Stiglitz (2002) Globalization and its discontents

Available - New College P 2.2 STI

Notes. (more)

Krugman (2007) The Conscience of a Liberal

Available - American Institute HC 110 .I5 K74 2009

Notes. (more)

Journals

American Political Science Review (APSR)
American Journal of Political Science (AJPS)
Annual Review of Political Science (ARPS)
British Journal of Political Science (BJPS)
Comparative Politics (Comp)
Journal of Politics (JP)
Legislative Studies Quarterly (LSQ)
Political Science Quarterly (PSQ)
Studies in American Political Development (SAPD)

Notes. (more)

Bamford (2002) Body of Secrets

Available - SSL UB256.U6.BAM

Notes. (more)

Keech (1995) Economic Politics

Available - SSL JK271.KEE

Notes. (more)

wars numbers etc.

ADDAvailable - Google DocsNotes. (more)

deficit cutting/stimulus arithmetic

ADDAvailable - Google DocsNotes. (more)

Alt and Chrystal (1983) Political Economics

James Alt and Alec Chrystal, Political Economics (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1983).
Available - SSL - HB73.ALT

Notes. (more)

Thesis Credits

People who have helped with the project

David Robertson - initial discussions and formulation of idea/method
Alan Ware - feedback on idea/methods, new directions for the project
Nigel Bowles - encouragement, help finding a new supervisor?
Jeff Stonecash - feedback, interesting ideas, new directions for the project
Scott Blinder - feedback model specification
Paul Martin - small amount of feedback via email (more)

Bates et al (1998) Analytic Narratives

Available - New College - P 1.5 BAT Notes. (more)

Grossman and Helpman (2001) Special Interest Politics

Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 2001. Special Interest Politics, Cambridge MA and London UK: The MIT Press.
Available - New: P 2.1 GRO

Notes. (more)

Links

BBC BBC iPlayer Facebook Oxford Emails

Guardian Times Indy FT Economist Telegraph

NYTimes LA Times Washington Post

The New Yorker The Daily Beast

Google

(more)

TT10 - Week 2 - Comp Gov Reading List

Trinity Term Week 2. Comparative Politics as a Science
Aim of the session: Reflect on the achievements and promise of comparative political science, in the light of earlier seminar discussions.
Discussion topics:
(a) Was Barbara Geddes’s (1991) unflattering portrayal of comparative politics (as a field of transient fads rather than cumulative progress) a defensible view in 1991? To the extent that Geddes’s argument was correct, did the picture improve by the time her book of the same name (Paradigms and Sand Castles) was published in 2003?
(b) Is it plausible to look back upon the 1950s and 1960s as a ‘golden age of comparative politics’,
followed by an age of decline and mediocrity? Or is it a case of ‘doing better and feeling worse’?
(c) Robert Bates argues that ‘rare is the [political science] department wherein the area specialists fail to constitute a center of resistance to new trends in the discipline.’ Does area studies hinder the development of comparative politics as a science, or does it act to raise the empirical quality of comparative politics?

Readings:
(a) Some general reflections on the state of the art in comparative politics and its claimed progress or decline
· *Geddes, Barbara (2003), ‘Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics
· Bates, Robert (1996), ‘Letter from the President: Area Studies and the Discipline,’ APSA-CP 7,
no. 1 (Winter), available http://www.nd.edu/~apsacp/
· Brown, Archie (2005), ‘Comparative Politics: A View from Britain,’ APSA-CP 16, no. 1 (Winter),
available http://www.nd.edu/~apsacp/
· Bates, Robert (1997), ‘Area studies and the discipline: a useful controversy?’ PS: Political
Science & Politics, 30 no. 2 (June).
· Johnson, Chalmers (1997), ‘Preconception vs. observation, or the contributions of rational choice theory and area studies to contemporary political science,’ PS: Political Science & Politics 30, no. 2 (June).
· Harry Eckstein (1962), ‘A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present,’ Comparative
Politics: A Reader, Free Press, pp. 3-32.
· Dalton, Russell J (1991), ‘Comparative Politics of the Industrial Democracies: From the Golden
Age to Island-hopping’ (pp.15-43) (both in William Crotty ed. Political Science: Looking to the
Future, Vol 2: Comparative Politics, Policy and International Relations
· King, Desmond (1998), ‘The Politics of Social Research: Institutionalizing Public Funding
Regimes in the US and Britain,’ BJPS 28: 415-444.
· Chilcote, Ronald (1981), Theories of Comparative Politics, especially chapters 1 and 3 and
Appendix 1.1 ‘Notes on a Comparative Terminology’.
· Macridis, Roy (1968), ‘Comparative Politics and the Study of Government’ Comparative
Politics 1: 79-80 (and see other articles in that issue)
· Bates, Robert (1997), ‘Comparative Politics and Rational Choice: A Review Essay’ APSR 91 (3):
699-704
· Almond, Gabriel (1988), ‘Separate Tables’ PS: Political Science and Politics 21 (Fall 1988):
828-41 OR Almond, Gabriel (1989), A Divided Discipline (contrast what Almond said twenty
years or so earlier in his 1966 ‘Political Theory and Political Science’ APSR 60)
· Zuckerman (1999), ‘Reforming Explanatory Standards and Advancing Theory in Comparative
Politics’, in Lichbach and Zuckerman (eds), Comparative Politics
· Hardin, Renwick Monroe, Jervis, Rudolph, Smiley and Smith (2002), ‘Shaking Things Up?
Thoughts about the future of political science’, Political Science and Politics 35 (2)
· Howard J. Wiarda (ed.) (1991), New Directions in Comparative Politics, Boulder, Col.: Westview
Press, 2nd. edn.
· Ronald Rogowski, (1993), ‘Comparative Politics,’ in Ada W. Finifter (ed.), Political Science: The
State of the Discipline II, Washington, D.C.: The American Political Science Association.
· Philippe Schmitter (1993), ‘Comparative Politics,’ pp. 171-77, in Joel Krieger (ed.), The Oxford
Companion to the Politics of the World, New York: Oxford University Press.
· Peter Mair (1996), ‘Comparative Politics: An Overview,’ pp. 309-35, in Robert Goodin and Hans- Dieter Klingemann (eds.), The New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
· Laitin, David D. (2002), ‘Comparative Politics: The State of the Subdisicipline,’ pp. 630-659 in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (eds.), Political Science: State of the Discipline, New York: W.W. Norton & Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.

