Petra Schleiter (petra.schleiter@politics.ox.ac.uk)
Democratic regimes structure representation, accountability and the policy process in
different ways. This session examines the nature of these regime type differences,
and the extent to which they affect political outcomes ranging from the survival of
democracy to budget balances.
Discussion topics:
(a) What are the main differences between parliamentarism and presidentialism, and do they have any substantive implications for the nature of democratic representation and accountability?
(b) Is parliamentarism conducive to better political outcomes than presidential systems? Why/Why not?
Readings:
(a) Regime type, representation and accountability
· Strom, K, Muller, W. and Bergman, T. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary
Democracies (2003), particularly chapter 3
· Lijphart, Arend (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty -Six Countries, New Haven: Yale UP, ch 7.
· Sartori, Giovanni (1997), Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, 2nd edition, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, part 2.
· Shugart and Carey (1992), Presidents and Assemblies
· Samuels, D. J. and M. S. Shugart (2003), ‘Presidentialism, Elections and Representation.’ Journal of Theoretical Politics 15(1): 33-60.
· Carey, J. M. (2007). "Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting." American Journal of Political Science 51(1): 92-107 or Carey, J. M. (2009). Legislative voting and accountability. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
· Samuels, David (2004), Presidentialism and Accountability for the Economy in Comparative Perspective, American Political Science Review, vol. 98, no. 3, August 2004
· Dahl, Robert, Ian Shapiro and Jose A. Cheibub (eds.) (2003), The Democracy Sourcebook. (Chs by Scott Mainwaring on Presidentialism, Multipartism and Democracy, and Joe Foweraker on Institutional Design, Party Systems and Governability).
(b) Regime type, Coalitions and Policy
· Tsebelis, G. (2002), Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work.
· Eaton, Kent, ‘Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism in the Policy Arena’, Comparative Politics 32, no. 3 (April 2000), 355-376. (Review of several key books on the effects of executive format on policy making.)
· Samuels, D. (2009 forthcoming). "Separation of Purpose and Corruption in Presidential Democracies." American Journal of Political Science.
· Weaver, R. Kent, and Bert A. Rockman, eds., (1993), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
· Powell, G. Bingham (1982), Contemporary Democracies. Participation, Stability and Violence.
· Lijphart, Arend (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty -Six Countries, New Haven: Yale UP, chs. 15-17
· Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2005), The Economic Effects of Constitutions.
· Cheibub, Jose Antonio (2006), ‘Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget Balances in Democratic Systems’, American Political Science Review 100: 353-368.
· Shugart, M. S. (1999), ‘Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and the Provision of Collective Goods in Less-Developed Countries.’ Constitutional Political Economy 10(1): 53-88.
· Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Soberg Shugart (1997), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, Cambridge: CUP, chs. 1 and 11
· Haggard, Stephan, and Mathew McCubbins (2001), Presidents, Parliaments and Policy,
Cambridge: CUP.
· Cox, Gary and Morgenstern, Scott, ‘Latin America’s Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents’ Comparative Politics, January, 2001.
· Amorim Neto, ‘The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy-Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas’, Comparative Political Studies, vol.39, no.6, 2006
· Huber, John D. (1996), ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’ American Political Science Review, Vol.90, No.2, pp.269-282.
· Feigenbaum, Harvey, Richard Samuels, and R. Kent Weaver (1993), ‘Innovation, Coordination, and Implementation in Energy Policy’, in R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 42-109.
· Cowhey, Peter F., ‘Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States’, International Organization 47, no. 2 , spring 1993, 299-326.
(c) Regime type and the survival of democracy
· Lijphart, Arend ed. (1992), Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, (a collection of abridged relevant articles, including those from Linz, Duverger, Horowitz and Lipset) or:
· Linz, Juan J., ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy 1, no. 1, winter 1990.
· Horowitz, Donald, ‘Comparing Democratic Systems’, Journal of Democracy 1, no. 4, fall 1990. (Both at SSL Staff Desk.)
· Cheibub, Jose Antonio (2007), Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Democracy.
· Przeworski, Adam et al., ‘What Makes Democracies Endure?’ Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1 winter 1996, 39-55.
· Svolik, Milan (2008), “Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation”, American Political Science Review, vol. 102, no. 2.
· Shugart, Matthew (1995), ‘Parliaments over Presidents?’ Journal of Democracy 6 (2): 169-72.
· Stepan, Alfred and Cindy Skach (1993), ‘Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic
Consolidation’ World Politics 46.
· Mainwaring, Scott, and Shugart M.S. (1997), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America.
· Sartori, Giovanni (1997), Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, 2nd edition, Basingstoke: Macmillan, chs. 5-7.
· Bernhard, Michael, Timothy Nordstrom, and Christopher Reenock, ‘Economic Performance, Institutional Intermediation, and Democratic Survival’, Journal of Politics 63, no. 3, August 2001, 775-803.
