete absence of autonomous capacity to administer industrial planning in the US polity in the early 1930s condemned the NRA to be at first a characteristic mobilisation effort, and then an arena of bitterly politicised and inconclusive conflicts.
(268)
The Federal Agricultural Complex and the Roots of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration
(269)
The AAA's trajectory did not reflect the divisiveness and stalemate of the NRA's.
(270)
Important differences between agri production and industrial prodn. Annual cycle with fewer key decisions to be regulated over time.
The AAA was placed within an existing federal department. USDA. (NRA would not have gained from being placed within the Commerce dept - reason given earlier).
The Agri Dept was an island of strength in the ocean of weakness of Federal government.
(274)
The "personality factor" had been dissolved in the USDA because a corporate factor the influence of land grant college training and tradition has been overwhelmingly strong.
Conclusion
The agricultural experts, ideas and administrative means were products of a long process of institution building whose roots go back to the Civil War.
The institutions laid the basis for the administrative will to intervene in the national market economy.
Armstrong: a large measure of organisational unity and homogeneity in socialisation among elite administrators has been crucial for development of an interventionist role definition.
The US agricultural complex historically nurtured a process of political learning about what could effectively be done for farmers and society as a whole through public agricultural policy.
Heclo: politics finds its source not only in power but also in uncertainty
(278)
The reach of the New Deal's ambitious early venture into industrial planning simply exceeded the grasp that could be afforded by the public institutions and intelligence of the day.
(more)

King (1999) The Racial Bureacracy....

King, Desmond (1999) ‘The Racial Bureaucracy: African Americans and the Federal Government in the Era of Segregated Race Relations’, Governance, 12 (4), 345-77
Available - PDF link

Racial bureaucracy in the civil service - one group of employees placed in a subordinate position to the others both formally and informally. Physical working conditions and daily routines were constructed around the segregation of one group of employees because of their race, and advancement and promotion was delimited by race. Between the 1890s and 1945 in the US.

(347) State theory and the racial bureaucracy
Neither version (theory) was satisfactory at explaining how segregation was introduced into Federal government.
The local racial state thesis: Rueschemeyer Stephens and Stephens (1992) - emphasis on the decentralised character of the state. This allowed the South to continue to exclude blacks totally. But - segregationist practices were followed in the North as well.
(348)
The weak state thesis: (e.g. Krasner 1978; Nettl 1968; Skocpol 1985; Skowronek 1982)
- but for African Americans, the state has often appeared as a strong institution whether a source of oppression, or as an institution willing to thwart local racism.
The dichotomy between strong and weak states may be overdrawn in the literature.
State capacities are often dynamic in nature - party political and electoral calculations are crucial in the role that the federal govt adopts.
(349)
Apparent weakness or strength of the state was not an immutable institutional feature.
In the mid-1950s after the Brown decision and findings from Truman's investigative committees - USDJ officials became instruments through which civil rights were realised (Graham 1990).

(350) Building the racial bureaucracy

(364) Discrimination Under Segregation
New Deal programmes were established in 1932 to provide public relief and employment for all Americans. Many of these programmes were segregated.
(368) Conclusion
Multiple traditions approach to the formation of American political values - e.g. contradiction of the "separate but equal" mantra with the Plessy judgement.
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MT09 - Week 8 Tutorial - Strong and Weak States

Week 8: Do comparative theories of state capacity provide a sound basis for distinguishing between strong and weak states?

Consult the course reading list and
On the general theory you could look at Skocpol, Theda, ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research’, in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, 1985;

for an attempt to apply it see: King, Desmond (1999) ‘The Racial Bureaucracy: African Americans and the Federal Government in the Era of Segregated Race Relations’, Governance, 12 (4), 345-77;

Skocpol, Theda and Kenneth Finegold (1982) ‘State Capacity and Economic Intervention in the Early New Deal,’ Political Science Quarterly, 97 (2), 255-78..

(more)

Party Politics No. 9 Issue 5 (2003)

Available SSL - Per P
Issues: v.1:no.1(1995)- Last rec'd: v.15:no.6(2009:NOV) on NOV 13, 2009
Link to full PDF of journal - http://ppq.sagepub.com/content/vol9/issue1/

Notes. (more)

Thompson (1973) Fear and loathing on the campaign trail

Available - SSL E859.THO

Notes. (more)

McGinness (1988) The selling of the president

Available SSL - E851.MCG 1988

Notes. (more)

Campbell (2007) The Blair Years

Available Oxford Union - 942.086 BLA [CAM]
.

Notes. (more)

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives

Lipset, Seymour M and Rokkan, Stein (1967) ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction’, in S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan eds Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives
Available SSL - JF2051.LIP.

Notes. (more)

Robert Erikson and Jan O. Jonsson (1998) Social Origin as an interest bearing asset

Available PDF Link.

Notes. (more)

Ware, Alan (1996), Political Parties and Party Systems

Ware, Alan (1996), Political Parties and Party Systems, Oxford: OUP – Part I (Good introductory text)
Available New College P 2.1 WAR

Notes. (more)

Schumpeter, Joseph (1985) ‘Two Concepts of Democracy’

Schumpeter, Joseph (1985) ‘Two Concepts of Democracy’ in Anthony Quinton ed, Political Philosophy
Available New College - P 1.4 QUI

Notes. (more)

Downs, Anthony (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy

Downs, Anthony (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy.
Available New College - P 1.4 DOW

Notes. (more)

Dalton, Russell (2006), Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties

Dalton, Russell (2006), Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties
Available - New College P 2.1 DAL

Notes. (more)

MT09 - Week 7 - Voting and Elections

Elections and party competition are essential to a functioning democracy because
they enable public preferences to be translated into public policy. But who actually
sets the politicalagenda, how do parties mobilise support, and what determines how
an individual votes? This session aims to explore party competition and the
relationship between parties and voters in developed democracies.

Discussion topics:
(a) How do you win an election? Has the rise of televisions/the internet changed everything? How important are party structures? Who sets the political agenda - party elites or the electorate?
(b) Do we best understand how people vote by adopting the lens of ideology, class voting, economic voting, or post-materialist voting? How much variation exists across nations, and what research strategies can we use to model this?

Readings:
(a) Parties and Political Competition
· Dalton, Russell (2006), Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties
· Downs, Anthony (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy OR Dunleavy, Patrick (1986) Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, Chs 4 & 5, and compare with Schumpeter, Joseph (1985) ‘Two Concepts of Democracy’ in Anthony Quinton ed, Political Philosophy
· *Kirchheimer, Otto (1966), ‘The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems’, in
Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, Political Parties and Political Development
· Lipset, Seymour M and Rokkan, Stein (1967) ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction’, in S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan eds Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives
· Mair, Peter (2002), ‘Comparing Party Systems’, in Lawrence LeDuc et al. (eds.), Comparing
Democracies 2: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting
· Nichter, Simeon (2008) ‘Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot’, American Political Science Review, 102, 1
· Party Politics 9, no. 5 (2003) – special issue on Party Organization and Campaigning at the Grass Roots
· Ware, Alan (1996), Political Parties and Party Systems, Oxford: OUP – Part I (Good introductory text)

(b) Voters and vote choice
· Clarke, Harold D., David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart, et al (2004), Political Choice in Britain
· Evans, Geoffrey, ed (1999), The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context, esp Intro and Conc (pay attention to the definition of class at pp.8-11 and think carefully about it)
· Hinich, M. J. and M. C. Munger (1994), Ideology and the theory of political choice
· Hout, M, C. Brooks & J. Manza (1999), ‘The Democratic Class Struggle in the United States’
American Sociological Review 60
· Inglehart, Ronald and J-R Rabier (1986), ‘Political Realignment in Advanced Industrial Society:
From Class- Based Politics to Quality-of-Life Politics’ Government and Opposition 21
· Thomassen, J. ed. (2006), The European Voter.