(b) A small sample of literature from the 1950s and 1960s (mostly encountered earlier in the course: review earlier sessions for older putative ‘classics’ as well)
· Almond, Gabriel A and Verba, Sidney (1963), The Civic Culture
· Lipset, Seymour S (1959), Political Man
· Almond, Gabriel and Coleman, James eds (1960), The Politics of Developing Areas
· Lipset, Seymour M and Rokkan, Stein eds (1967), Party Systems and Voter Alignments ch 1.
· Moore, Barrington (1962), Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

(more)

TT10 - Comp Gov

Trinity Term
17. Time, History and Narrative in Political Science Scott Blinder (scott.blinder@politics.ox.ac.uk)
18. Comparative Politics as a Science Scott Blinder (scott.blinder@politics.ox.ac.uk)
19. Revision Session I Nigel Bowles (nigel.bowles@politics.ox.ac.uk)
20. Revision Session II Nigel Bowles (nigel.bowles@politics.ox.ac.uk) (more)

NYT Article - Plans to introduce new corp. campaign spending regulations 13 Apr '10

ADD
Link

Notes. (more)

Friedman (1952) The Methodology of Positive Economics

Available - Link

Notes. (more)

DFW (2001) Democracy, English and the Wars over Usage

Harper's Magazine
April, 2001
Tense Present
Democracy, English, and the Wars over Usage

Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Fay and Moon (1977) What would an adequate philosophy of social science look like?

Brian Fay and J Donald Moon, ‘What would an adequate philosophy of social science look like?’ in Philosophy of Social Science Vol 7, 1977, pp 209-227; reprinted in Michael Martin and Lee C MacIntyre, Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science MIT Press 1994
Available - PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Scriven (1956) A Possible Distinction between Traditional Scientific Disciplines and the Study of Human Behaviour

Scriven, Michael, "A Possible Distinction between Traditional Scientific Disciplines and the Study of Human Behaviour." Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 (1956): 330-39. Reprinted in Michael Martin and Lee C MacIntyre (eds) Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, MIT Press 1994
Available - PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Rosenberg (2004) Philosophy of Social Science

Alexander Rosenberg, Philosophy of Social Science 3rd edn, Oxford, 2004
Available - New College - P 6 ROS

Notes. (more)

Brock (1998) The Seduction of Hillary Rodham

ADD
Available - American Inst VHL OpenShelf E 887 .C55 B76 1996

Notes. (more)

Skocpol (1996) Boomerang

Boomerang: Health Care Reform and the Turn against Government
Available - American Inst VHL OpenShelf RA 395 .A3 S56 1996
Available - Social Sci. SSL Main Lib RA395.A3.SKO

Notes. (more)

Johnson & Broder (1996) The System

The System: The American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point (Paperback)
~ Haynes Johnson (Author), David Broder (Author)
American Inst - VHL OpenShelf - RA 395 .A3 J64 1996
Social Sci. SSL Main Lib - RA395.A3.JOH

Notes. (more)

Schuster et al (1998) How good is healthcare in the US?

How Good Is the Quality of Health Care in the United States?
Author(s): Mark A. Schuster, Elizabeth A. McGlynn, Robert H. Brook
Source: The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 76, No. 4, Improving the Quality of Health Care (1998), pp. 517-563
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Milbank Memorial Fund
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3350511


Notes. (more)

Healthcare reform clarifying the concepts

Article - bit simplistic, from 1993 debate
Available - JStor PDF

Notes. (more)

Price et al (2006) Locating the Issue Public

LOCATING THE ISSUE PUBLIC:
The Multi-Dimensional Nature of Engagement with Health Care Reform
(Issue Publics and Healthcare reform)
Available - JStor PDF

Notes. (more)

Research Design Essay (plan)

Suggested plan for research design essay. Question "how did campaign finance affect voting on healthcare reform?" or "implied threats and implied bribes - Citizens United and legislator action"

Does spending help secure votes in congressional elections (literature review)
Theoretical basis for spending influence (lit review)

Does funding change legislator action?
Models - lobbyists give to legislators most different in views (persuasion/vote buying) - literature review
Lobbyists give to legislators most similar in views (legislative subsidy) - literature review

What is healthcare reform? Summary of historical background
Detailed explanation of the various bills/congressional discussions since 111th congress

Research methods - break down the bill - who voted for against? who voted for/against certain provisions, e.g. public option

Regression model - dependent variable - voting for provisions - independent variables - party, proportion of donations by PACs etc., polling info?