Students might also want to consider one of the following ‘eye-witness’ accounts:
· Campbell, Alastair (2007) The Blair Years
· McGinness, Joe (1988), The Selling of the President
· Thomas, Evan (2009), "A Long Time Coming": The Inspiring, Combative 2008 Campaign and the Historic Election of Barack Obama
· Thompson, Hunter S (2005), Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail
(more)

Przeworski (1988) Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts

Przeworski, Adam “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,” pp. 59-80 from Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

(60)
In authoritarian regimes "someone/something" has the capacity to prevent political outcomes adverse to their interests. Power apparatus capable of overturning the outcomes of the institutionalised political process.
Tutelary democracy has the democratic political institutions but retains an authoritarian structure (e.g. the military) which can intervene where it perceives unwanted outcomes.
(62)
Crucial moment in the passage to democracy is the threshold beyond which noone can intervene to reverse outcomes in the formal democratic process.

(64)
Democracy involves the creation of institutions that provide a guarantee to "relevant political forces" that their interests would not be too adversely affected in the course of democratic competition.
Each party in the negotiation behaves strategically in its self interest. The package includes the following compromise: at least one of the parties will agree to an outcome which will be best for it given the eventual retribution of the other parties, but not as good as it would have been had the other parties bound themselves to a course of action. Takes a Stackelberg equilibrium approach.
Thesis based on assumptions:
1) institutions have an impact among outcomes of conflicts
2) the protagonists believe that they do
3) institutions that would provide the relevant political forces with reasonable security can be found under some circumstances.
I think this idea of utility maximising conflicting agents/groups is a reasonable one but it needs to be combined with structural variables that predispose the groups towards democratic outcomes rather than a power sharing authoritarian regime. If civil society is not strong enough for example then participation may remain low.
Probability distribution of outcomes is political power determined jointly by the institutional arrangement and the resources which the parties bring into politics.
The alternative of an open, possibly violent conflict, and a democratic outcome which provides security but requires compromise, may benefit the latter. Need conflicting groups with relatively equal bargaining power and the ability to forge a compromise.
Think of this in the context of veto players.

(70)
III - Is an institutional solution always possible?
Analysis limited to a negotiated devolution of power, a ruptura but a ruptura pactada.
Where a democratic Right is in existence the parties can find support appealing to the values of property and democracy - the power block can be quite certain that properly designed institutions will protect its interests.
Where the Right is antidemocratic - it values protection of property more than its own political autonomy - no one whom the authoritarian block can delegate the representation of its interests under democratic conditions.
(72)
Only where the Left lost the first democratic election did democracy not get reversed.
Mass support is required at the stage where there are no institutions that could serve the autonomous organisations as a forum of expression and negotiation. The decalage between autonomous organisation of the civil society and the closed character of state institutions means democracy must assume a mass character - mass movement is needed as a means of pressure - the street becomes the chief arena of expression before the other channels exist.
Workers are typically the first and largest force to organise autonomously. Places of work and markets are the only places people can meet naturally without police supervision. Political rights are necessary for workers to struggle for economic interests.
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Linz and Stepan (1996) Problems of democratic transition and consolidation

Reading list pages 3 - 83 in MT09 Week 3.
Available New College - P 1.3 LIN
Available Hard Copy in folder.

Chapter 1 - Democracy and its arenas
Character of a non-democ regime affects the paths of transition and what actions must be taken
Definition - completed transition: sufficient agreement about procedures...
Electorialist fallacy... elections are necessary but not sufficient
Institutional indeterminacy within the democratic arena may leave the transition incomplete
Definition - consolidated democracy: separate from the quality of democracy, a narrower definition involving behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional dimensions. Democracy has become "the only game in town".
Behaviourally - no significant groups seriously attempt to overthrow democ regime or secede from the state.
Attitudinally - the overwhelming majority of the people believe in the democratic system
Constitutionally - all the actors in the polity agree political conflict will be resolved according to the established norms, and that violations of these norms likely to be ineffective and costly
The ineffective and costly bit is a useful addition. most of these definitions seem vague and difficult to operationalise
A consolidated democ would only break down due to some new dynamic not inherent weakness.

(7)
The Five Arenas of a Consolidated Democracy
Five interacting arenas to enforce one another.
Democracy is governance of a state. So the polity must first become a state.
1. Free and lively civil society.
2. Autonomous and valued civil society
3. Rule of law to guarantee individuals' freedoms and right to association life
4. State apparatus/bureacracy
5. Institutionalised economic society

In the regimes thy studied, non-democratic states did not survive by defending themselves by force. The cost of that scale of repression was too high, and the legitimacy believed too weak.
A full democratic transition must involve political society involving appreciation of the core institutions political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, interparty alliances and legislatures.
Distinctiveness of civil and political society but also their complementarity is important to consolidate democracy.
At the moment of democratic transition, political society might try to dismantle civil society.
All significant actors must uphold and respect the rule of law (often a rule of law embodied in a spirit of consitutionalism)
First 3 are virtually definitional pre-requisites of a consolidated democracy. Conditions more likely to be satisfied if 4 and 5 exist as well.
To protect rights of its citizens govt needs to claim a monopoly on the use of force. Effective capacity to command, regulate and extract.
Economic society. There can never be a consolidated democracy in a command economy (excluding in war time). Similarly there can never be a modern consolidated democ in a pure market economy. Economic society is the socio-politically constructed set of norms and insitutions which mediate between the state and the market.
They theorise that a degree of market autonomy and ownership diversity in society is necessary to produce the liveliness and independence of civil society necessary to contribute to democracy. They didn't explain why exactly civil society is necessary apart from to oppose non-democratic regimes. Civil society is a way of consolidating the power of the people and making it tangible.
(12)
Adam Smith assigned three indispensible tasks to the modern state.

(24)
Nation states and democratisation: inconvenient facts
Under what empirical conditions do they form complementary and conflictual logics?
A nation-state policy (Rogers Brubaker: "nationalising state policies" (1994) aimed at increasing cultural homegeneity). Dominant language, maybe a favoured religion, - contrast to democratic policies in the state making process which emphasise a broad and inclusive citizenship where all citizens are accorded equal individual rights.
(25)
Conflicts are reduced when empirically almost all of the residents of a state identify with one subjective idea of the nation (a nation which is virtually contiguous with the state). Only in the cases of no significant irredenta, only on nation existing within the state, and low cultural diversity - simultaneously pursue democratisation policies and nation state policies.
However, very few states that are nondemocratic will begin a democratic transition with a very high degree of nation state homogeneity. (but they gave examples of six states that did begin transitions with homogenous nation states).
When there are national groups that claim the right of self-determination.
When there is a large minority that might be considered by a neighbouring state an irredenta.
If minorities are alienated they might turn to a neighbouring country for support.
(27)
Complex negotiations, pacts and possible territorial realignments and consociational agreements are often necessary before the majority formula will be accepted as legitimately binding. As Dahl argues (1989) simple insistence on the majority formula per se will not do anything until the appropriateness of the unit is established.
Could having a lack of a single nation state actually help spur the emergence of democracy, a consensus mode of government would be the only way to impart legitimacy? Depends on how deep the cleavages are between the groups.
The domain is the group of people comprising the unit - and it should be clearly bounded (Dahl 1989). The more indeterminate the domain or scope, the more likely the unit, if established, would become embroiled in jurisdictional squabbles or even civil wars. (p. 207)
They think it would be impossible for half the territories in the world that are not now democratic could ever simultaneously become nation-states and consolidated democracies (because creating the nation would involve non-democratic actions).
Because many of the states are multinational, multilingual and multicultural.
The purposeful process of nation building by the French after the Jacobin idea was an incredible success.
(31)
Sociological analysis is that such an effort is doomed to failure in most societies and certainly liberal democratic societies. Every society produces an intellectual elite which defends the "primordial" values and characteristics. Such elites did not exist in agrarian preindustrial societies (Gellner). Argues that under modern circumstances with advanced communication systems and widely disseminated national cultural output, and multicultural norms abound - homogenising policies would be likely undemocratic and might tend towards ethnic cleansing.
They are glossing over a very complex subject here but making a distanced, general point.