Process tracing for key actors
(more)

Palda (2002) Campaign Finance An Introductory Essay

Palda's views on campaign finance, coming from the freedom of speech angle - following on from his 1994 book "how much is your vote worth?"
Available - PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Financing the 2004 Election (Brookings Institution Press)

ADD
American Inst
VHL OpenShelf JK 1991 .F57 2006 Available

Notes. (more)

Brookings Institution Press - Financing the 2008 Election: Assessing Reform

Financing the 2008 Election: Assessing Reform (Paperback)
~ Anthony Corrado (Editor), David B. Magleby (Editor)
Available - Amazon Link
# Paperback: 240 pages
# Publisher: Brookings Institution Press (January 2010)
# Language: English
# ISBN-10: 0815703325
# ISBN-13: 978-0815703327


Notes. (more)

Campaign Finance - implied threats and implied bribes

Another approach to looking at the effect of money that isn't spent directly.

Implied Threat - since Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission can the threat of issue ads change actions of legislators/candidates?

Implied Bribe - what do legislators do after they leave office? Does this give them skewed incentives? (more)

Gais (1998) Improper Influence

Improper influence : campaign finance law, political interest groups, and the problem of equality / Thomas Gais.
Publisher Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, c1998
American Inst
VHL OpenShelf KF 4920 .G35 1998 Available

Notes. (more)

Biersack, Herrnson and Wilcox (1999) After the Revolution

After the revolution : PACs, lobbies, and the Republican Congress / Robert Biersack, Paul S. Herrnson, Clyde Wilcox, general editors.
Available - American Inst
VHL OpenShelf JK 1991 .A66 1999

Notes. (more)

Baron (1994) Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters

Electoral Competition with Informed and Uniformed Voters
Author(s): David P. Baron
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 33-47
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944880
Available - Google Docs

Formal analysis based on candidates designing policies to sell policies to interest groups to generate funds to appeal to uninformed voters, and choosing policies that appeal to informed voters.

Cited by: http://www.jstor.org/stable/info/2944880?seq=1&type=cite (more)

Austen-Smith (1995) Campaign Contributions and Access

Campaign Contributions and Access
Author(s): David Austen-Smith
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Sep., 1995), pp. 566-581
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2082974

Goes through the 3 theories of campaign contributions and access.
Predicated on the idea that congressmen genuinely do have their own preferences and so PACs merely gain a chance to state their case in front of sympathetic legislators with consistent preferences. It is about providing information rather than changing prefs.

How is this measure of preferences made?

// Read this piece - overview of theoretical literature based on formal analysis
Is access what's important? (more)

Coleman and Manna (2000) Campaign Spending and the Quality of Democracy

Congressional Campaign Spending and the Quality of Democracy
Author(s): John J. Coleman and Paul F. Manna
Source: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Aug., 2000), pp. 757-789
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science
Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647959

Their result is that more spending does have some positive outcomes, based on survey data of various types of political attitudes. Based on 1994-1996 House Elections only.

How they state their claim "Despite the concerns of reformers, we find that campaign spending produces generally beneficial effects. Campaign spending contributes importantly to key aspects of democracy and political community such as knowledge and affect, while not damaging public trust or involvement."

Did they get the direction of causation right? Need to check that higher spending not a result of higher contributions which is a result of higher levels of all these variables... (more)

Bonneau (2007) The Effects of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections

The Effects of Campaign Spending in State Supreme Court Elections
Author(s): Chris W. Bonneau
Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 489-499
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4623847
Available - PDF

Conclusion is that spending more money helps the challenger, not the incumbent
The incumbent already has free publicity so spending more money doesn't help (as much)
Argument therefore that limiting campaign contributions (for state supreme court judges) would serve to increase incumbency advantage (more)

Artes Vinuela (2007) Campaign spending and office seeking motivations

Campaign spending and office-seeking motivations: an
empirical analysis
Available - http://www.springerlink.com/content/k705751136445576/fulltext.pdf

Campaign spending per capita increases with stakes for winner (measured by appointment power of office).

campaign spending per capita increases with the level of self-government of the region. Our results concord with those reported for other countries with very different systems of campaign funding

// So people spend more to win more important races. Hardly surprising. Suggests actors believe in a link between campaign spending and vote share. Would go against rational choice view that policy is all that matters.
(more)

Stratman (2002) Can special interests buy congressional votes?

Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation
* Thomas Stratmann
* Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 45, No. 2, Part 1 (Oct., 2002), pp. 345-373
* Published by: The University of Chicago Press

Available - Google Docs
PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Hall and Wayman (1990) Buying time: Moneyed interests...

Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees
* Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman
* The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (Sep., 1990), pp. 797-820
* Published by: American Political Science Association

Available - Google Docs
PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Hall and Deardorf (2006) Lobbying as legislative subsidy

Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
Available - Google Docs
PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Esterling (2007) Campaign Contributions and Attention to Policy Analysis in Congressional Committees

Buying Expertise: Campaign Contributions and Attention to Policy
Analysis in Congressional Committees
KEVIN M. ESTERLING University of California, Riverside
Available - Google Docs
PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Confessore (2003) Welcome to the Machine

Confessore, Nicholas. 2003. “Welcome to the Machine.”Washington Monthly, July/
August
Available - Google Docs
Available - link

Notes. (more)

Baumgartner et al (1998) Basic Interests

Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of
Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Available - SSL JK1118.BAU

Notes. (more)

Zinn (1980) A People's History of the US

Available - SSL - E178.1.ZIN

Notes. (more)

Thelen (2004) How Institutions Evolve

Thelen, Kathleen Ann. How Institutions Evolve : The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Available - SSL - HF5549.5.T7.THE (and issue desk copy)

In conjunction with presentation for research methods class:
Class 2 (week 5): Case studies and small-n studies. (Bermeo/Whitefield).
Students should produce a critique of the strengths and weaknesses of two important case studies/small-N studies in the literature (Scharpf (1991) and Thelen (2004)).

Overview of issues to be addressed:

• What do you see as the main strengths, what as the main weaknesses of the respective studies with respect to their research design?
• Briefly summarize the results of the respective studies, and assess their generalisability. Do the authors discuss generalisability?
• Having read the studies by Scharpf and Thelen, what are your thoughts about the practicability of the positions expressed in the debate between Lieberson and Savolainen?.

(more)

Simon Johnson and James Kwak (2010) 13 Bankers

Released 30 March 2010
Available - ?

Notes. (more)

HT10 - Week 4 Reading List - Cabinet Formation

Aim of the session: To critically explore cross-national theories accounting for the formation of cabinets and to assess empirical strategies for testing these theories.

Discussion topics:
(a) Which aspects of coalition formation and portfolio allocation can the size of parties and their policy preferences account for?
(b) In what way do institutions shape coalition formation and portfolio allocation?
(c) Assess the empirical strategies that have been used to test coalition theories.

Readings:
(a) The size of parties & policy preferences
· Riker, William (1962), The Theory of Political Coalitions
· Axelrod, Robert (1970), Conflict of Interests
· DeSwaan, Abram (1973), Coalition Theories and Government Formation. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
· Laver, M. (1998), ‘Models of government formation.’ Annual Review of Political Science: 1-25.
· Strøm, Kaare (1990), Minority Government and Majority Rule
· Or Strøm, Kaare (1984), ‘Minority Governments in Parliamentary democracies: The rationality of non-winning cabinet solutions’. Comparative Political Studies Vol. 17, No. 2, 199-227 (1984)
· van Roozenthal, Peter (1992), ‘The Effect of Dominant and Central Parties on Cabinet Composition and Durability.’ Legislative Studies Quarterly 17: 5-36.
· Laver, Michael J. and Norman Schofield (1990), Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
· Laver, Michael J. and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1996), Making and Breaking Governments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
· Volden, Craig and Clifford J. Carruba (2004), ‘The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies.’ American Journal of Political Science 48: 521-537.
· Paul V. Warwick, James N. Druckman (2006), The portfolio allocation paradox: An investigation into the nature of a very strong but puzzling relationship. European Journal of Political Research, 45 Issue 4, 635-665.

(b) Institutions:
· Austen-Smith, David and Jeffrey Banks (1988), ‘Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes.’ American Political Science Review 82(2): 405-422.
· Baron, David B. (1991), ‘A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems.’ American Political Science Review 85: 137-164.
· Baron, David B. (1993), ‘Government Formation and Endogenous Parties.’ American Political Science Review 83: 1181-1206.
· Strøm, Kaare, Ian Budge and Michael J. Laver (1994), ‘Constraints on Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems.’ American Journal of Political Science 38: 303-335.
· Diermeier, D. (2006), ‘Coalition Government’ (chapter 9), The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, 162-179.
· Diermeier, D. and A. Merlo (2004), ‘An empirical investigation of coalitional bargaining procedures.’ Journal of Public Economics 8: 783-797.
· Druckman, James N. and Michael F. Thies (2002), ‘The Importance of Concurrence: The Impact of Bicameralism on Government Formation and Duration.’ American Journal of Political Science 46: 760-771.
· Ansolabhere, Stephen, James M. Snyder Jr., Aaron B. Strauss, and Michael M. Ting (2005), ‘Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments.’ American Journal of Political Science 49(3): 550-563.
· Mershon, C. (1996). "The Costs of Coalition: Coalition Theories and Italian Governments." The American Political Science Review 90(3): 534-554.
· Martin, Lanny W. and Randolph T. Stevenson (2001), ‘Government Formation in
Parliamentary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science, 45: 33-50. 18
· Warwick, Paul (1996), ‘Coalition Government Membership in Western European Parliamentary Democracies.’ British Journal of Political Science 26: 471-499.
· Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strøm, eds. (2000), Coalition Governments in Western Europe.
· Amorim Neto, Octavio and Kaare Strom (2006), ‘Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science, 36(4): 619-643. (more)

Judicial Activism

Judicial Activism
A Synopsis

The issue of "Judicial Activism" is a live one in most countries of the common
law. The accusation that judges have exceeded their proper function is often
made by politicians, media commentators and even some lawyers. The
accusers allege that judges should stick to applying the law they
should not
make it.

The slightest familiarity with current and recent debates over judicial decisions
in Australia, Canada, India and the United States shows that "judicial
activism" is a topic that lawyers need to address seriously. In Australia,
following a closely divided decision of the High Court on native title in favour
of the Aboriginal claimants, the majority judges were accused of "activism".
The Acting Prime Minister of Australia promised to appoint "Capital C
Conservatives" to replace them when their positions fell vacant. The majority
decision of the US Supreme Court in Bush v Gore was denounced by its
critics as "judicial activism" as
was the more recent decision in Lawrence v
Texas declaring that State sodomy offences were unconstitutional. The more
recent court decisions over the recall of the Governor of California have been
described by opponents as instances of "judicial activism". In Canada, the
court decisions upholding the right of homosexuals to "gay marriage" was
defended by supporters as an example of equal rights under the Charter of
Rights. But to others it was a case of "judicial activism", usurping the role of
the elected government and parliament.

In these lectures, Justice Kirby explores these and other cases. Upon one
view, the common law is a continuous legacy of judicial activism over nearly
800 years. But when is judicial creativity in the construction of a written
constitution, the interpretation of legislation or the creation of new principles of
the common law a proper case of judicial reasoning? And when is it an
impermissible instance of judicial activism that exceeds the judge's function?
In examining the judicial method in a topical context, Justice Kirby suggests
that the debate over judicial activism has so far largely passed the judiciary of
the United Kingdom by. However, he points out that recent developments
make it unlikely that this state of affairs will persist. The developments he
mentions include the proposed creation of a Supreme Court for the United
Kingdom, the resulting identification of the Supreme Court judges as public
figures, the increased roles of the judge in reviewing legislation under the
Humans Rights Act, the developments in judicial review of administrative
action and the new procedures for selecting and training judges and changes
in the arrangements affecting the senior members of the Bar from whom the
judges are chosen. The role of the courts under the proposed European
Constitution is another potential agent of change.