(33)
Multinational states and consociational democracies.
(35)
If successful democratic consolidation is the goal, the particular mix of nations, cultures, and awakened political identities present [must be taken into account by democracy crafters]. Nationalising policies could be destabilising, e.g. civil society: schooling and mass media restricted to the official language. Political society - nationalising citizenship laws could lead to over-representation of the dominant nationality. State bureacracy - use of a particular language could over represent one nationality. Rule of law could privilege a range of cultural customs. Economic society the state could be given rights to ownership distribution. A democratising strategy would require consensus policies in each of these areas.
Is this a systematic approach to nation state/democracy building? See table pg. 36.

(55)
Chapter 4 - The implications of prior regime type for transition paths and consolidation tasks
It depends how developed the 5 arenas of democracy are. E.g. authoritarian regime could be strong in every arena apart from the political arena - the creation of the autonomy, authority, power and legitimacy of democratic institutions.
Difference between transition from post-totalitarian regime (Spain in '70s, Hungary) and from a fully totalitarian regime.
They claim to spell out their arguments in a "systematic and detailed manner".
Post-totalitarian regimes still may need to overcome the legacy of authoritarianism.
Sultanistic societies will need to begin construction of civil society, constitutionalism and a rule of law, professional norms for the bureacracy, economic society and political institutions from a very low base.
Neither theoretically nor historically do democratic transitions involve pacts.
Eight distinctive paths to redemocratisation (see Stepan, in O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead eds 1986) only 3 of which involved pacts.
Pacts can range from very democratic to not democratic in their intention and consequences.
Pact creation does not automatically lead to pact maintenance.
(more)

O'Donnell (1999) Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies

O’Donnell, Guillermo (1999 )“Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies” in Andreas
Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner eds. The Self-restraining State: Power and
Accountability in New Democracies pp29-52.
Available SSL - JF229.SEL



Notes. (more)

Zhang (1994) Corporatism, Totalitarianism and the Transition to Democracy

Baohui Zhang, ‘Corporatism, Totalitarianism and the Transition to Democracy’, Comparative Political Studies, vol 27, 1, 1994
Available - PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Pye (1990) Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism

Lucian Pye, 'Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism', American Political Science Review, 84, 1990
Available - PDF Link

Notes (more)

Huntingdon (1991) How Countries Democratise

Samuel Huntington, 'How Countries Democratise', Political Science Quarterly, 106:4, 1991-92
Available - PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Higley (1989) The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns

John Higley, ‘The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns’, American Sociological Review, vol. 54, pp 17-32
Available - PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Dogan and Higley (1998) Elites Crises and the Origins of Regimes

Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds), Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).
Available: SSL - JC330.ELI
Chapter 1 available PDF

Chapter 2 - Historical and theoretical conditions (Alan Knight).
(30)
What exactly is a "crisis"? Difficult to identify empirically and is vulnerable to ex post facto rationalisations. We see crises when and where we want to. Even though Dogan and Higley do formulate a narrow political conception involving an event or series of events that over a short time period (days or weaks) that destroy or drastically weaken a regime's equilibrium and effectiveness.

Chapter 3 - Political crises and elite settlements (Burton and Higley)
(64)
There is a disagreement here with Knight who argues that it is at times of crisis when elites are weakest. Knight has identified some situations where elite control was limited or absent. They regard this as supporting their theory; elites lost control because they were disunited. In none of these cases was there an elite settlement.
Knight is not the first scholar to speculate that elite settlements are largely epiphenemonal outcomes of structural class struggles or cultural evolutions. Marxists see the 1689 elite settlement in Britain as solidifying the landed class's hold on power.
(65)
The thesis that because of a unique political crisis English elites alone reached a settlement during the early modern period is more parsimonious, less disembodied, and accords better with the conclusions of historians who have studied the period closely. There was a similar class system in other European countries but no specific settlements reached so the marxist explanation is less compelling.
A general shortcoming of class centred structural frameworks is that classes and other large collectivities are never actors; nor are states.
(more)

Higley and Gunther (1991) Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America

John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1991) ch. 1.
Available SSL - HN110.5.Z9.ELI or New College P 2.3 HIG .

Preface - they take the view that another book on democratisation is necessary because there is room for further work at the theoretical and intepretive level.
The country studies in the existing literature focus on consolidation within individual countries rather than emergence. Transitions may be triggered by a wide variety of events and the course may vary from case to case.
They aim to take a systematic view focussing on the role of elites in democratic transitions.
O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) see elite pacts as crucial to transition from authoritarian rule.
Politics as bargaining rather than politics as war (Sartori 1987)
Argue that there is widespread agreement about elite precondition for consolidated democracy.
In independent authoritarian states, elite transformation carried out by elites themselves are the main possibly only route to democratic consolidation. Elite transformations from disunity to consensual unity must occur- through elite settlement or elite convergence.

Chapter 1: Introduction - elite transformations and democratic regimes.
(1)
"ideal-type" definitions of democracy, they offer a few, they are "demanding"
We cannot be too rigid in conceiving of democracy in procedural terms
They reject the substantive conception of measuring democracy by political and social outcomes.

(3)
Consolidated regimes
definition: regime that meets all the procedural criteria of democracy and in which all politically significant groups agree/adhere to the democratic rules of the game (an ideal type)
"a process of adaption/freezing of democratic norms, that come to be accepted as legitimate by part or all of civil society" (Morlino, 1986, p. 210)
definition Analytically consolidated regimes encompass specific elite and mass features. All important elite groups and factions share a consensus about rules and codes of political conduct and the worth of political institutions. what's "important"?
and Extensive mass participation in elections with no groups systematically left out
So it doesn't have to be durable, systemic, what if one of the important elites changed their mind? maybe there should have to be some sort of equilibrium or incentive for them not to do so
Where elites are not in consensus about the democratic rules of the game but procedural democracy exists, they call it unconsolidated democracy.
Stable limited democracies have elite consensus but poor participation.
Pseudo democracies - elections but with little elite competition and/or mass intimidation
(7)
Consolidation should be operationalised in such a way that it is not tautological, i.e. not just based on the length of the regime's survival
Public statements from elites (particularly at a time a new constitution is being drafted and ratified) can give an indication of elite consensus. this seems very subjective...
Antisystem parties with consistently high levels of support demonstrate lack of consolidation. May try to subvert existing institutions or vote against a democratic constitution.
(8)
Elites, definition: persons who are able to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially. again a very subjective definition
The key decision makers in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, cultural organisations and movements.
Large countries e.g. US/Soviet Union there may be >10,000 elites. Quite small countries e.g. Portugal <1000 style="font-style: italic;">We are thinking about elites, conceptualising this variable, on the basis of individuals. Should we be thinking about groups or organisations instead? What if elite organisations are bounded by strong constitutions?
Elites relevant to democratic transitions are in opposition to authoritarian regimes. Unless (spontaneous) outbursts are directed by acknowledged leaders and are organised, popular outbursts usually dissipate or are promtly suppressed.
Important variable: protest groups require an "acknowledged and organised" set of elites, either within or without the authoritarian regime.
Unorganised forces are unlikely to establish a stable democracy even if successful in toppling a regime.
Democratic stability depends on agreements that can be struck only among elites which then need to impose these agreements on their followers and gain support for them.