Link to article

Notes. (more)

Strom et al (2005) Delegation and Accountability in New Democracies

Strom, Muller, Bergman (2005) Delegation and Accountability in New Democracies
Available - Chapter PDF links

Notes. (more)

Holstrom (1994) Judicialisation of Policy in Sweden

IRSR 1994 Volume 15 Number 2
Available - Link http://ips.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/15/2/153 PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Rios-Figeroa & Taylor (2006) Inst. Determinants of Judlation of Polcy in Brzl & Mex

Institutional Determinants of the Judicialisation of Policy in Brazil and Mexico*
Available - PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Democratization 10:4 - Special Issue on the Judiciary in Democratic Politics

Available - Link

Particular Articles/Notes

1. Gloppen. Introduction: the accountability function of the courts in new democracies (more)

Taylor (1971) Interpretation and the Sciences of Man

Taylor, Charles. "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man." In Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985; originally published in Review of Metaphysics vol 25, 1971 pp3-51; reprinted in Martin and MacIntyre;
Available - JStor

Questions for discussion:
1. What are Taylor’s arguments against the eptistemological analysis related to verificationism?
2. What does ‘hermeneutical’ mean, and imply, for Taylor?
3. What is the relationship between ‘reality’ and ‘intersubjectivity, for Taylor?. (more)

Weber (1949) Objectivity in the Social Sciences

Weber, Max, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy." In Max Weber: The Methodology of the Social Sciences, edited by Edward A Shils and Henry A Finch. New York: Macmillan, 1949
Available - PDF Link (?)
Available New College - PP.6 WEB

Notes. (more)

HT10 - Intermediate Social Statistics

Lectures Tuesday 2-4 Dept. Experimental Psychology
Classes Thurs 16:00-18:00 Weeks 3, 5,6,8
Course info PDF

Notes. (more)

HT10 - Week 3 - Presidentialism vs Parlimentarianism

Petra Schleiter (petra.schleiter@politics.ox.ac.uk)
Democratic regimes structure representation, accountability and the policy process in
different ways. This session examines the nature of these regime type differences,
and the extent to which they affect political outcomes ranging from the survival of
democracy to budget balances.


Discussion topics:
(a) What are the main differences between parliamentarism and presidentialism, and do they have any substantive implications for the nature of democratic representation and accountability?
(b) Is parliamentarism conducive to better political outcomes than presidential systems? Why/Why not?

Readings:
(a) Regime type, representation and accountability
· Strom, K, Muller, W. and Bergman, T. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary
Democracies (2003), particularly chapter 3
· Lijphart, Arend (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty -Six Countries, New Haven: Yale UP, ch 7.
· Sartori, Giovanni (1997), Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, 2nd edition, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, part 2.
· Shugart and Carey (1992), Presidents and Assemblies
· Samuels, D. J. and M. S. Shugart (2003), ‘Presidentialism, Elections and Representation.’ Journal of Theoretical Politics 15(1): 33-60.
· Carey, J. M. (2007). "Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting." American Journal of Political Science 51(1): 92-107 or Carey, J. M. (2009). Legislative voting and accountability. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
· Samuels, David (2004), Presidentialism and Accountability for the Economy in Comparative Perspective, American Political Science Review, vol. 98, no. 3, August 2004
· Dahl, Robert, Ian Shapiro and Jose A. Cheibub (eds.) (2003), The Democracy Sourcebook. (Chs by Scott Mainwaring on Presidentialism, Multipartism and Democracy, and Joe Foweraker on Institutional Design, Party Systems and Governability).

(b) Regime type, Coalitions and Policy
· Tsebelis, G. (2002), Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work.
· Eaton, Kent, ‘Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism in the Policy Arena’, Comparative Politics 32, no. 3 (April 2000), 355-376. (Review of several key books on the effects of executive format on policy making.)
· Samuels, D. (2009 forthcoming). "Separation of Purpose and Corruption in Presidential Democracies." American Journal of Political Science.
· Weaver, R. Kent, and Bert A. Rockman, eds., (1993), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
· Powell, G. Bingham (1982), Contemporary Democracies. Participation, Stability and Violence.
· Lijphart, Arend (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty -Six Countries, New Haven: Yale UP, chs. 15-17
· Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2005), The Economic Effects of Constitutions.
· Cheibub, Jose Antonio (2006), ‘Presidentialism, Electoral Identifiability, and Budget Balances in Democratic Systems’, American Political Science Review 100: 353-368.
· Shugart, M. S. (1999), ‘Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and the Provision of Collective Goods in Less-Developed Countries.’ Constitutional Political Economy 10(1): 53-88.
· Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Soberg Shugart (1997), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, Cambridge: CUP, chs. 1 and 11
· Haggard, Stephan, and Mathew McCubbins (2001), Presidents, Parliaments and Policy,
Cambridge: CUP.
· Cox, Gary and Morgenstern, Scott, ‘Latin America’s Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents’ Comparative Politics, January, 2001.
· Amorim Neto, ‘The Presidential Calculus: Executive Policy-Making and Cabinet Formation in the Americas’, Comparative Political Studies, vol.39, no.6, 2006
· Huber, John D. (1996), ‘The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies’ American Political Science Review, Vol.90, No.2, pp.269-282.
· Feigenbaum, Harvey, Richard Samuels, and R. Kent Weaver (1993), ‘Innovation, Coordination, and Implementation in Energy Policy’, in R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 42-109.
· Cowhey, Peter F., ‘Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States’, International Organization 47, no. 2 , spring 1993, 299-326.

(c) Regime type and the survival of democracy
· Lijphart, Arend ed. (1992), Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, (a collection of abridged relevant articles, including those from Linz, Duverger, Horowitz and Lipset) or:
· Linz, Juan J., ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’, Journal of Democracy 1, no. 1, winter 1990.
· Horowitz, Donald, ‘Comparing Democratic Systems’, Journal of Democracy 1, no. 4, fall 1990. (Both at SSL Staff Desk.)
· Cheibub, Jose Antonio (2007), Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Democracy.
· Przeworski, Adam et al., ‘What Makes Democracies Endure?’ Journal of Democracy 7, no. 1 winter 1996, 39-55.
· Svolik, Milan (2008), “Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation”, American Political Science Review, vol. 102, no. 2.
· Shugart, Matthew (1995), ‘Parliaments over Presidents?’ Journal of Democracy 6 (2): 169-72.
· Stepan, Alfred and Cindy Skach (1993), ‘Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic
Consolidation’ World Politics 46.
· Mainwaring, Scott, and Shugart M.S. (1997), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America.
· Sartori, Giovanni (1997), Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, 2nd edition, Basingstoke: Macmillan, chs. 5-7.
· Bernhard, Michael, Timothy Nordstrom, and Christopher Reenock, ‘Economic Performance, Institutional Intermediation, and Democratic Survival’, Journal of Politics 63, no. 3, August 2001, 775-803. (more)

HT10 - Philosophy of Social Sciences Classes

Link to PDF
2 Classes (1st Week and 3rd Week) + Coursework due 0th Week TT10

Notes. (more)

TT10 - Tutorial 2 - Principal Agent Theory

QUESTION 2: ‘Principal-agent theory is useful for framing questions, not for answering them.' Discuss.

See the departmental reading list reading list for Hilary Week 7(a) . You might also take a look at:

Overview

Horn, Murray J (1995) The Political Economy of Public Administration, 1995

Miller, G.J., The political evolution of principal-agent models, Annual Review of Political Science, 8: 203-225, 2005

Waterman, Richard W. and Kenneth J. Meier, "Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?" Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 8 (April): 173-202, 1998

Lane, Jan-Erik, Public Administration and Public Management: The Principal-Agent Perspective, 2005

Application of the theory


Krause, G A. and K J. Meier (eds.), Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy, esp. the Conclusion, 2003

Special issue of the European Journal of Political Research, 37 (3), 2000

Weingast, Barry “The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal-agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)” in Public Choice 44 1984 pp. 147–88

Weingast and Moran “Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? “Regulatory policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission” in Journal of. Political Economy 91 1983 pp. 765–800

McCubbins, M, Noll and Weingast “Administrative Procedures and Political Control” in Journal of Law Economics and Organization 1987 3 (2) pp. 243-279

Banks, J.S. and Weingast B.R. “The Political Control of Bureaucracies Under Asymmetric Information” American Journal of Political Science 1992 36(2)

Huwang, Y. “Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economics Perspective” in Political Studies: 2002 Vol. 50 pp. 61–79. (more)

TT10 - Tutorial 1 - Cultural Analysis

Paul Chaisty

QUESTION 1: Does cultural analysis of political behaviour enhance or undermine the comparative method?


See the departmental reading list reading list for Hilary Week 6. You might also take a look at:

Kohli, A. et. al, ‘The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium’, World Politics,
48: 1-49, 1995
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/25053951.pdf

MacIntyre, Alasdair, 'Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?' in his Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy, 1984.

(Other paper - Przeworski - Is the science of comparative politics possible - might be worth constrasting it with the macintyre one - http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/isthescience.pdf (more)

Ruggie (1998) Constructing the World Polity

Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalisation (New International Relations)

Notes. (more)

Peterson, Paul E (1995) The Price of Federalism

Peterson, Paul E (1995) The Price of Federalism
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Wachendorfer-Schmidt, Ute ed (2000) Federalism and Political Performance

Wachendorfer-Schmidt, Ute ed (2000) Federalism and Political Performance
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Watts, Ronald (1996), Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s

Watts, Ronald (1996), Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s
Available - Google Docs 1, Google Docs 2

Notes. (more)

Scharpf, Fritz (1988) ‘The Joint-Decision Trap

Scharpf, Fritz (1988) ‘The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from West German Federalism and European Integration’ Public Administration 66
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Nicolaidis, Kalypso and Robert Howse (2001) The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union

Nicolaidis, Kalypso and Robert Howse (2001) The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Stepan (2004) Electorally generated Veto Players in Unitary and Federal Systems

Stepan, Alfred “Electorally generated Veto Players in Unitary and Federal Systems” in Edward Gibson ed. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America pp323-355
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Dahl, Robert Democracy and Its Critics pp193-209 or Dahl, 1986 “Federalism and the Democratic Process’

Dahl, Robert Democracy and Its Critics pp193-209 or Dahl, 1986 “Federalism and the
Democratic Process’ in Democracy, Identity and Equality
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Bunce (2003) Federalism and Territorial Cleavages

Bunce, Valerie 2003 in Ugo Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo eds. Federalism and Territorial Cleavages
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Bermeo, Nancy 2002 The Import of Institutions

Bermeo, Nancy 2002 The Import of Institutions J D April , vol 13.no 2 pp 96-110
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Jonathan Rodden. “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and Measurement,”

Jonathan Rodden. “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and
Measurement,” Comparative Politics. 36, 4 (2004).
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Riker (1964) Federalism