(10)
Types of elites
Structural integration and value consensus are the two dimensions of elite functioning.
Disunified elite - struct integ and val consens are minimal.
Consensually unified elite - the 2 dimensions are relatively inclusive
They tend to perceive politics as positive sum or politics as bargaining (Sartori 1987)
Share an underlying consensus about rules of the game and worth of democratic institutions
Reduces the cost of political defeat (incentive structure)
Ideologically unified elite - structural integration and value consensus are monolithic (totalitarian)
Emergence of democracy takes place when elite transformations occur. Settlement and convergence.

(13)
Elite settlement
Elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganise their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements (Burton and Higley 1987)
Can create patterns of peaceful and open competition between elites (basis for a stable limited democracy)
Can facilitate emergence of a consolidated democracy (though no guarantee)
Two sets of circumstances foster elite settlements:
Prior conflict with both sides suffering heavy losses. Involves situation of uncertainty and/or situation where fighting is more costly than conceding some powers.
Major crisis that threatened the resumption of widespread violence.
Elite cooperation had to be sustained and there were usually some elites seeking to undercut any agreement. Do we know systematically why such elite pacts were signed? Must be about beliefs and incentives but it is difficult to translate this to reality.
(18)
Feature of elite settlements was the predominance of experienced political leaders rather than "new men". Again adds colour but is hardly a systematic approach
At the time elites reached settlements in England, Sweden, Columbia and Venezuela, their countries were at a relatively low level of socio-economic development.
England and Sweden were predominantly agrarian societies. Neither Col or Venez were highly industrialised. Suggests that the national elites enjoyed considerable autonomy from mass followings and pressures. Elites could be more dynamic in forging a consensus.
"Settlements cannot occur in a democratic or mass-media fishbowl" because elites require autonomy. Seems like dodgy reasoning/hardly backed up by much evidence or theory
Leadership positions of elites must be strong enough to negotiate away important concessions to traditional enemies without being ousted.
The situations for successful elite settlement and the formation of a consolidated democracy are very rare hence we rarely see this in reality.

(20)
Elite settlements and democratic consolidation
there can be a significant time lag while democratic participation increases to a sufficient level. There is a strong link between socioeconomic development and mass participation in democratic politics (Almond and Verba 1963; Lipset 1960).
Subsistence economies are normally associated with populations that are illiterate, geographically isolated, deferential to local elites, and uninvolved in national politics. Economic mobilisation goes hand in hand with political mobilisation.
As in England and Sweden, consensually unified elites may gradually coopt the elites that later emerge from mass parties and movements spawned by industrialisation and modernisation.
An elite settlement needs to coopt all important elites so as new elites develop as society changes, they too need to be brought in, otherwise the regime is unconsolidated.
(23)
The mass mobilisation/protest/action often necessary/influential in bringing down an authoritarian regime may make subsequent democratic consolidation difficult (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
Elites may need to demobilise their supporters once the regime falls.

Elite Convergence (occurs in unconsolidated democracies)
Elites realise that by forming a broad coalition they can mobilise a reliable majority of voters, win elections repeatedly, protect their interests by dominating government executive power.
Signalled by electoral victory of previously dissident elites.
Polarised elites must moderate their distinctive ideological and policy positions.
Is it possible to identify these situations ex ante as well as ex post?
(29)
Key facilitating circumstances (based on the French situation) are a high level of socioeconomic development and a strong leader.
(more)

MT09 - Week 6 Tutorial - Why democratise?

“Whilst we now have good explanations to why democracies consolidate, it remains difficult to explain systematically why they become democracies in the first place.” Discuss. (Week 6).

Consult the course reading list. You might also take a look at:

*John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1991) ch. 1. On the same theme, see: Mattei Dogan and John Higley (eds), Elites, Crises, and the Origins of Regimes (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); John Higley, ‘The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns’, American Sociological Review, vol. 54, pp 17-32

Samuel Huntington, 'How Countries Democratise', Political Science Quarterly, 106:4, 1991-92

Lucian Pye, 'Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism', American Political Science Review, 84, 1990

Baohui Zhang, ‘Corporatism, Totalitarianism and the Transition to Democracy’, Comparative Political Studies, vol 27, 1, 1994

Essay plan:

What is democratic consolidation? Do we have good explanations for it. Short bit on this.

Emergence to democracy. Why did some countries become democracies?

Why do some states not become democracies?

State theory- why do we need states - why do democratic states serve this purpose?

(more)

MT09 Week 6 - Representation and Electoral Systems

Aim of the session: To critically examine the literature on electoral systems (both as dependent and independent variables), to explore the factors affecting the emergence and transformation of electoral systems and to analyze the outcomes predicted by theories of electoral systems..

Discussion topics:
(a) What are the most important factors affecting the emergence and/or transformation of electoral systems? Which of the different theoretical approaches to this question do you find most convincing? Why?
(b) What are the most important consequences of electoral systems? Which of the different theoretical approaches to this question do you find most convincing? Why?

Readings:
(a) Electoral systems as dependent variables
· Boix, Carles (1999), ‘Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies’ APSR 93 (3): 609-624.
· Colomer Josep Maria (2005), ‘It’s Parties that Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger’s Law’s Upside Down)’. Political Studies 53:1–21.
· Cox, Gary (1997), Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems.
· Cusack, Thomas R., Iversen, Torben and Soskice, David (2007), ‘Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems’. American Political Science Review 101: 373-391.
· Rogowski, Ronald (1987), ‘Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions’. International
Organization 41: 203–24.
· Rokkan, Stein (1970), Citizens, Elections, Parties.
· Benoit, Kenneth (2007), ‘Electoral Laws as Political Consequences: Explaining the Origins and Change of Electoral Institutions’ Annual Review of Political Science 10: 363-90.
· Przeworkski, Adam, Susan Carol Stokes and Bernard Manin (1999), Democracy, Accountability
and Representation

(b) Electoral systems as independent variables
· Bawn, Kathleen, and Frances Rosenbluth (2006), ‘Short versus Long Coalitions: Electoral
Accountability and the Size of the Government Sector’. American Journal of Political Science 50:
251–65.
· Cox, Gary. Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems. American Journal of Political Science, 1990, 34: 903-35.
· Duverger, Maurice (1963), Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State.
· Iversen, Torben, and Soskice, David (2006), ‘Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others’. American Political Science Review 100 (2): 165-191.
· Lijphart, Arend (1990), ‘The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws’ APSR 84 (2) pp 481-496.
· Powell, G Bingham (2000), Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Vision.
· Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini (2004), The Economic Effects of Constitutions.
· Rogowski, Ronald, and Kayser, Mark Andreas (2002), ‘Majoritarian Electoral Systems and
Consumer Power’. American Journal of Political Science 46: 526-539.
· Rae, Douglas (1971), The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws.
· Taagepeera, Rein and Matthew Shugart (1989) Seats and Votes
· Sartori, Giovanni (2001), ‘The Party-Effects of Electoral Systems’, in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds), Political Parties and Democracy. (more)

Milward (1992) The European Rescue of the Nation State

*Milward, Alan (1992), The European Rescue of the Nation-State
Available New College - P 1.5 MIL.

Notes. (more)

Nordlinger (1981) On the autonomy of the democratic state

Nordlinger, Eric (1981), On the Autonomy of the Democratic State
Available SSL - JC423.NOR .

And here is the rest of it. (more)

Weiss (1998) The Myth of the Powerless State

Weiss, Linda (1998), The Myth of the Powerless State
Available SSL - HD87.WEI

Notes (more)

Evans et al (1985) Bringing the State Back In

Evans, Peter B et al eds (1985) Bringing the State Back In, esp Intro, Chs 2 & 4
Available New College - P 6.2 EVA

Chapter 2 - The State and Economic Transformation - Towards and Analysis of the conditions underlying effective intervention. (P. 44)

The classic interpretations of Polanyi and Gershenkron have brought the state to the fore of capitalist economic development.
Myth of the industrial revolution of a purely private process.
States affect the form and rate of cpaital accumulation and affect whether negative distributional effects will be mitigated or exacerbated.
Even narrowest neoclassic model has room for the state. Market requires a strong set of normative underpinnings to function at all (Durkheim). Need for effective institutionalised guarantees of these - otherwise transactions costs will be exhorbitant.
(Ostrom, protecting the commons?)
Class argument - dominant class that has no interest in transforming the means of production - split between this class and the state apparatus. Realist theory of IR - states need to attain economic development to defend themselves against their neighbours - state managers are incentivised to conflict with the dominant class.
(45)
In monopoly capitalist economies where industries are mainly oligopolies - theoretical justification for relying on market signals to promote capital accumulation fades.
Relax assumption of competitive market - competition is no longer possible to both stimulate and discipline entrepreneurship.
(46)
If distribution is an issue, role of an extra market actor is clear cut.
Not falling into the "functionalist trap" of assuming that because the state is "necessary" is will therefore have the inclination and capacity to fulfil its required role.

Outline of the approach (p. 47)
They use a Weberian definition of the state - set of organisations invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people in a particular territory.
Cardoso: we cannot see the state just as an expression of class interests - since it cannot be other than a social network of people, it therefore has interests of its own and exists in its own right.
Coherent state action is the concern of state elites.
State's ability to act in a coherent way is strictly circumscribed by it's simultaneously an arena of social conflict. Unless social domination is monolithic - state apparatuses will inevitably become arenas of social conflict
[these are theories of state action/basis of a theory at least]
State's claim to being the guardian of the universal interests of society can contradict its role as an autonomous corporate actor.
(48)
The efficacy of the state will always depend on the pattern in which these contradictory tendencies are combined, both in internal structure and in relation to the social structure as a whole.
(49)
The state must acquire relative autonomy from the dominant social class in order to promote economic transformation effectively. The same idea is found in Marxist, classic pluralist and state-centric approaches.
Discussion focusses on the social structural conditions likely to promote autonomy.
They argue against seeing these factors as mutually reinforcing - state's success in building its role as a corporate actor may undercut its ability to remain autonomous and effective intervention may increase the extent to which the state becomes an arena of social conflict
[draw in Nordlinger's theories of state autonomy - is the state autonomous when it can formulate its own preferences or does it have to be able to actually enact them as well. Could the state by strong but not autonomous? - criticism of the theory here).

State structure and the capacity to intervene (p. 50)
Classic answer: Weber - bureaucratic organisation is the most efficient form of organising large scale administrative activities. Weber's ideal type - corporate cohesion of the organisation, differentiation and insulation from its social environment, unambiguous location of decision making and channels of authority, internal rationality and activism.
To engage in economic transformation, workings of this machinery must link up with workings of the market. [to engage the state must have an appropriate relationship with the 5 spheres of partial democracy, otherwise it won't have legitimacy/influence in all of these spheres, it will harm its capability. Rueschemeyer and Evens are focussing on the economic arena - or market sphere as they call it).

(51) Constructing bureaucratic machinery
Effective process of institution building must reshape the goals, priorities, and commitments of core participants and inculcate shared assumptions and expectations on which a common rationality can be based.
Growth of a distinctive esprit de corps among pivotal civil servants is an essential aspect of this process. Such institutional constructions may require decades or generations to become established.
State elites may not be able to intervene in the way they wish if the bureaucratic machinery cannot be created in time. (see footnote 15 p. 73)
(52)
State formation may be as much a result of luck, external factors rather than planning. E.g. S. Korea's institutions were founded on those built by Japan when under occupation.
Organisations cannot easily switch or expand into other fields of action - inflexibility.
(52)
Classic argument for state managers having a different perspective than the dominant class is their removal from concern with short run profit considerations. Potential for a distinctive outlook remains an important aspect of state structure - crucial for its ability to realise its role as a corporate actor.
Organisational capacity and distributional policies

State structure: implications and conclusions (P. 59)
Building the non-bureaucratic foundations of bureaucratic functioning - non instrumental sources of cohesion. Cannot be laid ad hoc. Historical chapter must be taken into account in any attempt to explain its capacity or lack of capacity to intervene.
[how do we measure scope of intervention, goals?]
A large amount of political independence is required for the administrative units rather than just administrative independence. This invites attempts to capture these units by societal groups.

State action and class relations (p. 60)

Conclusions (P. 68)
Some of the competing interests in economy and society, even the structurally dominant ones, will have to be sacrificed in order to achieve systematically required "collective goods" that cannot be provided by partial interests.
[can bring in the example of Japan as mentioned by Moore/Skocpol whereby the state used a situation of national emergency to overrule the dominant class interests).
Mutual reinforcement between state intervention and state autonomy/corporate cohesion occurs and often predominates.
Having more resources under state control diminishes the state's reliance on privately generated resources and thereby increases autonomy.
State's claim to being a guardian of universal interests becomes problematic when some social agents view its interventions as being wilful and particularistic. Deeper interventions can undermine one of the main bases from which state managers can claim autonomy if legitimacy is questioned.
(70)
Specific outcomes cannot be predicted by an overarching theory of capitalism nor do they follow an all embracing logic of industrial society. They must be viewed as complexly contingent explicable on by the basis of careful comparative historical research.