William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964, chapt 1 and Chpt 2 sectionsI-III.
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Gibson, Edward (2004) “Federalism and Democracy” in Edward Gibson ed. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America

Gibson, Edward (2004) “Federalism and Democracy” in Edward Gibson ed. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America pp1-27
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Stepan, A (1999) ‘Federalism and Democracy Beyond the US Model’

Stepan, A (1999) ‘Federalism and Democracy Beyond the US Model’, J D, 10: 19-34
Available - PDF Link

Notes. (more)

Riker, William H (1975) ‘Federalism’

Riker, William H (1975) ‘Federalism’ in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby eds Handbook of Political Science, Vol 5
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Elazar, Daniel (1997) ‘Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems’

Elazar, Daniel (1997) ‘Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems’ IPSR vol 18 no3 pp237-251
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

HT10 - Week 1 - Federalism

Aim of the session: To understand the varied origins, forms and effects of federalism.
Discussion topics
(a) Why, and how, do federal systems come into being?
(b) What are the patterns of democratic federalism?
(b) How do the effects of these different patterns of democratic federalism vary and why?

Readings:
(a) Origins and Patterns
· Elazar, Daniel (1997) ‘Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems’ IPSR vol 18 no3 pp237-251
· Riker, William H (1975) ‘Federalism’ in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby eds Handbook of Political Science, Vol 5
· Stepan, A (1999) ‘Federalism and Democracy Beyond the US Model’, J D, 10: 19-34

(b) Varieties and Effects
· Gibson, Edward (2004) “Federalism and Democracy” in Edward Gibson ed. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America pp1-27
· Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison and John Jay.. The Federalist Papers, 10 and 51.
· William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964, chapt 1 and Chpt 2 sectionsI-III.
· Jonathan Rodden. “Comparative Federalism and Decentralization: On Meaning and
Measurement,” Comparative Politics. 36, 4 (2004).
· Bermeo, Nancy 2002 The Import of Institutions J D April , vol 13.no 2 pp 96-110
· Bunce, Valerie 2003 in Ugo Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo eds. Federalism and Territorial Cleavages
· Rodden, Jonathan 2006 Hamilton’s Paradox The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism
· Dahl, Robert Democracy and Its Critics pp193-209 or Dahl, 1986 “Federalism and the
Democratic Process’ in Democracy, Identity and Equality
· Stepan, Alfred “Electorally generated Veto Players in Unitary and Federal Systems” in Edward Gibson ed. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America pp323-355
· Stepan, Alfred (2001), ‘Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism: (Multi)-Nationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism, ch 15 in Stepan, A, Arguing Comparative Politics
· Elazar, Daniel (1991) Exploring Federalism
· Forsyth, Murray (1989) Federalism and Nationalism
· Hesse, Jens and Wright, Vincent eds (1995) Federalizing Europe?
· Peterson, Paul E (1995) The Price of Federalism (a focus on the US)
· Kelemen, Daniel (2004) The Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU Chapt 1
· Nicolaidis, Kalypso and Robert Howse (2001) The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union
· Scharpf, Fritz (1988) ‘The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from West German Federalism and European Integration’ Public Administration 66
· Wheare, Kenneth (4th ed 1963) Federal Government
· Wachendorfer-Schmidt, Ute ed (2000) Federalism and Political Performance
· Watts, Ronald (1996), Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s
· Braun, D (ed) (2000), Public Policy and Federalism (2000) (more)

HT10 - Tutorial Week 7 - Parliamentary vs Presidential Regimes

QUESTION 2: In what ways, if any, does the distinction between parliamentary and presidential regimes advance the comparative analysis of political systems?

See the departmental reading list for Hilary Week 3. You might also take a look at:

Robert Elgie, ‘From Linz to Tsebelis: Three Waves of Presidential/Parliamentary Studies?’, Democratization, 12: 1 (2005), pp. 106-122 (more)

HT 10 - Tutorial Week 3 - Judicialism and Democracy

QUESTION 1: 'In practice courts do not try to overturn major aspects of a government's policies, so that to talk of their having political power is misleading.' Discuss.

See the departmental reading list for Hilary Week 2 (a). You might also take a look at:

Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Bonchek, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Insitutions, ch. 15

George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, pp. 225-235 (more)

TT10 - Intro to Comp Gov III - Paul Chaisty

QUESTION 1: Does cultural analysis of political behaviour enhance or undermine the comparative method?

QUESTION 2: ‘Principal-agent theory is useful for framing questions, not for answering them.' Discuss. (more)

HT10 - Intro to Comp Gov II - Paul Chaisty

QUESTION 1: 'In practice courts do not try to overturn major aspects of a government's policies, so that to talk of their having political power is misleading.' Discuss.

QUESTION 2: In what ways, if any, does the distinction between parliamentary and presidential regimes advance the comparative analysis of political systems? (more)

HT10 - Political Institutions Programme

9. Federalism Cindy Skach (cindy.skach@politics.ox.ac.uk)
10. Rights, Politics and Judicialisation Cindy Skach (cindy.skach@politics.ox.ac.uk)
11. Presidentialism and Parliamentarism Petra Schleiter (petra.schleiter@politics.ox.ac.uk)
12. Cabinet Formation Petra Schleiter (petra.schleiter@politics.ox.ac.uk)
13. Agency, Leadership, and Politics Scott Blinder (scott.blinder@politics.ox.ac.uk)
14. Culture and Democracy. Cindy Skach (cindy.skach@politics.ox.ac.uk)
15. Institutions and Rational Choice Ray Duch (raymond.duch@politics.ox.ac.uk)
16. Institutionalist Theories of Political
Economy: Varieties of Capitalism
Stewart Wood (stewart.wood@politics.ox.ac.uk)