Chapter 4 - Weir and Skocpol - State structures and the possibilities for Keynesian responses to the great depression in Sweden, Britain and the US (p. 107)
(Introduction)
Keynesian era of the 1930s in honour of Keynes's 1936 book The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.
Sweden and the US were the sites of the boldest responses to the crisis by reformist political leaderships. Supported electorally by industrial workers and farmers, both embarked on programmes of deficit government spending to provide emergency relief, create public works projects jobs, and enhance popular social security.
(108)
Liberal platform to reduce unemployment called for a large scale programme of loan financed public works,

Conclusion (p. 148)
The Great Depression opened new possibilities for the state in capitalist liberal democracies to become the active agent of societal welfare through a synthesis of social spending and macroeconomic management.
Depended on emergence of new ideas about the management of capitalist economies, a shift in political power that strengthened organised labour, socially rooted coalitions politically willing and able to support deficit spending policies.
[draw the distinction between the government and the state]
Such factors were not sufficient to account for national policy choices. Political parties defined their goals in the 1930s in close relationship to existing policies and capacities of the states with which they were dealing.
The political coalitions of social groups willing to support deficit spending programmes gained leverage only through state structures and came together or broke apart partially in response to the sequence and effects of state policies themselves.
Several comparative observations worth turning into questions for further exploration:
Swedish economists achieved their policy impact without first forging a striking new grand theory. And without clothing their econoic presciptions in politically partisan and conflictual prescriptions.
Early and sustained access to administratively strategic centres of public policy made it possible for Swedish economists to produce effective intellectual justifications for state sponsored reforms in this relatively atheoretical and non conflictual mode.
The organisational structure of the British state in the 1920s influenced Keynes's theories which then influenced everything that followed. Random outcome...
(more)

MT09 - Week 5 reading list - The State in Comparative Politics

Aim of the session: Despite the central role states occupy in our lives and in the political science literature, there is remarkably little agreement on how powerful the state actually is and what the state should actually do. This session aims to explore different models of state-society relations, and to understand variations in types of state across time and political systems..

Discussion topics:
(a) What is, and what is not, the state? How can we model state-society rela tions? How can we assess or measure state ‘capacity’ in comparative analysis, to trace how it is changing? Does it make sense to distinguish between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states? (or ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ states?)?

(b) Is state power increasing or declining? Is it paradoxical that some political scientists argue for
‘bringing the state back in’ just when others are suggesting that globalization means state power is declining? Is there clear evidence of a general decline in state capacity and if so for what types of state, if any, is such a decline to be regretted?

Readings:
(a) State Capacity
· Almond, Gabriel (1988), ‘Return to the State’ American Political Science Review 82: 853-74.
· Dyson, Kenneth (1980), The State Tradition in Western Europe. Contrast with Laborde, Cécile
(2000) ‘The Concept of the State in British and French Political Thought’ Political Studies 48 (3):
540-57.
· Evans, Peter B et al eds (1985) Bringing the State Back In, esp Intro, Chs 2 & 4.
· Krasner, Stephen (1984), ‘Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical
Dynamics’ Comparative Politics 16: 223-46.
· *Levi, Margaret (1988), Of Rule and Revenue (Ch 2).
· Migdal, Joel (1988), Strong Societies and Weak States, Ch 1. (See p.4 for an enumeration of state capacities).
· *Nettl, J Peter (1968), ‘The State as a Conceptual Variable’ World Politics 20 (4) 559-592.
· North, Douglass (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History: 20-32. (Also compare with his more recent Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance).
· Nordlinger, Eric (1981), On the Autonomy of the Democratic State.
· *Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the ‘Spirit’ of Capitalism and Other Writings. (Compare
with Karl Marx’s Das Kapital).

(b) State Power & State Failure
· Bates, Roger (2008), When Things Fall Apart.
· Berger, Suzanne (2000), ‘Globalization and Politics’ Annual Review of Politics Science 3: 43-62.
· Cerny, Philip (1997), ‘Paradoxes of the Competitive State: The Dynamics of Political
Globalization’ Government and Opposition 32 (2): 251-74.
· *Geertz, C ed (1969), Old Societies and New States.
· Held, David and Anthony McGrew eds (2000), The Global Transformations Reader, Ch 11.
(This is a good introduction to the globalization debate, especially the Intro and Chs 7 & 12).
· Herbst, Jeffrey (2000), States and Power in Africa, Intro.
· Majone, Giandomenico (1997), ‘From the Positive to the Regulatory State’ Jrnl Public Policy 17:
139-67.
· *Milward, Alan (1992), The European Rescue of the Nation-State.
· Strange, Susan (1996), The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy.
· Weiss, Linda (1998), The Myth of the Powerless State.
· Woods, Ngaire ed. (2000), The Political Economy of Globalization, Chs 1 & 5.. (more)

MT09 - Week 4 essay plan - Democratisation breakdown

Some ideas to talk about in the class.

The framework we are being given to understand regime breakdown.
Firstly what is a regime?
Someone/something/some group of people has control over the institutions of state, the departments of government and (possibly) the military
Having stronger control over more institutions/functions leads to stronger state power
Usually some political elites will direct the institutions. Why do they institutions listen to them? Because the regime has enough legitimacy or coercive power
If the regime has legitimacy in the eyes of the military it can probably coerce all other departments. If not, the other departments may have split loyalties between the regime and the military.
The military elites may be interested in a number of things - they need to retain legitimacy among their troops. Cannot therefore repress a majority of the population actively.
Popular support aids legitimacy of the regime

If the regime loses sufficient legitimacy to control the state institutions and in particular the military, it faces regime breakdown
If it doesn't have legitimacy it can try coercion (so long as it maintains the apparatus of coercion)

We can think of legitimacy in terms of five arenas (Linz and Stepan, 1996) - political, economic, civil society, rule of law, state apparatus (including the military?)

Breakdown led by the public comes either through civil society or through (ordinary people) circumventing the rule of law


Why does democracy not emerge?
In some cases - because there is not sufficient economic and social development. Borrowing from development theory, we can think of the poverty traps that consign countries to low development. Having the natural resource curse; being landlocked with bad neighbours; conflict trap; poor governance. 3 and 4 can be self perpetuating. 1 and 2 are structural factors. Natural resource trap, from Boix theory, can lead to increased costs of democratisation as well as the economic impact.
(more)

Capoccia (2001) Defending democracy: reactions to extremism in inter-war europe (book)

Cappocia, Giovanni. Defending Democracy; Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe
Reading MT09 Week 4 - Chp 3 pp. 47-67.

Notes. (more)

Mansfield and Snyder (2005) Electing to Fight...

Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder, (2005) Electing to Fight Why Emerging Democracies go to War.
Reading list MT09 Week 4: Chapt 3 pp.39-68.

Notes. (more)

Levitsky and Way ( ) Competitive Authoritarianism

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Evolution of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era (with Lucan A. Way). New York: Cambridge University Press Chapter 1 and conclusion.

Notes. (more)

Howard and Roessler (2006) Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritaran Regimes

Howard, Marc Morjé, and Philip G. Roessler (2006) ? Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes ? American Journal of Political Science 50 (2), 365–381.

Notes. (more)

Diamond and Morlino (2004) The Quality of Democracy: An Overview

Diamond, Larry and Leonardo Morlino 2004 “The Quality of Democracy: An Overview” J D 15
(4) 20-31.

Notes (more)

Carothers (2002) The End of the Transition Paradigm

Carothers, Thomas 2002 “The End of the Transition Paradigm” JD 13:1 pp5-21.

This piece looks at cases after the supposed "third wave" of democracy, in 1970-1990.

The transition paradigm no longer works.
1. Any country moving away from dictatorial rule is in transition to democracy
2. Democracy tends to unfold in a set sequence of stages
1. The opening - democratic ferment and political liberalisation, cracks appear, most prominent fault line between hardliners and softliners.
2. Breakthrough, collapse of the regime and a rapid installation of a democratic one
3. Consolidation - slow process democratic forms are translated into democratic substance
Criticism - it involves a lot of teleology
4. Belief that underlying conditions, e.g. economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions, etc. will not be critical factors. All that was necessary was a decision by the political elites and the ability to fend off threats from antidemo forces.