(more)

Tate, C Neal and Vallinder, Torbjörn eds (1995), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power

Tate, C Neal and Vallinder, Torbjörn eds (1995), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Stone Sweet (2002), ‘Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy’

Stone Sweet (2002), ‘Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy’, West European Politics 25 (1): 77-100
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Shapiro and Sweet (2002) On Law, Politics and Judicialization

Shapiro, Martin, and Alec Stone Sweet (2002), On Law, Politics and Judicialization, Oxford: OUP.
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Schwartz (2000), The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe

Schwartz, Herman (2000), The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Guarnieri, Carlo, and Patrizia Pederzoli (2002), The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy

Guarnieri, Carlo, and Patrizia Pederzoli (2002), The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy, introduction and ch 3
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Garrett, Kelemen & Schulz (1998) The ECJ

Garrett, Geoffrey, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Heiner Schulz, ‘The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union’, International Organization 52, no. 1 (winter 1998), 149-176.
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Dworkin (1977) Taking Rights Seriously

Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously, pp. esp. 90-94 and Chapter 7.
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Whittington, Keith E. (1999), Constitutional Construction

Whittington, Keith E. (1999), Constitutional Construction
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Sunstein (1993) Against Positive Rights

Sunstein, Cass. “Against Positive Rights,” East European Constitutional Review, Vol 2, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 35-38.
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Rosenberg, Gerald (1991), The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?

Rosenberg, Gerald (1991), The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Kelemen (2001) The Limits of Judicial Power

Kelemen, R. Dan (2001), ‘The Limits of Judicial Power’, CPS, 34:6, pp. 622-650
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Gloppen et al (2003) - The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies.

Gloppen, Siri et al. Democratization 10:4 (winter 2003) – special issue on Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies.
Available -

Notes. (more)

Gillman (2002) How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas

Gillman, Howard (2002), ‘How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the US 1875-1891’, APSR 96 (3): 511-524
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Epp (1998) The Rights Revolution

Epp, Charles R. (1998), The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in
Comparative Perspective, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

Notes. (more)

Benhabib (2004) The Rights of Others

Benhabib, S. The Rights of Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 1-24, and 171-22
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Barak (2005) A Purposive Interpretation in Law

Barak, A. Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), “Introduction.”
Available - Google Docs

Notes. (more)

Barak (2002) A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy

Barak, A. “A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,” Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 116, November 2002.
Available - Google Docs (the 1997 article of the same title)
(Also the HLR article)

Notes. (more)

HT10 - Week 2 - Rights, Judicial Politics and Judicialisation

Aim of the session: To explore how to understand and explain the role of rights, courts, and judges, and the scope and extent of their influence, in democratic politics..

Discussion topics:
(a) Do courts play a unique or especially powerful role in constitutional politics?
(b) How far has ‘judicialisation’ progressed and why?
(c) Are there any affinities between particular rights, on the one hand, and specific institutional
configurations, on the other hand?

Readings:
(a) Judges as political actors, and the relationship between rights, courts and other institutions
· Barak, A. “A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 116, November 2002.
· Barak, A. Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), “Introduction.”
· Benhabib, S. The Rights of Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 1-24, and 171-22.
· Epp, Charles R. (1998), The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in
Comparative Perspective, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
· Gillman, Howard (2002), ‘How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas:
Federal Courts in the US 1875-1891’, APSR 96 (3): 511-524
· Gloppen, Siri et al. Democratization 10:4 (winter 2003) – special issue on Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies.
· Kelemen, R. Dan (2001), ‘The Limits of Judicial Power’, CPS, 34:6, pp. 622-650
· Rosenberg, Gerald (1991), The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
· Sunstein, Cass. “Against Positive Rights,” East European Constitutional Review, Vol 2, No. 1
(Winter 1993), pp. 35-38.
· Whittington, Keith E. (1999), Constitutional Construction.

b) Judicialisation
· Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously, pp. esp. 90-94 and Chapter 7.
· Garrett, Geoffrey, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Heiner Schulz, ‘The European Court of Justice,
National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union’, International Organization 52, no. 1 (winter 1998), 149-176.
· Guarnieri, Carlo, and Patrizia Pederzoli (2002), The Power of Judges: A Comparative Study of
Courts and Democracy, introduction and ch 3
· Schwartz, Herman (2000), The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe
· Shapiro, Martin, and Alec Stone Sweet (2002), On Law, Politics and Judicialization, Oxford:
OUP.
· Stone Sweet, A. (2000), Governing with Judges OR
. Stone Sweet (2002), ‘Constitutional Courts and Parliamentary Democracy’, West European Politics 25 (1): 77-100
· Tate, C Neal and Vallinder, Torbjörn eds (1995), The Global Expansion of Judicial Power.. (more)

Fishkin (2009) When the People Speak

Available SSL - JC423.FIS 2009 (confined). Notes. (more)

Lectures for HT10

Check this list http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/teaching/resources/lecture_list/HT10%20Lecture%20List.pdf

Need to find out what group in for the classes (more)

Epp (1998) The rights revolution:

Available SSL - K3240.4.EPP
Reading List: HT10 Week 2
Epp, Charles R. (1998), The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists and Supreme Courts in
Comparative Perspective, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Notes. (more)

Barak (2005) Purposive interpretation in Law

Available SSL - K295.H4.BAR 2005
Reading list - HT10 week 2. (introduction)

Notes. (more)

Mearsheimer and Walt (1997) The Israel lobby and U.S. foreign policy

Available SSL - E183.8.I7.MEA, Union - 327.730 569 4 MEA. And here is the rest of it. (more)