Belief in the value of elections - giving post dictatorial regimes legitimacy and increasing political participation

Gray (sic) zone - countries that are neither dictatorial nor heading towards democracy
Syndromes:
Feckless pluralism and Dominant-power politics are 2 gray zone alternatives
(more)

Brown (2001) Evaluating Russia's Democratisation

Brown, Archie 2001 “Evaluating Russia’s Democratization” in Archie Brown ed. Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader pp546-68.

And here is the rest of it. (more)

Brownlee (2007) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization

Brownlee, Jason. (2007) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization pp 16-43. (c) Stalled (and Stopped) Transitions

Notes (more)

Bellin (2004) The robustness of authoritarianism in the middle east

Bellin, Eva.(2004) “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: A Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics , 36, 2 (2004): 139-157.

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Bermeo (2003) Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times...

Bermeo, Nancy (2003) Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy Introduction, Chp1 pp1 -20 and Chp 7 pp.221-256.

Notes.
Much of what elites attempt to do is conditioned by their judgement of how ordinary people will behave.
People -> individuality of the group's membership. Ordinary -> no extraordinary powers vis a vis the states in which they live.
Do they defend democracy or embrace dictatorship? And why/when etc.?

First challenge - "finding" ordinary people - disentangling them from civil society
Second challenge - two competing visions - ordinary people as "heroic", or as members of groups with destabilising influences
Study of Electoral Behaviour, Strikes, Demonstrations and Acts of Violence
Mass defections to extremist parties are rare
Extremist support usually a result of expansion of the franchise or mobilisation of non-voters (so non-voters are not ordinary people?). Changes in the composition of the electorate rather than changes in heart and mind caused extremist support to grow.
Blame lies with political elites
either wholly - their own democratic convictions were so weak they used public polarisation as a rationale for creating an authoritarian regime
Other times they "allowed" public polarisation to grow violent and threaten public order and the military as an institution - when the military was threatened, democracy was doomed

Chapter 1
What is civil society - why is it important?
"The network of formal and informal associations that mediate between individual actors and the state"
The offer the fellowship, resources and refinement that make acts of defiance seem feasible

Civil society as salvation
de Tocqueville regards it as the only way of preserving freedom
Lots of other positive adjectives about civil society

Civil society as a spoiler
in the 1970s it was cast in an ambiguous role
Huntingdon (1968) drew a distinction between institutionalised societies where the expansion of civil society reduces tensions, and praetorian societies in which participation of new groups exacerbates tensions.
Highly activist society can lead to democratic instability. Linz for example believes civil society should have no direct connections with those in power if democracy is to be preserved.
E.g. O'Donnell (1979) pre-coup Argentinian and Brazilian governments wre victimised by praetorian coalitions (and also collaborated in it)
When a certain level of development of society allows even the base to get organised, the trouble begins.
Elected officials can face a barely manageable schedule of political demands (can lead to unsolvable problems and crises?)
Tying in civil society with Linz theory - it leads to government incapacity by increasing the demands on government.
Hirschman (1970) - need a balance between alert and inert citizens

If civic organisations can work against democracy - it is logical that the individual actors that compose them be blamed
Bermeo's point - we can blame civil society but not individuals?
Strand of the literature claiming ordinary people are not ready for the freedom democracy allows (see P15) e.g. Working class authoritarianism (Lipset, 1960) had its roots in low education, low participation, little reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity and authoritarian family patterns.
Theory - in times of crisis ordinary people cannot be trusted to resist the lure of authoritarianism
For a regime to endure it has to continually prove its legitimacy, and can rely on loyalty to some extent but needs to prove to each generation

Institutions to control the populace
Sartori (1976) - party systems and party elites must restrain the forces of polarity inherent in political democracies. Party systems need to contain the ideological range and number of parties in the national legislature.

Conclusion - Ordinary people often play a PERIPHERAL role in the breakdown of democracy. In the cases where their role is more central, it's only partially captured by polarisation metaphor.
Mistaken the polarisation in "select and small groups" in civil society for polarisation in society as a whole. Voters generally did not polarise nor did public opinion shift to the edges of the left-right scale.

Chapter 7 - Polarisation and the ignorance of elites
In reality many people failed to polarise and Bermeo places the blame for democracy's demise overwhelmingly with political elites

Ordinary people rarely threw democracies off balance with their votes
Each of the many democracies studied (except Poland) fell to forces on the right but the democracies they replaced were of varied "hues".
The right do not necessarily unify against the left - e.g. if a right wing dictatorship takes over a right wing government - so the polarisation metaphor is not always accurate.
[Why would we need to assume polarisation? It's just one form of instability]
At the polls: even in Italy where the centre collapsed among political elites it still held its own at the polls.
Reason - loyalty and inertia - party identification is not easily changed - remarkably resistant to passing political events
If the party collapses by itself - or - if the composition of the electorate changes
Opportunity costs of political participation - collecting information is costly and party switching seems to be correlated with high levels of information (see p.224; Converse, in Campbell et al)

Weakness of using the unilinear, bipolar schema
Many parties don't particularly fit onto it
Often electoral alliances between parties with seemingly inconsistent ideologies made representation of particular votes difficult in countries such as Italy, Poland, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay.
Prefers to think of the policy landscape as a sphere

Polarisation in multiple arenas
It's a process as well as a condition. Growth of mutually antagonistic self identified groups. They are extremist (G Bingham Powell) if they offer the chance of radical change in the social, economic and political fabric of the existing system. (Is extremist the right word to use here?)
Different processes of polarisation:
- in public spaces
- at the polls
- in public opinion
- among political elites
Important to trace the trajectories of polarisation in different arenas because a democratic regime is itself composed of partial-regimes (Schmitter 1992)
Linz and Stepan (1996) "democracy is more than a regime" - it is an interacting system composed of 5 interrelated arenas - political society, civil society, economic society, rule of law, state apparatus.
[regimes need to maintain legitimacy in all of those areas in order to endure]

Role of elites - acting on the (generally) mistaken impression that polarisation in the streets was representative of high levels of polarisation in society generally - they reacted to it by exacerbating polarisation in political society
[so wouldn't those elites have been involved in the polarisation "on the streets"?]
They demanded increased concessions for the mobilised and extended toleration of disruption
Political polarisation let to military elites considering intervention
Polarisation can be contagious from one arena to another

Timing
None of the 17 cases studied here suffered a regime change during an economic boom. But bad economic performance was not unambiguously associated with regime breakdown
-Social movement literature - social movements emerge and lead to public polarisation when there are changes in political opportunity structures
Tarrow - the opening up of access to power / shifts in ruling alignments / availability of influential allies

Intensity - related to the density of social movements

Saliency - elites misjudged the size of social movements because they did not have good information on them [but how can you tell the real size of the social movements retrospectively.. just by using voting behaviour? is this a good measure? why did elites always get it wrong? would elites have had the capacity to put down these movements anyway?]
[Election results wouldn't be a good measure if a large part of the electorate felt disenfranchised or if party competition was limited/sham-like, or voting inertia hid true support for other groups]
pg.234
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Linz (1978) Crisis, Breakdown and Re -equilibration

Linz, Juan (1978) Crisis, Breakdown and Re -equilibration
Reading list MT09 Week 4: Chp 3-4 pp50-86.

Chapter 3 - The Process of Breakdown.

How does a democratic regime break down? Disloyal versus loyal actors. The former want to end the regime, the latter to preserve it. As long as the electoral strength or the parliamentary representation of the disloyal parties does not constitute an absolute majority, a democratic regime can survive.

As long as it has legitimacy, the democratic regime can count on the passive obedience of most citizens and successfully repress violent challenges.

When the government is unable to solve a problem for which the disloyal opposition offers itself as a solution, the regime is in danger. If parties loyal to the regime can not compromise on a particular issue/set of issues, one/some of them may be tempted to align with disloyal opposition to promote that issue.

This can weaken the legitimacy of the regime by destroying trust in the system (the very act of a loyal party joining with a disloyal party), and may result in societal polarisation, which is also damaging for democracy.

If it is not possible to solve a pressing problem within the system, people have to decide what is more important, the problem or the system.

Concept of a polarised, centrifugal, multiparty system that is both a cause an a consequence of unsolvable problems.

What type of problems are unsolvable?
- Structural problems (international influences, resource imbalances): rarely the cause of a breakdown but if they become acute can become destabilising - e.g. an economic crisis
- Some problems are unsolvable if maintaining democratic freedoms
- Mistakes made by elites turning solvable problems into insuperable ones
- International problem involving domestic concession (e.g. climate change?)

Losing the support of the military/military leadership
Creates a military challenge to civil authority
Loss of the monopoly on organised political force
Government loses legitimacy when it allows groups with paramilitary discipline to emerge for political reasons. Tolerance of disloyal paramilitaries helped the disintegration of democratic rule in Italy, Germany, Austria and to some extent Spain (footnote 18)
Can not be sure of using the military to quell dissent
One sidedness in dealing with violent acts can lead to a loss of legitimacy, polarisation (government needs to be able to distance itself)
It needs mass but moderate response to uprisings - democracies MAY need larger security forces than dictatorships as they rely on numbers not strength

Following incompatible goals leads to an incapacity to reconcile conflicting objectives

Particularly in a crisis, governments depend on party organisations as well as the electorate for support.
If it is the mid-level cadres (usually most ideological) who are most important, this creates difficulties (they might prefer ideology to democracy)

Complex problems + fragmented leadership further weakens the system.

Define revolution:
A sovereign is the one who can decide in the state of emergency
If the transfer of loyalties to another sovereign takes place, revolution occured (Tilly)

Regimes with a long history of stability are more likely to survive than those without, as it generates loyalty/legitimacy among the members/civilians. (using Hirschman's theory of loyalty).

Crisis strata - to what extent can people be mobilised for or against the regime?
Affects how durable the regime it.
Theory - Crisis stricken groups who have leadership qualities, free time, discipline, skills in violence
Difference in Spain compared to Germany

Role of violence: usually doesn't directly lead to breakdown but contributes to the loss of legitimacy, loss of power then power vacuum
Elites failing to deal properly with violence can lead to regime breakdown. E.g. excessive lenience towards violent acts on one side

Summary of the model

THE REGIME AN UNSOLVABLE Loss of legitimacy Challenge to
[Structural factors] > PROBLEM > Disloyalty > regime

Democratic crisis and multinational states
Loyalty of citizens to the state should be greater than loyalty to another state in the making
Disloyal minority may become a majority by persuading people to take their view, or slowly change the social structure to become a majority
Consociationalism may reduce nationalist/seccessionist minority strains but preconditions for its success not always present and not easily achieved.
Theory - territory should be linked to culture and language otherwise risk of polarisation
Making a group a permanent minority through boundary setting can reduce legitimacy
If a minority is committed to maintaining its distinctive cultural heritage and cannot do so within the political system it could lead to secessionists aims.
Democracies are unstable in multinational states (footnote 27). Not many stable democracies in multinational states. Cause of breakdown?

Government instability / Political system causes
- Growing difficulty in forming coalitions
- Factionalisation and fragmentation of parties (see other lit on importance of parties)
- Shifts in electorates towards the extremes (other evidence - usually it's not the electorate that shifted to the extreme but the elites who mistakenly thought they did)
Coopting disloyal oppositions as the government is unwilling or unable to repress them

Does the electoral system promote competition or cooperation?
Abdication of democratic authenticity.
- e.g. turning political issues into supposedly technical issues to be dealt with by unelected officials or the judiciary

Presidentialism versus parlimentarianism
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MT09 - Week 4 reading list - Democratization: Reversals, Prevention, and Poor Substitutes

Aim of the session: To analyse why democratization gets reversed, blocked or stalled.

Discussion topics:
(a) What factors have explained the breakdown of democracy in the past and are they likely to have validity in the future?
(b) What factors explain why the process of democratization gets blocked or stalled?
Readings:

(a) Democratization’s Reversals
· Linz, Juan (1978) Crisis, Breakdown and Re -equilibration Chp 3-4 pp50-86.
· Bermeo, Nancy (2003) Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy Introduction, Chp1 pp1 -20 and Chp 7 pp.221-256.
· Cappocia, Giovanni. Defending Democracy; Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe Chp 3 pp. 47-67.

(b) Preventing Democratization
· Bellin, Eva.(2004) “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: A Comparative
Perspective,” Comparative Politics , 36, 2 (2004): 139-157.
· Brownlee, Jason. (2007) Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization pp 16-43. (c) Stalled (and Stopped) Transitions
· Brown, Archie 2001“Evaluating Russia’s Democratization” in Archie Brown ed. Contemporary
Russian Politics: A Reader pp546-68.
· Carothers, Thomas 2002 “The End of the Transition Paradigm” JD 13:1 pp5-21.
· Diamond, Larry and Leonardo Morlino 2004 “The Quality of Democracy: An Overview” J D 15
(4) 20-31.
· Howard, Marc Morjé, and Philip G. Roessler (2006) ? Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes ? American Journal of Political Science 50 (2), 365–381.
· Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Evolution of
Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era (with Lucan A. Way). New York: Cambridge University Press Chapter 1 and conclusion.
· Mansfield, Edward and Jack Snyder, (2005) Electing to Fight Why Emerging Democracies go to
War. Chapt 3 pp.39-68.
· Mainwaring, Scott, Ana Maria Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez eds (2006). The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes Chpt 1pp 1-35 and Chpt 10 295-332 if possible.
· Mattes, Robert and Michael Bratton (2007) Learning about Democracy in Africa:
Awareness, Performance, and Experience A J P S 51 (1), 192–217.
· McFaul, Michael, 2002 “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship” W P vol 54 n.2
pp212-44.
· O’Donnell, Guillermo (1999 )“Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies” in Andreas
Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc Plattner eds. The Self-restraining State: Power and
Accountability in New Democracies pp29-52.
· Schedler, Andreas 2002 “Elections without Democracy” “The Menu of Manipulation”J D
vol 13, n.2 April 2002 pp 36-50.
· Whitefield, Stephen (2006) “Mind the Representation Gap: Explaining Differences in Public Views of Representation in Post-communist Democracies” C P S. Vol. 39, Iss. 6; p. 733.
· Whitehead, Laurence (2002) Democratization Theory and Experience Chpt 7 165-185 and
Chpts 4 ,5 pp90- 135 if possible. (more)

McLean (2002) Review Article: William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetics

McLean, Iain (2002), ‘Review Article: William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetic (s)’.British Journal of Political Science 32, 535-558.
Link to PDF.

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